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ABSTRACT 
The flexibility in power system networks is not fully modeled in existing real-time 
contingency analysis (RTCA) and real-time security-constrained economic dispatch 
(RT SCED) applications. Thus, corrective transmission switching (CTS) is proposed in 
this dissertation to enable RTCA and RT SCED to take advantage of the flexibility in 
the transmission system in a practical way. 
RTCA is first conducted to identify critical contingencies that may cause viola-
tions. Then, for each critical contingency, CTS is performed to determine the beneficial 
switching actions that can reduce post-contingency violations. To reduce computational 
burden, fast heuristic algorithms are proposed to generate candidate switching lists. Nu-
merical simulations performed on three large-scale realistic power systems (TVA, ER-
COT, and PJM) demonstrate that CTS can significantly reduce post-contingency vio-
lations. Parallel computing can further reduce the solution time. 
RT SCED is to eliminate the actual overloads and potential post-contingency over-
loads identified by RTCA. Procedure-A, which is consistent with existing industry 
practices, is proposed to connect RTCA and RT SCED. As CTS can reduce post-con-
tingency violations, higher branch limits, referred to as pseudo limits, may be available 
for some contingency-case network constraints. Thus, Procedure-B is proposed to take 
advantage of the reliability benefits provided by CTS. With the proposed Procedure-B, 
CTS can be modeled in RT SCED implicitly through the proposed pseudo limits for 
contingency-case network constraints, which requires no change to existing RT SCED 
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tools. Numerical simulations demonstrate that the proposed Procedure-A can effec-
tively eliminate the flow violations reported by RTCA and that the proposed Procedure-
B can reduce most of the congestion cost with consideration of CTS. 
The system status may be inaccurately estimated due to false data injection (FDI) 
cyber-attacks, which may mislead operators to adjust the system improperly and cause 
network violations. Thus, a two-stage FDI detection (FDID) approach, along with sev-
eral metrics and an alert system, is proposed in this dissertation to detect FDI attacks. 
The first stage is to determine whether the system is under attack and the second stage 
would identify the target branch. Numerical simulations demonstrate the effectiveness 
of the proposed two-stage FDID approach. 
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𝑄𝑘0,𝑡𝑜  Initial reactive power on branch k flowing out of the to-bus. 
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𝑝𝑘  Cyber flow on branch k. 
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𝑃𝑚𝑛  Active power flowing from bus m to bus n. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
A power system is an electrical network of interconnected elements that are used 
to generate, transmit, and consume electric power. It consists of, but not limited to, 
generators, loads, transmission lines, transformers, phase shifters, circuit breakers, and 
shunts. High voltage direct current lines may exist in some power systems. 
The prime function of an electrical network is to transmit and distribute power. The 
voltage level varies from several hundred volts to around one thousand kilovolts (kV). 
A power system network can be divided into two portions: a high-voltage level trans-
mission subsystem and a low-voltage level distribution subsystem. 
The asset value of infrastructure in the North American power system represents 
more than 1 trillion United States (U.S.) dollars. The electricity grid of the United States 
contains over 360,000 miles of transmission lines including around 180,000 miles of 
high-voltage lines and connects to over 6,000 power plants in 2012 [1]. Reference [1] 
also reports that: 1) in 2011, the global power generation capacity, which grows by 2% 
annually, is about five trillion watts; 2) the two countries that have the largest genera-
tion capacity are the United States and China, each of which accounts for approximately 
20% of the world’s total installed capacity; 3) the generation capacity in China will 
increase by about 3% per year through 2035 while the capacity growth in the United 
States is less than 1% during the same period. 
Only 10% of the energy consumption in America was used to produce electricity 
in 1940; this percentage increased to 25% in 1970 and it was around 40% in 2003 [2]. 
This implies the efficiency of electricity as a source for supplying energy is increasing. 
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As introduced in [3], 56% of the electricity generated in the United States in 2012 was 
provided by coal-fired power plants and nuclear power plants. 
There are more than 3,100 electric companies, utilities, and regulation organiza-
tions in the United States. For instance, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC) regulates interstate transmission networks and energy markets [4]; North 
American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) ensures the reliability of the power 
systems in North America by developing reliability standards [5]. 
Independent System Operators (ISOs) were created under FERC Order 888 and 
Order 889. The goal of the ISOs is to meet the requirements of providing unbiased open 
access to transmission. Subsequently, FERC issued Order 2000 that presents the re-
quirements to be a Regional Transmission Organization (RTO). Voluntary formation 
of RTO was encouraged by FERC to manage the regional transmission network [6]. 
The ISOs/RTOs in the United States include California ISO (CAISO), New York ISO 
(NYISO), ISO New England (ISO-NE), Midcontinent ISO (MISO), PJM Interconnec-
tion (PJM), Southwest Power Pool, and Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT). 
Note that ERCOT is governed by the Public Utility Commission of Texas rather than 
FERC. 
1.1 Background 
As energy cannot be economically stored on a large scale, electricity must be pro-
duced, transported, and consumed at the same time. Therefore, it is very challenging to 
maintain reliable real-time operations of power systems. Failure of any element may 
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have a negative effect on the normal operations of power systems. Hence, it is essential 
to improve power system security and reliability. 
Power systems are built with some degree of redundancy due to concerns regarding 
power system security. In addition, a number of mandatory standards for power system 
reliability have been developed recently. Complying with these standards makes the 
system less susceptible. However, power systems are complex and dynamical in nature, 
which makes it hard to operate them properly. Uncertainty such as load fluctuation 
makes it more difficult to maintain power system security in real-time. Thus, power 
system real-time secure operations have gained increased attention. Operators are 
forced to make preventive adjustments in advance or take just-in-time corrective actions 
in order to maintain power system security in the event of a disturbance. 
System security consists of three major functions [7], which includes: 
• System monitoring, 
• Contingency analysis, 
• Security-constrained economic dispatch (SCED). 
These are key functions of energy management systems (EMSs) used in modern power 
systems. The system monitoring function determines the system condition and provides 
a base for contingency analysis and security-constrained economic dispatch. Contin-
gency analysis identifies potential post-contingency violations, which will be corrected 
by SCED. 
The system monitoring function receives data from remote terminal units or local 
control centers and then performs state estimation (SE) to determine the real-time status 
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of the system, including bus voltage magnitude and angle. Thus, with this function, 
system operators will be informed immediately when branch overloads and voltage 
limit violations occur. It provides system operators with the actual real-time system 
condition, as well as a base case for other real-time applications. 
Contingency analysis evaluates the impact of a potential contingency on system 
security. Contingency analysis when simulated in real-time is referred to as real-time 
contingency analysis (RTCA). With the results obtained from RTCA, the system can 
operate defensively in real-time. A contingency may cause serious consequences in a 
short time and operators may not have sufficient time to react to the contingency, pre-
vent the situation from getting worse, and restore the system. Thus, the goal of RTCA 
is to enable system operators to be better prepared with pre-planned strategies to deal 
with potential critical contingencies. 
SCED aims to provide a least-cost re-dispatch solution for online units while meet-
ing the network constraints as well as other restrictions. When simulated in real-time, 
SCED is referred to as real-time SCED (RT SCED). Actual network violations obtained 
from state estimation or base-case power flow and potential post-contingency network 
violations obtained from RTCA will be sent to RT SCED as network constraints and 
are supposed to be eliminated with the new dispatch point obtained from RT SCED in 
the post-SCED steady state. 
1.2 Motivation 
Power system operations need to satisfy physical constraints such as Kirchhoff's 
laws and comply with reliability standards. Improper real-time operations may result in 
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system violations, islanding, irreversible damage to electrical equipment, and in the 
worst-case a blackout. Therefore, improving system reliability in real-time operations 
is very important. This dissertation focuses on reliability enhancements for real-time 
operations of electric power systems. 
The ISOs typically use energy management systems to help system operators mon-
itor and manage the system in real-time. Key functions of the EMS include system 
monitoring, RTCA, and RT SCED. System monitoring observes the system condition 
and provides a base case for all other real-time applications. RTCA identifies critical 
contingencies and the associated violations and forms network constraints for RT 
SCED. RT SCED produces a generation re-dispatch solution that would eliminate the 
actual base-case network constraints and the potential contingency-case network viola-
tions identified by RTCA and meet all the system requirements at least cost. 
Electrical networks are built with some level of redundancy due to security con-
cerns. They are traditionally considered as static assets in power system real-time op-
erations. However, the flexibility in electrical network has not been fully utilized and 
reflected in existing operational tools. Prior research efforts have illustrated that trans-
mission switching (TS) can provide a variety of benefits for power system operations. 
Transmission switching is a control strategy that switches a branch out of service to 
achieve a particular goal. 
Though transmission switching has not been widely used as a regular strategy in 
reality, it is being used as an emergency corrective control scheme for some parties, 
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which is referred to as corrective TS (CTS). The switching actions are mainly deter-
mined based on ad-hoc methods and it is unclear how CTS would improve and fit in 
existing operational applications. In this dissertation, the reliability enhancements pro-
vided by CTS are investigated and a systematic procedure is proposed in order to inte-
grate CTS into RTCA and RT SCED. The proposed integrating procedure will require 
minimal change to existing operational tools. 
Given a base case, provided by the system monitoring function of EMS, RTCA 
will first execute and identify critical contingencies that are to be sent to the CTS rou-
tine. Several heuristic approaches are proposed to generate a ranked candidate switch-
ing list. Five beneficial switching actions, which would reduce or eliminate the post-
contingency violations, are identified for each of those critical contingencies. Numeri-
cal simulations on three large-scale practical systems demonstrate the effectiveness of 
CTS. Simulation results also show that parallel computing can speed up the entire pro-
cess including both contingency analysis routine and transmission switching routine. 
Modeling CTS in RT SCED directly will largely increase the computational time, 
which makes it impossible for real-time applications. In this dissertation, a practical 
heuristic is proposed to capture the benefits provided by CTS in RT SCED, as a result 
of which existing RT SCED model can remain the same. With the proposed heuristic, 
the branch limits of the network constraints that are sent from RTCA to RT SCED 
would increase, which can then reduce congestion cost significantly and enable RT 
SCED to obtain a solution with a lower total cost. The increased limit is referred to as 
a pseudo limit; and a SCED with pseudo limits is referred to as an enhanced SCED (E-
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SCED) in this dissertation. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed E-SCED 
approach can reduce congestion cost significantly and the CTS actions identified for a 
critical contingency in the pre-SCED situation can still reduce the violations under the 
same contingency in the post-SCED situation. 
As stated above, state estimation estimates the system condition and provides a 
starting point for RTCA and RT SCED. Thus, it is very important to ensure the correct-
ness of state estimation. Bad data detection and identification can filter out large ran-
dom measurement errors. However, malicious false data injection (FDI) cyber-attacks 
can bypass traditional bad data detection and cause branch overloads that are not ob-
served by system operators. Thus, it is vital to develop a strategy that can effectively 
detect FDI attacks in real-time. Several metrics that monitor abnormal load deviations 
and flow changes are proposed in this dissertation. Qualitative analysis can be con-
ducted with the proposed FDI cyber-attack alert system. A systematic two-stage FDID 
approach is proposed to determine whether the system is under attack and identify the 
target branch. Case studies validate the proposed metrics, alert system, and systematic 
two-stage FDID approach. 
1.3 Summary of Contents 
The rest of this dissertation is structured as follows. A thorough literature review 
is presented in Chapter 2. In this chapter, power flow studies are first presented, fol-
lowed by a comprehensive introduction of contingency analysis. Then, a systematic 
review of past transmission switching research is presented, as well as a detailed review 
on economic dispatch and false data injection cyber-attack and detection. At the end of 
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this chapter, an overview of general parallel computing technology and its various ap-
plications in the power system area are presented. 
Chapter 3 focuses on RTCA only. The RTCA model used in this dissertation is 
first introduced, followed by a discussion on the contingency list as well as the defini-
tion of critical contingencies. Case studies show that three large-scale practical systems 
are vulnerable to several contingencies. Parallel computing is also conducted to speed 
up the contingency analysis process. 
In Chapter 4, the fundamentals of how transmission switching benefits the system 
are introduced and the metrics for defining a beneficial switching action are proposed. 
Heuristic algorithms are proposed to generate a list of candidate switching branches. 
Numerical simulations are then presented to demonstrate the effectiveness of CTS. It is 
shown that CTS is a promising strategy in industry. Parallel computing enhances this 
viewpoint by further reducing the solution time. 
Chapter 5 first presents how the network constraints are obtained from RTCA and 
then introduces a typical RT SCED model used in industry. The procedure of consid-
ering CTS in RT SCED is described in detail. Multiple RT SCED models with different 
forms of network constraints are simulated and compared. With the most precise SCED 
model, the effects of CTS on SCED results are investigated. The benefits of CTS are 
also validated by running RTCA with a different base case representing the post-SCED 
situation. Case studies show that the congestion cost can be reduced significantly with 
CTS. 
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Chapter 6 studies cyber-physical system security. The effects of FDI attacks on 
power systems are examined and it is shown that FDI can result in physical flow viola-
tions. Several metrics are proposed in this chapter, as well as an FDI cyber-attack alert 
system. The proposed metrics can monitor malicious load deviations as well as suspi-
cious flow changes. A systematic two-stage FDID approach is proposed to detect po-
tential FDI attacks. Cases studies demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed two-
stage FDID approach. 
Chapter 7 concludes this dissertation and potential future work is presented in 
Chapter 8. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Power Flow Studies 
In power system engineering, a power flow study is the basis for steady-state anal-
ysis of the interconnected system. There are transmission system power flow studies 
and distribution system power flow studies. This dissertation only focuses on transmis-
sion system power flow studies. Thus, the system can be assumed to be three-phase 
balanced and only positive sequence network is modeled. Single-line diagrams and the 
per unit system are used to simply the analysis. The pi-equivalent circuit model is typ-
ically used to represent branches. Then, a power flow problem can be solved through 
computer programs under those assumptions and the information listed below will be 
reported: 
• voltage magnitude and phase angle at each bus, 
• active power injection and reactive power injection at each bus, 
• active power flows and reactive power flows on each branch. 
Two widely used models are the full AC power flow model and the simplified DC 
power flow model, which will be presented below. The power flow models are used for 
solving most problems in the power system domain. Hence, power flow studies are 
remarkably important for various power system applications including RTCA, RT 
SCED, and the proposed CTS. Note that RTCA and CTS implemented in this disserta-
tion use the AC power flow model while RT SCED uses the DC power flow model. 
AC feasibility of the solutions obtained from RT SCED is verified through AC power 
flow simulations. 
11 
 
 
Fig. 2.1 shows the single-line diagram of a typical two-terminal circuit, which is 
an essential component of a transmission network. Note that P and Q denote active 
power and reactive power respectively. The power flowing out of one terminal does not 
equal to the power flowing into the other terminal because of the losses on the branch 
connecting those two buses, which means that 𝑃𝑚𝑛 ≠ −𝑃𝑛𝑚 and 𝑄𝑚𝑛 ≠ −𝑄𝑛𝑚. The 
branch power flow equations are shown below, 
𝑃𝑚𝑛 = 𝑉𝑚
2𝑔𝑚𝑛 − 𝑉𝑚𝑉𝑛(𝑔𝑚𝑛 cos 𝜃𝑚𝑛 + 𝑏𝑚𝑛 sin 𝜃𝑚𝑛)  (2.1) 
𝑄𝑚𝑛 = −𝑉𝑚
2 (𝑏𝑚𝑛 +
𝑏𝑚𝑛0
2
) + 𝑉𝑚𝑉𝑛(𝑏𝑚𝑛 cos 𝜃𝑚𝑛 − 𝑔𝑚𝑛 sin 𝜃𝑚𝑛)  (2.2) 
where, 
𝑦𝑚𝑛 = 𝑔𝑚𝑛 + 𝑗𝑏𝑚𝑛 =
1
𝑧𝑚𝑛
=
𝑟𝑚𝑛−𝑗𝑥𝑚𝑛
𝑟𝑚𝑛
2 +𝑥𝑚𝑛
2     (2.3) 
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Fig. 2.1 Single-Line Diagram of a Two-Terminal Circuit. 
 
Fig. 2.2 shows a single-line equivalent diagram of a transformer. A transformer is 
typically represented by a pi-equivalent circuit and an ideal transformer. The tap ratio 
is tm for bus m and is one for the nominal end n. 𝑏𝑚𝑛0,𝑚 and 𝑏𝑚𝑛0,𝑛 are the magnetizing 
susceptances. In this dissertation, they are set equal for simplification. The power flow 
equations for transformers can be derived by replacing 𝑉𝑚 with 𝑉𝑚/𝑡𝑚 and replacing 
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𝑏𝑚𝑛0/2 with 𝑏𝑚𝑛0,𝑚 in the transmission power flow equations (2.1) and (2.2). For a 
phase shifting transformer, an extra modification is to replace 𝜃𝑚𝑛 with 𝜃𝑚𝑛 − 𝜃𝑚𝑛,𝑠, 
where 𝜃𝑚𝑛,𝑠 is the phase angle setting of this phase shifting transformer. 
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Fig. 2.2 Single-Line Equivalent Diagram of a Transformer. 
 
2.1.1 AC Power Flow 
A number of different AC power flow algorithms have been developed in the lit-
erature [8]-[9]. Several well-known iterative approaches include Gauss-Seidel method, 
Newton-Raphson method, and fast decoupled power flow (FDPF) method. There are 
three basic types of buses: PV buses, PQ buses, and slack buses. 
A PV bus is a bus that has the capability of controlling its voltage magnitude and 
it is usually a generator bus or a bus whose voltage magnitude is controlled by nearby 
generators or other devices such as switched shunts and static VAR compensator. A PQ 
bus is typically a load bus or a connection bus. A slack bus should be a bus where there 
is a large amount of generation capacity. For some power flow algorithms including the 
Newton-Raphson method, a normal assumption is that the slack bus is used to balance 
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the generation and demand. A slack bus is also referred to as the swing bus, angle ref-
erence bus, or just 𝑉𝜃 bus. 
In a power flow study, the voltage magnitude and voltage angle at a slack bus are 
fixed; the active power and voltage magnitude at PV buses remain the same; and the 
active power and reactive power at PQ buses are fixed. The generator reactive power 
output Q will adjust automatically to maintain the voltage set point. In reality, the reac-
tive power output Q has its minimum limit and maximum limit. Therefore, a PV bus 
may have to switch to a PQ bus when the Q at that bus reaches its limit. Another strategy 
for not violating generators’ reactive power limits is to adjust the voltage set values at 
the PV buses when the associated reactive power capacity constraints are violated [8]. 
Gauss-Seidel Method 
The Gauss-Seidel approach was the first method to solve the power flow problem 
on digital computers [8]. Although each iteration of this approach is fast, it is slow 
overall since it typically takes many iterations before it converges with the desired ac-
curacy. It may fail to converge when the system contains negative reactance branches 
(compensated transmission lines). The determination of the initial point is critical for 
the algorithm convergence. 
Newton-Raphson Method 
The robust and reliable Newton-Raphson approach is widely used in practice for 
solving the power flow problem. The key of this approach is to create the Jacobian 
matrix based on the nodal power mismatch functions; then a set of linear equations are 
solved simultaneously to obtain an updated solution. This process repeats itself until 
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the specified stopping criteria are satisfied or the maximum number of iterations is 
reached. State variables have to be updated between each iteration, as well as the Jaco-
bian matrix. The converged solution may be different with different starting points. 
Fast Decoupled Power Flow 
The fast decoupled power flow algorithm is developed based on the Newton-
Raphson method. The Newton-Raphson method is robust but it may be slow as the 
Jacobian matrix has to be updated per iteration, which accounts for a significant percent 
of the total computational time. 
Considering the fact that transmission branches typically have high reactance-to-
resistance (X/R) ratios, the Newton-Raphson method can be simplified to accelerate 
convergence. One popular simplified method is the fast decoupled power flow method, 
which was originally proposed in [9] in 1974. Therefore, another term for FDPF is the 
Stott decoupled power flow method, named after the first author of [9]. After FDPF 
was first proposed, it has been further enhanced to make the algorithm more robust. 
The assumptions of standard FDPF method include that 1) the interaction between 
active power and voltage magnitude is neglected, 2) the interaction between reactive 
power and voltage angle is neglected, and 3) the angle difference across a branch is 
small enough such that the associated cosine value can be assumed to be one. Assump-
tions 1) and 2) are based on engineering experience and observations: the voltage mag-
nitude would not be significantly affected by the active power and the voltage angle 
will not change much due to change in reactive power. 
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The power flow converges when both the active power unbalance and the reactive 
power unbalance of each bus are less than the predefined tolerances. Though the toler-
ances for active power convergence and reactive power convergence are usually set to 
the same values, they do not have to be identical. 
The above standard FDPF method is called the XB method. Another similar 
method is known as the BX method. The BX method may have a better convergence 
performance than the XB method when the system contains transmission lines with low 
X/R ratio [10]. The Jacobian matrix of the FDPF approach is constant. Thus, the calcu-
lation and factorization of the constant Jacobian matrix are conducted only once at the 
beginning of the algorithm and they can be directly used by all following iterations. 
Therefore, the FDPF approach can reduce the computation time per iteration. However, 
more iterations may be required to reach the desired precision. 
The FDPF approach also uses the Newton’s method. The difference between the 
FDPF and Newton-Raphson methods is that their correction equations are different. 
The Newton’s method is used in the FDPF approach to solve two sets of equations with 
reduced dimension while the Newton-Raphson method solves the correction equations 
with full dimension. 
2.1.2 DC Power Flow 
Though a full AC model based power flow study is accurate, it is complex and hard 
to solve due to its non-linearity and non-convexity characteristics. When reactive power 
and voltage magnitude are not of concern, an approximate DC model can be used for 
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solving power flow problems. The simplification of an AC model into a DC model is 
illustrated below. 
First of all, reactive power is ignored in the FDPF approach. Furthermore, with the 
assumption that voltage magnitude has little effect on active power, the voltage magni-
tude of each bus is simply set to one. Then, the simplified transmission power flow 
equation is as follows, 
𝑃𝑚𝑛 =
𝜃𝑚𝑛
𝑥𝑚𝑛
      (2.4) 
The DC power flow model can be used to obtain information regarding the active 
power and voltage angle in high-voltage transmission networks. By using the approxi-
mate DC model instead of the accurate AC model, the non-linearity and non-convexity 
of the AC model can be avoided. Therefore, the DC model is widely used in many areas 
such as transmission expansion planning, maintenance scheduling, day-ahead unit com-
mitment, and real-time economic dispatch (RTED). 
Note that the branches of a distribution network typically do not have high ratio 
X/R. As a result, the DC model may not be accurate for a distribution network. It is 
worth mentioning that this DC power flow model is used to model an alternating current 
network rather than a direct current network. 
2.1.3 Linearized AC Power Flow 
Though the DC power flow model is widely used in the electric power industry, 
especially in the energy markets areas, it is not as accurate as the AC power flow model 
[11]. Hot-start 𝛼-matching and h-matching power flow methods can provide much 
more precise results in comparison with cold-start DC power flow method [11]-[12]. 
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However, those methods do not capture the information about reactive power and volt-
age magnitude. Linearized AC power flow models can incorporate reactive power and 
voltage magnitude while the linear character remains. Reference [13] proposes a line-
arized AC power flow model, which is faster than the full AC power flow model and 
can capture reactive power and voltage magnitude information that are ignored in the 
DC power flow model. A piecewise linear AC power flow model is proposed in [14] to 
speed up the process of power networks islanding. 
2.2 Contingency Analysis 
There are two types of outage in power systems: planned outage and unplanned 
outage. Planned outage is typically preventive maintenance or replacement for power 
system elements. It ranges from several minutes to months. Regular maintenance can 
largely extend the lifetime of an equipment, which can reduce the investment cost. An 
unplanned outage normally means the failure of elements in real-time. A forced outage 
is unpredictable and may seriously jeopardize the system security. Thus, an unexpected 
outage is also referred to as a contingency. This dissertation will focus on the unplanned 
outage - contingency only. 
In general, a contingency is the loss or failure of a single element or multiple ele-
ments of a power system. An element of a power system usually refers to a major elec-
trical equipment such as a transmission line. The system can be considered to be secure 
under a particular contingency if it does not create any major problem. 
There are two types of violations, branch thermal limit violation (flow violation) 
and bus voltage limit violation (voltage violation). Flow violation occurs when the flow 
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on a branch exceeds its capacity rating. Voltage violation includes under-voltage vio-
lation when the voltage magnitude is less than Vmin and over-voltage violation when the 
voltage magnitude is greater than Vmax. Typically, Vmin is set to 0.9 and Vmax is set to 
1.1. For systems that requires a tight voltage range, Vmin and Vmax can also be set to 0.95 
and 1.05 respectively. 
Contingency analysis can be conducted either in real-time or day-ahead. Day-
ahead contingency analysis evaluates the effect of contingency on system reliability 
and identifies active network constraints for day-ahead scheduling. It may help quickly 
identify the critical problems in real-time. Real-time contingency analysis reports the 
consequences of contingencies that may occur in a very short time, which allows oper-
ators to react quickly to the unexpected outages by using pre-determined recovery strat-
egies. This dissertation only focuses on real-time contingency analysis. 
RTCA is an essential application in the EMS of modern power systems. The goal 
of RTCA is to analyze the system static security under each potential contingency, 
which will be reported to the system operators in real-time. RTCA can identify the 
critical contingencies and the associated violations. Thus, RTCA enables system oper-
ators to make corrective control plans in advance for handling post-contingency viola-
tions when a critical contingency actually occurs, or to preposition the system to elim-
inate those potential post-contingency violations. Therefore, RTCA is very important 
for power system real-time secure operations and, thus, it is worthwhile to investigate 
RTCA in this dissertation. RTCA on three large-scale real power systems are simulated 
and analyzed in Chapter 3. 
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2.2.1 Contingency Types 
There are two basic types of contingency, single-element contingency and multi-
ple-element contingency. A single-element contingency includes a generator contin-
gency or a branch contingency. It is also referred to as the widely used term N-1. A 
multiple-element contingency is a simultaneous failure of multiple elements, which can 
be denoted by N-m. It can be a simultaneous failure of a generator and a branch, two 
branches, two generators, or three or more elements. Note that the probability of a mul-
tiple-element contingency is extremely low. 
To be specific, the term branch in this dissertation includes transmission line, trans-
former, and phase shifter. A phase shifter is a special type of transformer that can create 
a phase angle shift and control the flow of active power. 
Contingency analysis has been traditionally limited to N-1 level due to the compu-
tational complexity and low probability of simultaneous failures. In this dissertation, 
only single-element contingency is studied. Contingency analysis estimates the impact 
of potential near-future contingencies on power system security: if a contingency oc-
curs, what the results could be and whether the system can withstand this contingency. 
Branch contingency is much more common than generator contingency. When a 
branch is out of service and disconnected from the rest of the network, the flow on that 
branch becomes zero and the flows on nearby branches may change significantly. As a 
result, branch overloads and bus voltage violations may occur under a branch contin-
gency. 
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If generation re-dispatch is not conducted for a generator contingency, all the gen-
eration loss would have to be picked up only by a slack bus, which is impractical. Thus, 
generation re-dispatch is required. Adjustments of generation can be determined with a 
set of generator participation factors as well as optimization-based methods. Normally, 
four options are available to calculate the participation factors that can be calculated 
based on: 
• available capacity, 
• capacity, 
• reserve, 
• or inertia. 
In reality, when a generator outage occurs, there would be a power imbalance issue 
between total demand and total generation. This will cause a frequency drop and all 
other generators will immediately increase their outputs based on their inertia and then 
reposition their dispatch points due to droop control when governors start to react. Sys-
tem operators can perform generation re-dispatch for a generator contingency. How-
ever, it is worth noting that there is very limited time for operators to re-dispatch gen-
eration to pick up the loss of a generator and recover the frequency back to its normal 
range. Therefore, due to the computational complexity, no optimization method is in-
volved for any of the above participation factor based re-dispatch algorithms, which are 
very fast and can be used to perform generation re-dispatch in real-time. In this disser-
tation, available capacity based participation factor is used to perform generation re-
dispatch to resolve the power imbalance issue caused by a generator contingency. 
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2.2.2 Procedure 
The procedure of contingency analysis is presented in Fig. 2.3. A base case power 
flow simulation is first performed to determine the pre-contingency system condition. 
Then, the base case solution including bus voltage magnitudes and bus voltage angles 
are used as the starting point of each contingency power flow simulation. In the case of 
a branch contingency, the active power outputs of generators will remain at the pre-
contingency level except for the generators at the slack bus, which is assumed to pick 
up the change in losses. However, in the event of a generator contingency, they may 
change significantly due to generation re-dispatch. 
 
Start
Monitor System 
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g=1
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No
Record
Yes
Simulate loss of 
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simulated?
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Fig. 2.3 Contingency Analysis Procedure. 
 
After the base case power flow is solved, the first contingency in the contingency 
list will be simulated. This contingency is modeled by fully de-energizing the corre-
sponding outaged element from the system. The power flow problem is then solved 
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again with the updated system model. The consequences of this contingency are eval-
uated by checking the bus voltages against the limits Vmax and Vmin and by checking 
branch flows against branch capacities. This evaluation process is referred to as limit 
checking. 
After the simulation for the first contingency is completed, the system is reset to 
the original base case operating condition. Then, the second contingency in the contin-
gency list is simulated and its impact is analyzed. This process repeats itself until all 
the remaining contingencies in the contingency list are examined. The identified critical 
contingencies and the associated potential post-contingency violations are recorded in 
this process. 
As presented above, the contingencies are independent of each other. The order of 
contingencies in the contingency list does not affect the results. Therefore, it is con-
cluded that contingency analysis is suitable for parallel computing. 
2.2.3 Contingency List 
Power systems are built with some level of redundancy that it can sustain a number 
of contingencies. However, it is improper and impractical that the redundancy can pre-
vent all contingencies from causing system violations. The RTCA application may not 
be able to simulate all potential contingencies in a very limited time. Therefore, only a 
subset of contingencies may be modeled in practice. 
Off-line analysis can be performed with historical data to determine the contin-
gency list, which contains contingencies that may cause negative effects on system se-
curity and contingencies that correspond to a high probability of occurrence. Thus, 
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RTCA only simulates the contingencies in the contingency list that contains a subset of 
all potential contingencies, which would save a lot of solution time for RTCA. The 
contingency lists may be different for different system conditions. For example, the 
contingency list for a peak hour might be very different with the contingency list for an 
off-peak hour. 
Note that DC power flow model based contingency analysis would take much less 
time than AC power flow model based contingency analysis. If voltage magnitude and 
reactive power are not of concern, the DC model based contingency analysis may be 
preferred. Moreover, the DC model based contingency analysis can be used as a screen-
ing process to reduce the contingency list for the full AC contingency analysis simula-
tion. However, it is worth pointing out that the DC power flow model is not as accurate 
as the AC power flow model. 
2.2.4 Results of Contingency Analysis 
It is very important to analyze the results of contingency analysis as they expose 
the system vulnerabilities. Typically, contingency analysis will report a list of critical 
contingencies that may cause potential violations and a list of individual potential post-
contingency violations. It may also report some statistics shown below:  
• the total post-contingency violations per contingency, 
• the number of buses with voltage violations, 
• the number of branches with flow violations over all the contingencies,  
• the number of contingencies that cannot converge, and  
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• the worst flow violation and the worst voltage violation among all the con-
tingencies simulated. 
2.2.5 Industry Practices 
To ensure secure operations of power systems, ISOs have to comply with several 
reliability standards required by NERC. One of those standards is N-1 reliability that 
requires power systems to withstand the loss of one element. Thus, RTCA is conducted 
successively every several minutes at all ISOs. The implementation of contingency 
analysis could be different among different ISOs. 
In MISO, the RTCA tool simulates more than 11,500 contingency scenarios every 
4 minutes [15]. Data from state estimator are utilized and contingency analysis is per-
formed by solving contingency power flows independently. All the potential flow vio-
lations and voltage violations are recorded, as well as the associated critical contingen-
cies [16]. 
PJM runs a full AC contingency analysis to identify the contingencies that would 
cause violations in the system [17]. Approximately 6,000 contingencies are simulated 
every minute at PJM [17]. Though there is a list of all contingencies in the PJM data-
base, not all contingencies in that list are evaluated at all times [18]. 
A two-phase procedure is used in ERCOT to perform contingency analysis [19]. A 
heuristic screening procedure is conducted in phase one to identify the most severe 
contingencies with respect to post-contingency violations. Then, in phase two, fast de-
coupled power flow based full AC analysis is then performed on the selected contin-
gencies as well as those explicitly chosen in advance. ERCOT has approximately 3938 
25 
 
 
contingencies, including 3333 branch contingencies and 605 generator contingencies, 
modeled in its operations database in 2012 [20]. RTCA in the ERCOT system executes 
every five minutes [20]. 
The RTCA tool used in CAISO simulates about 2,200 pre-specified contingencies 
every five minutes [21]. It would report potential overload and voltage violation fol-
lowing contingency, which alerts the system operator to critical contingencies. 
NYISO performs RTCA on pre-defined single and multiple contingencies, which 
would provide system operator with a list of potential transmission violations [22]. 
The contingency analysis software used in ISO-NE executes every six minutes au-
tomatically or upon demand [23]. RTCA would sort flow violations and voltage viola-
tions by the percent severity and provide system operator only with the critical con-
straints of which the associated post-contingency flow is over 90% of the emergency 
limit [24]. 
2.2.6 Post-contingency Violation Management 
Contingencies may result in system security violations such as voltage limit viola-
tions and branch overloads. It would further weaken the system if the right corrective 
actions are not implemented. For instance, a cascading failure or cascading outage may 
occur and cause system blackouts. Therefore, managing post-contingency violations is 
essential for the system secure operations. 
For each critical contingency that would cause potential post-contingency viola-
tions, appropriate corrective actions should be determined in advance to ensure system 
26 
 
 
security in case a contingency actually occurs. A number of approaches are available 
to handle these violations. Some approaches are listed below: 
• Economic dispatch, 
• Committing fast-start units, 
• Transformer tap adjustment, 
• Phase shifter angle adjustment, 
• Transmission switching, 
• Load shedding. 
The DC power flow based economic dispatch problem with additional network 
constraints can be solved to relieve flow violations. If fast robust algorithms and ad-
vanced computers are available, the AC power flow model based economic dispatch 
may also be used to relieve both flow violations and voltage violations. Committing 
fast-start units is an effective strategy but that may come with extra costs. Transformer 
tap adjustment and phase shifter angle adjustment are different approaches to mitigate 
violations. Transmission switching is also an effective way to reduce violations or even 
completely eliminate all the violations. Load shedding will always be the last option to 
resort due to the concern regarding economic loss. 
The effect of transmission switching on post-contingency violation reduction is 
thoroughly investigated in this dissertation. Transmission switching is a low cost alter-
native in comparison to other corrective strategies presented above, which indicates 
transmission switching is a promising approach to relieve post-contingency violations. 
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2.3 Transmission Switching 
It is very unlikely that a single network topology could be optimal for different 
operating hours or different system conditions. Network reconfiguration is a valuable 
strategy to build a smarter and more flexible power grid. 
Traditionally, transmission network is considered as a static network for short-term 
operations of power systems. For example, the conventional economic dispatch or op-
timal power flow (OPF) model does not include the flexibility in transmission network. 
However, system operators are able to reconfigure the network in real-time and trans-
mission switching can benefit the system in various aspects. Transmission switching 
that temporarily reconfigures the system network can be used to relieve branch over-
loads, eliminate voltage violation, reduce cost, and improve system reliability. 
Redundancy of transmission networks is one of the reasons why there are flexibil-
ities in the power system networks and why transmission switching can provide various 
benefits. Typically, transmission switching can provide more benefits for a meshed 
transmission network than a distribution network. 
In this dissertation, the flexibility in transmission network is considered in RTCA 
and RT SCED via corrective transmission switching. With CTS, the violations reported 
from RTCA can be substantially reduced, which demonstrates the reliability benefits 
provided by CTS. Those reliability benefits can be translated into significant congestion 
cost reduction when CTS is considered in RT SCED. The reliability benefits with CTS 
are studied in Chapter 4 and the economic benefits with CTS are studies in Chapter 5. 
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A thorough literature review of transmission switching and network topology op-
timization is presented in [25]. Transmission switching can be used as a corrective strat-
egy, a loss reduction method, and a congestion management tool. The existing industry 
practices are introduced in [25], as well as the benefits achieved with optimal transmis-
sion switching (OTS). The effect of TS on financial transmission rights markets is also 
analyzed.  
Given a problem, the optimal solution with TS will be at least as good as the solu-
tion obtained without TS because the feasible set with TS is a superset of the feasible 
set without TS. A three-node system is used in [26] to illustrate the concept of TS. The 
applications of TS in various power system areas are introduced below. 
2.3.1 TS in Unit Commitment 
A formulation for co-optimizing unit commitment and transmission switching is 
presented in [27] to ensure N-1 reliability. Numerical studies show that the optimal 
network topology varies from hour to hour and that the optimal unit commitment solu-
tions will be different. A decomposition method is proposed to reduce the computa-
tional burden. Another conclusion is that the need to start up a generator can be replaced 
by TS, which will translate into significant cost savings. For example, $120,000 can be 
saved with TS on the IEEE RTS96 test system in the time frame of one single day. It is 
also concluded that TS can benefit the system without jeopardizing the reliability. 
In [28], TS is introduced in security-constrained unit commitment (SCUC) prob-
lem to relieve violations and reduce operation costs. Benders decomposition is used to 
divide the original complex problem into two simplified problems, unit commitment 
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master problem and TS sub-problem. Iterations between those two sub-problems are 
required. The proposed SCUC model with TS can be used for congestion management 
without causing additional cost [28]. 
Three algorithms for day-ahead corrective transmission switching are proposed in 
[29]. TS is incorporated in the N-1 contingency analysis model. The three approaches 
include 1) a mixed integer programming (MIP) in which the status of transmission line 
is represented by binary variables, 2) a heuristic based MIP in which only one switching 
action is allowed per iteration, and 3) a greedy algorithm. The most accurate MIP model 
is very hard to solve. On the contrary, the heuristic based MIP and the greedy algorithm 
are less complicated and relatively easy to solve. Numerical simulations show that the 
greedy algorithm can provide quality solutions with less solution time as compared to 
the other two approaches. 
2.3.2 TS in Optimal Power Flow 
A novel formulation for determining both the optimal transmission topology and 
the optimal generation dispatch is proposed in [30]. Numerical simulations on the stand-
ard IEEE 118-bus test case show that system operation cost can be reduced by 25% by 
optimizing the network topology. It is also observed that a switching action aiming for 
cost saving does not necessarily have a negative impact on reliability [30]. Reference 
[31] presents how network topology changes would affect energy markets. Simulation 
results indicate that topology changes for cost reduction typically result in lower load 
payments and higher generation rents. It is illustrated in [32] that incorporating trans-
mission switching in the system dispatch application can reduce cost while the system 
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N-1 reliability still remains. With the N-1 DC optimal power flow (DCOPF) model, 
15% savings are obtained through TS. Both [30] and [32] use the same IEEE 118-bus 
test system. 
Although co-optimization of network topology and unit generation could achieve 
significant reduction in congestion cost, its MIP model is not solvable within a reason-
able time even for moderate-scale systems. A shift factor based MIP model with TS 
was presented in [33]. A branch outage can be simulated with the original topology by 
using flow-cancelling transactions approach. The complexity of this problem highly 
depends on the numbers of switchable lines, monitored lines, and contingencies. The 
proposed shift factor based MIP formulation is more compact and more scalable than 
the conventional B-θ based MIP formulation and, thus, it is faster as verified by the 
simulation results. It would be more efficient when fewer constraints are explicitly en-
forced. 
To solve optimal transmission switching problem efficiently, three different heu-
ristics are proposed in [34], a DC heuristic with DCOPF, a DC heuristic with AC opti-
mal power flow (ACOPF), and an AC heuristic with ACOPF. Case studies show that 
the two ACOPF based heuristics provide similar solutions while the results obtained by 
the DCOPF based heuristic are very different. 
Heuristic policies based integration of TS in the OPF problem is discussed in [35]. 
A general algorithm structure is proposed in [35] and its objective is to determine the 
transmission topology in a reasonable time. Although the optimality is not guaranteed, 
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the proposed structure has the potential to attain high quality solutions for network to-
pology and generations with a low computational effort. Simulation results on the IEEE 
118-bus test system demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed heuristic policies in 
terms of production cost reduction. 
Based on the algorithm structure proposed in [35], three additional transmission 
switching policies are proposed in [36]: price difference, total cost derivative, and 
power transfer distribution factor (PTDF)-weighted cost derivative. These policies can 
provide production cost savings and maintain system reliability. The computational 
complexity of the proposed three policies is significantly lower than MIP-based ap-
proaches. The results show that the branches that the algorithm tends to switch are with 
low loading level, high degree of connectivity, and negative price differences. 
Optimal transmission switching can reduce generation costs and the investment 
cost for implementing OTS is low. However, heavy computational burden is one ob-
stacle to implement OTS. Two heuristics are developed in [37] to resolve this issue. 
They both rely on the line-ranking parameter derived from the optimal solution of a 
regular DCOPF problem. Case studies show that the proposed two heuristics are much 
faster than the previous methods in the literature while the cost reductions are similar. 
Promising results are achieved in a reasonable time with the heuristics proposed in 
[35]-[37]. However, all of those heuristic approaches are based on the DC power flow 
model, which is an approximation of the accurate AC power flow model and may in-
troduce errors. Extended from the DCOPF based heuristics proposed in [36] and [37], 
ACOPF based heuristics are proposed in [38]. Simulation results show that the DCOPF-
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based heuristics may provide poor quality switching solutions that may even lead to 
cost increase. The ACOPF based heuristics have a better performance than DCOPF 
based heuristics at the cost of longer computational time. A conclusion made in [38] is 
that a good heuristic approach for practical application should be not only accurate but 
fast as well. 
2.3.3 TS in Energy Markets 
Transmission switching can be used to optimize transmission outages in a market 
environment [39]. Reference [40] demonstrates the economic value of transmission 
switching with the IEEE 73-bus (RTS96) test system. It is shown in [41] that OTS can 
improve economic dispatch not only on small test systems but also on large-scale ISO 
models. 
Two novel concepts, just-in-time transmission and flowgate bidding, are presented 
in [42]. With just-in-time transmission, transmission elements that are switched off ser-
vice per the optimal dispatch solution can be switched back into the system as needed. 
Branch flow is allowed to temporarily exceed the rated capacity for a penalty price, 
which is flowgate bidding. Simulation results on large-scale ISO systems demonstrate 
the effectiveness of those models. 
2.3.4 TS in Expansion Planning 
Transmission switching is not only able to provide benefits in short-term operation 
studies but also in long-term planning studies. It is shown in [43] that modeling trans-
mission switching in system expansion planning can enhance the system security and 
reduce the total cost including the operation cost and investment cost. 
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2.3.5 TS in Load Shedding Recovery 
A novel load shedding recovery control scheme through transmission switching is 
proposed in [44]. Following a critical N-1 or N-2 contingency, implementing transmis-
sion switching can reduce the amount of load that would be curtailed from the system. 
The system can return to an N-1 reliable state faster with TS. 
2.3.6 TS in Congestion Management 
The total congestion costs in the PJM system in 2013 increased by $147.9 million 
or 28.0% in comparison with the 2012 level $529.0 million [45]. Obviously, a tremen-
dous amount of money has been wasted due to network congestion. Therefore, trans-
mission congestion management is essential to operate power systems economically. 
As a corrective control scheme, transmission switching is able to relieve congestion or 
overloads. 
With N-1 contingency criteria, transient stability, and voltage stability margin con-
sidered in [46], transient instability issues that exist in previous OTS methods can be 
resolved. It is also demonstrated that TS is an effective strategy to reduce congestion 
cost. 
Congestion management with OTS is studied in [47]. Two different procedures are 
proposed for determining the best network topology with respect to security criteria. 
The first procedure models the TS problem with mixed integer linear programming 
(MILP). The second procedure employs an augmented genetic algorithm, which takes 
N-1 security constraints into account. Numerical simulations on the CIGRE sample 33-
bus system and the 432-bus Extra High Voltage network of Italy show that solutions 
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obtained from those procedures are consistent while the deterministic procedure is 
twice as fast as genetic algorithm. 
PJM has published a list of switching solutions that may reduce or even eliminate 
the violations [48]. Though this list is for informational purposes only, it indicates the 
importance of TS in congestion management. Those identified switching solutions are 
not guaranteed to provide benefits since the beneficial switching actions may vary 
based upon the system conditions. The implementation of the identified transmission 
switching solutions would be determined at the discretion of PJM operators. Therefore, 
a systematic methodology is desired to identify the beneficial switching solutions in 
real-time. 
2.3.7 TS with Uncertainty 
Recently, renewable energy sources including wind power are growing rapidly and 
the penetration level of renewables in power systems is increasing quickly. Thus, more 
attention have been paid on the system uncertainty. In addition, load profile cannot be 
precisely predicted, which also contributes to the system uncertainty. 
Robust optimization can be used to handle the uncertainty. It is demonstrated in 
[49] that the switching solutions obtained from robust optimization will work for all 
possible system states. Given a pre-defined uncertainty set, TS can mitigate constraint 
violations. Simulation results show that TS does not necessarily degrade the system 
reliability and it may even benefit the system for achieving N-1 feasibility with uncer-
tainty. 
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Implementing corrective switching might cause disconnection of wind farms that 
do not have the low voltage ride through function from the main grid. A methodology 
is proposed in [50] to determine feasible alternatives for eliminating violations in a 
reasonable time. Simulation results show that none of the switching variants would dis-
connect wind farms from the system even for the wind farms that are not equipped with 
low voltage ride through technology. 
2.3.8 TS as a Corrective Mechanism 
Transmission switching can benefit the system as a corrective control method in 
emergency situations. A strategy for evaluating switching actions is proposed in [51]. 
This strategy maximizes the minimal system security margin. An algorithm that com-
bines line switching, bus-bar switching, and shunt switching is proposed to relieve over-
loads and voltage violations that are caused by system faults. Simulation results verify 
that the proposed corrective switching algorithm can effectively relieve system viola-
tions. Note that switching action can be implemented on different types of elements 
such as shunt and transmission line. However, this dissertation only focuses on trans-
mission switching. 
A greedy algorithm is proposed in [52] to improve the computational performance 
for the TS problem. A priority list of candidate switching lines is generated based on 
sensitivity. This heuristic is tested with various types of contingencies including N-1 
events, N-m events, and cascading events. Numerical simulations show that the pro-
posed heuristic is able to provide quick TS solutions for load recovery by improving 
the deliverability of reserve. The computational complexity of the TS problem can be 
36 
 
 
reduced with the proposed heuristic by transforming a MILP problem to a linear pro-
gramming (LP) problem. Therefore, it is possible to implement the proposed TS heu-
ristic in real-time. Another advantage of greedy algorithm is that it scales well for large-
scale systems while quality solutions would still be obtained. 
2.3.9 Industry Practices 
Though studies on transmission switching in the literature started in 1980s [53]-
[55], TS has not been extensively used in industry today. The main concerns of imple-
menting TS include reduction of system security margin, instability issue due to dis-
crete switching actions, and long computational time required to solve the TS problems. 
However, with fast development of power engineering, optimization, and computer sci-
ence technologies, those concerns and hurdles will be addressed eventually. Prior ef-
forts in the literature have demonstrated that switching a line off service does not nec-
essarily adversely affect the system and can benefit the system in various aspects. 
Transmission switching has gained a lot of attention recently. The hardware to im-
plement TS is mainly circuit breakers that already exist in contemporary power systems. 
The only requirement for implementing TS is to develop a decision support tool that 
can provide operators with beneficial switching solutions. Moreover, switching a line 
out of service should be fast enough for TS to be considered as a promising strategy in 
real-time operations. As switching actions would degrade circuit breakers and reduce 
their lifespan, it would be practical if TS is used as a corrective method or an emergency 
control scheme. Since the probability of the contingency is low, CTS would rarely need 
to be implemented. Thus, circuit breaker degradation due to CTS is minor. 
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In May 2009, as a result of the outages in the high voltage transmission system, 
significant congestion costs occurred for multiple days until CAISO was able to identify 
a TS action to relieve the congestion [56]. 
As documented in ISO-NE operating procedure No. 19 - Transmission Operation 
[57], TS is a viable option under both normal and emergency operating conditions and 
can be used to relieve transmission constraints. 
PJM lists switching solutions as corrective actions in response to several specific 
contingencies [58]. In 2012, PJM took several high-voltage lines out of service as a 
corrective action in response to Superstorm Sandy to alleviate over-voltage problems 
[44]. Note that the system had already lost multiple high voltage transmission assets 
when TS was implemented. 
Though there are several instances where TS is implemented in practice to accom-
plish particular objectives, the decisions are predominantly made based on lookup table 
methods or ad hoc procedures that may require operators’ personal judgment. Such 
empirical methods or offline analysis will limit operators’ capability of fully utilizing 
the flexibility provided by TS. As a result, the utilization of TS is limited in practice. 
Therefore, accurate, fast, and systematic approaches are desired and essential for the 
implementation of TS in industry. 
2.4 Economic Dispatch 
Economic dispatch determines the optimal outputs of a fleet of generating units to 
meet system demands with the least cost. As NERC requires bulk electric systems to 
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be able to withstand the loss of a single element and meet specific performance require-
ments [59], security constraints should be considered in economic dispatch. Economic 
dispatch that considers system security requirements is known as security-constrained 
economic dispatch. 
There are two basic types of SCED: day-ahead SCED and real-time SCED. Day-
ahead SCED is a multiple-period SCED that executes subsequent to the complete of 
the SCUC that determines units’ commitment status for each hour. RT SCED is typi-
cally a single-period SCED that focuses on a short-term ranging from 5 minutes to 15 
minutes. Note that day-ahead SCED and RT SCED are LP problems. This dissertation 
focuses on RT SCED. 
As described in Chapter 1, RT SCED is a major EMS function for power system 
operations. For a real power system, SCED runs consecutively in real-time. Generally, 
SCED is an optimization process that aims to provide the least cost generation that 
meets all the operation and reliability constraints. 
The system load profile changes constantly over time and would deviate from the 
forecast. As a result, the scheduled generator dispatch solution may not be optimal in 
terms of total system operation cost for the next SCED period. In addition, the uncer-
tainty such as load fluctuation may cause unexpected violations, which would jeopard-
ize the system reliability. Therefore, SCED that can effectively relieve system viola-
tions with the least cost is used as a regular mechanism for real-time operations of 
power systems in industry [60]-[61]. SCED can also be used to determine the energy 
prices in real-time markets [62]-[63]. 
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As an essential module of EMS, RT SCED is studied in Chapter 5 of this disserta-
tion. Procedure-A is first proposed to connect traditional RTCA and RT SCED, which 
is consistent with existing industrial practice. Then, Procedure-B is proposed to utilize 
the flexibility in transmission network. In Procedure-B, CTS is considered in SCED 
implicitly which requires no change to existing operational tools. 
2.4.1 SCED with Renewables 
Recently, with the advancement on the techniques for renewable energy sources, 
the penetration of renewables into power systems has increased significantly. Some 
renewables like wind power and solar power cannot be fully controlled. For instance, 
the generation from wind power largely depends on wind speed. Thus, they are also 
referred to as variable renewables. As the percent of variable renewables in power sup-
plies has increased to a significant level, it is very important to consider the uncertainty 
of variable renewables in SCED. 
As stated in [64], the conventional economic dispatch approach may not be able to 
properly accommodate the economic implication of power systems with significant 
level of penetration of renewables with high variability. Thus, [64] proposes an optimi-
zation model that can capture the variability cost of renewables by using the “best-fit” 
participation factors. Simulation results on two test cases demonstrate the effectiveness 
of the proposed approach as compared to the traditional method. 
A stochastic look-ahead economic dispatch model and uncertainty response con-
cept are proposed in [65] to manage uncertainty at the near-real-time stage. Scale re-
duction approaches and a hybrid parallel computing architecture are developed to speed 
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up the solution time. Case studies on a practical 5889-bus system illustrate the effec-
tiveness of the proposed approach. 
To address the challenges posed by integrating renewables into power grids, a sto-
chastic decomposition framework for multiple timescale economic dispatch is proposed 
in [66]. The proposed framework determines the generation of slow-response resources 
hourly ahead, which allows slow-response resources to adjust in time; it also determines 
the generation of fast-response resources at a smaller sub-hourly timescale, which al-
lows the system can better handle the variable RES. Simulations results demonstrate 
the effectiveness of the proposed framework by considering sub-hourly dispatch. 
2.4.2 Decentralized SCED 
For large-scale practical power systems, solving a centralized SCED directly might 
not be computationally efficient. Therefore, decentralized SCED may be an alternative 
in the case that centralized SCED does not solve efficiently. Another advantage of de-
centralized SCED is that it requires minimal information exchanged between different 
areas and, thus, it can help protect the privacy of each area. 
A consensus algorithm based distributed economic dispatch approach that consid-
ers the effect of transmission losses and generator limits is proposed in [67]. The two 
consensus algorithms use different strategies to ensure power balance. Simulation re-
sults demonstrate the effectiveness and scalability of the proposed approach. 
A decentralized and self-organizing economic dispatch approach is developed in 
[68]. Weighted averages of variables are used to obtain the economic dispatch solu-
tions. Simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach. 
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A multiple-stage decentralized approach is proposed to solve the economic dis-
patch problem in [69]. With a deterministic method, it consists of two stages; however, 
a third stage is required to obtain the final solution if a nondeterministic method is ap-
plied. The proposed approach can incorporate transmission losses and can be adapted 
for solving both convex and non-convex economic dispatch problems. Numerical stud-
ies on three cases verify the advantages of the proposed approach. 
A decentralized dynamic multiplier-based Lagrangian relaxation approach is pro-
posed in [70] for solving multi-area economic dispatch problem. The proposed method 
can solve to the global optimality faster and reflect the marginal cost change due to 
variation of power exchange level. Case studies performed on three systems show that 
the proposed method can significantly benefit large-scale multi-area power systems. 
2.4.3 SCED with Automatic Generation Control 
SCED dispatches generation in a timeframe of 5 minutes to 15 minutes. However, 
load demand fluctuates in seconds. To better resolve load variation and frequency de-
viation, automatic generation control (AGC) is employed to control frequency and 
maintain the system power balance in real-time. It is worth noting that the requirements 
for a unit to provide AGC service or regulation reserve are very strict and only a small 
subset of units are qualified as AGC service providers. Thus, coordination of AGC and 
SCED can better ensure sufficient regulation reserve in real time. 
A distributed approach is proposed in [71] to enable each generator to re-dispatch 
its output independently. The proposed formulation combines economic dispatch and 
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AGC. Numerical simulations show that the proposed method can correct for frequency 
deviations using the aggregate power imbalance only. 
The coordination between AGC and economic dispatch is studied in [72]. The tra-
ditional AGC is improved by using a distributed approach that combines economic dis-
patch with AGC. A hybrid of traditional AGC and the economic AGC is also studied. 
In this hybrid method, the power exchanges between different areas are fixed while the 
generators within their own areas can be re-dispatched. Case studies show that the hy-
brid AGC performs the best and it requires only local information. 
An extensive model that accounts for inter-temporal coupling between multiple 
timescales is proposed in [73]. The proposed integrated model consists of SCUC, 
SCED, and AGC. It can model the interaction between different timescales and can 
better handle the variability and uncertainty of variable generations such as wind units.  
2.4.4 SCED with Demand Management 
Traditionally, loads are treated as fixed and uncontrollable in SCED. However, 
flexible demands are increasing. Some flexible demands can be directly curtailed by 
system operators at the cost of providing extra credits for the customers that participate 
the load shedding incentives program. Therefore, it is very important to capture demand 
management in SCED. As the shares of renewables in power supplies increase, demand 
side management can benefit the system by providing tertiary reserve capacity [74]. 
As stated in [75], many utilities opt to curtail load rather than bring additional ex-
pensive units online during peak-load periods. The authors of [75] argue that direct 
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control mechanism is more promising for real-time economic dispatch than price re-
sponse mechanism as price signals cannot be used for services in real-time. 
The value of demand response can be estimated with a production cost model such 
as a SCED model [76]. The work presented in [76] investigates the effects of demand 
response on ancillary service and shows that demand response can contribute to meet-
ing the system ancillary service requirements. 
2.4.5 Industry Practices 
Economic dispatch was applied to adjust the outputs of online units as early as 
1930s and it was initially solved by hand [77]. The classical AC OPF formulations was 
first developed in 1962 by Carpentier [78]. Even though the problem has been formu-
lated for over 50 years, a fast, robust and reliable technique has not been developed to 
solve it due to its non-linearity, non-convexity, and large-scale features. As a result, the 
industry still uses a simplified linearized DC power flow model as described in Section 
2.1.2. There are two DC power flow models: PTDF model and B-𝜃 model. Typically, 
the PTDF model is used in industry rather than the B-𝜃 model. 
PJM 
PJM real-time dispatch package has two main applications: intermediate-time 
SCED (IT SCED) and RT SCED. IT SCED performs resource commitment over four 
intervals corresponding to a look-ahead period of about 2 hours [79]. 
RT SCED does not change units’ status and it dispatch online units in a single look-
ahead period of 15 minutes. RT SCED runs about every 5 minutes or upon demand 
whenever operators believe re-dispatch is needed. The solutions obtained from RT 
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SCED have to be approved by operators before they are sent to generators. For each 
RT SCED run, three scenarios are solved independently. Those three scenarios are 
known as base scenario, high scenario, and low scenario [80]. The base scenario data 
are from EMS. The other two scenarios are biased against the base scenario. Compared 
to the base scenario, high scenario has a higher amount of load while low scenario has 
a lower amount of load. RT SCED co-optimizes energy, reserves, and regulation sim-
ultaneously [81]. 
IT SCED does not directly send signals to generators. However, it provides a 2-
hour look-ahead dispatch trajectory and guides RT SCED [82]-[83]. IT SCED can also 
report potential warning information such as shortage of generation capacity to system 
operators so that they can take actions in advance. 
It is worth noting that the RT SCED software used at PJM will only provide a basis 
for the locational pricing calculator engine which determines the locational marginal 
price (LMP). Locational pricing calculator runs exactly every 5 minutes [81]. 
MISO 
The RT SCED tool used by MISO dispatches the energy and operating reserve to 
meet the forecasted energy demand and operating reserve requirements [84]. SCED 
executes continuously on a 5-minute periodic basis and the interval of its single look-
ahead period is 5 minutes. RT SCED starts solving the problem five minutes before the 
start of the RT SCED target interval or 10 minutes prior to the end of the RT SCED 
dispatch interval. In other words, if the target interval of RT SCED is from t to (t + 5 
minutes), then, RT SCED starts solving at the time of (t – 5 minutes). 
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Similar to PJM, the RT SCED application of MISO also uses an LP solver. Its 
objective is to minimize the total dispatch cost that excludes commitment costs such as 
start-up costs and no-load costs; because commitment costs are sunk costs for RT SCED 
[85]. 
ISO-NE 
ISO-NE uses the unit dispatch system to perform SCED, which produces desired 
dispatch points for the generators in its territory. They have to be approved before they 
are sent to the generators. The desired dispatch points will refresh periodically on a 5-
minute basis [86] as SCED executes every 5 minutes [87]. 
The single time-interval SCED of ISO-NE jointly optimizes energy and reserves 
and typically looks 15 minutes ahead [86], [88]-[89]. It uses an incremental linear-op-
timization method to minimize the cost and produces dispatch instructions for dispatch-
able resources. Real-time unit commitment (RTUC) is performed automatically every 
15 minutes or manually on demand. The commitment status of fast start units in the 
approved RTUC scenario will be passed to the unit dispatch system that either uses 
RTUC recommendations or just ignores it [90]. 
NYISO 
The real-time applications of NYISO include real-time commitment, real-time dis-
patch (RTD), and real-time dispatch/corrective auction mode (RTD-CAM) [91]. Simi-
lar to the IT SCED of PJM, real-time commitment is also a multi-period security-con-
strained unit commitment that minimizes the total production cost and co-optimizes 
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energy and reserves. Real-time commitment evaluates the system over a period of 2 
hours and 15 minutes with intervals of 15 minutes.  
RTD executes every 5 minutes and looks about an hour ahead [91]. It is essentially 
RT SCED. RTD-CAM overrides the regular RTD and executes on demand as deter-
mined by operators. Note that RTD-CAM may commit extra resources. RTD is a multi-
period dispatch process that simultaneously co-optimizes energy and reserves without 
involving commitment decisions [92]. The objective function of RTD includes incre-
mental energy cost. The solution for the first 5-minute look-ahead interval is immedi-
ately passed to the units while the solutions for other intervals are just for advisory 
purpose.  
Security assessment is triggered periodically on a minute basis. It will provide a 
list of transmission constraints that will be reviewed for operations and would be sent 
into RTD as inputs. 
CAISO 
As a component of the Market Analysis Engine of CAISO, SCED is used to deter-
mine the dispatch base points of participating generators [93]. The main applications in 
the real-time market of CAISO include hour-ahead scheduling process, short-term unit 
commitment, real-time unit commitment, real-time economic dispatch, real-time con-
tingency dispatch, and real-time manual dispatch [94].  
Short-term unit commitment looks at least 3 hours ahead and commit short and 
medium start units for reliability purpose. RTUC looks 1 to 2 hours ahead and commit 
only fast and short start units. Though short-term unit commitment executes hourly 
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while RTUC runs every 15 minutes, they are both multi-period optimization processes 
with 15-minute intervals. 
RTED performs generation re-dispatch to balance energy and normally executes 
on a 5-minute basis. However, under certain situations, real-time contingency dispatch 
and real-time manual dispatch would replace RTED and execute upon demand. 
RTED uses SCED as the optimization engine to determine the least cost 5-minute 
dispatch solutions that meet the units and transmission constraints within CAISO terri-
tory. RTED is a multi-period optimization process that co-optimizes energy and ancil-
lary services [95]. Only the dispatch solution associated with the first 5-minute interval 
will be implemented. RTED also calculates LMP for market financial settlement. The 
fixed time delay between the start time of each RTED run and the start time of the 
corresponding RTED target interval is set to 5 minutes. The time delay accounts for 
RTED computational time, operator approval time, and communication time [96]. 
ERCOT 
In ERCOT, SCED determines the least-cost dispatch of all generating units to meet 
the short-term load forecast. SCED is scheduled to execute every 5 minutes in the ER-
COT nodal market [97] and solves for a single interval of 5 minutes [98]-[99]. SCED 
can also be executed by ERCOT operators or other ERCOT systems [100]. It is inter-
esting that the SCED used in ERCOT is a quadratic programming (QP) problem due to 
the fact that the cost function for the ERCOT system is quadratic [98]-[99]. 
In ERCOT, the SCED application typically minimizes the total real-time dispatch 
cost and determines the optimum generation dispatch while reliability constraints are 
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satisfied. The outputs of SCED also include LMP [101]. Energy and ancillary services 
are co-optimized for available resources in the day-ahead markets of ERCOT. How-
ever, currently, there is no co-optimization for the real-time markets [102]-[103]. Note 
that real-time co-optimization is considered as a new initiative to improve the ERCOT 
real-time markets [102]. 
The SCED application used by ERCOT runs twice per cycle. The two executions 
of SCED per cycle can reduce market power and ensure competition [100]. The first 
SCED execution observes the limits of competitive constraints only and determines 
reference LMPs; the second SCED execution observes the limits of all constraints and 
uses the adjusted energy offer curve based on the results of the first SCED execution. 
SCED produces LMPs as well as the price of system-wide reserves. Real-time contin-
gency analysis identifies a list of constraints that will be sent to SCED and then SCED 
will re-dispatch generation to resolve the constraint violations [104]. 
Comparison 
The RT SCED tools used by various ISOs are similar to each other but they still 
have some different features. A comparison between various ISOs’ RT SCED applica-
tions is presented in Table 2.1. Normally, all six ISOs listed in Table 2.1 automatically 
run RT SCED every 5 minutes. Four ISOs implement a single time-interval RT SCED; 
however, the RT SCEDs used by the other two ISOs (NYISO and CAISO) look multi-
ple intervals ahead but only implement the solution associated with the first interval. 
The actual dispatch signals sent to generators are for the next 5 or 15 minutes for all 
ISOs. All ISOs except ERCOT co-optimize energy and reserves in real-time operations 
49 
 
 
or RT SCEDs. The RT SCED model used in ERCOT is a QP problem due to the fact 
that the cost functions in the ERCOT markets are quadratic. PJM, MISO, and ISO-NE 
execute RT SCED with LP solvers while it is not very clear what formulations are used 
to model the SCED problems in NYISO and CAISO. To follow the most widely used 
features in industry, the SCED implemented in Chapter 5 of this dissertation is a single 
15-minute interval LP based SCED that co-optimizes energy and reserves. 
 
Table 2.1 Comparison between Various ISOs’ RT SCED Applications 
ISO 
Execution 
cycle 
(minutes) 
Single 
period or 
multiple 
periods 
Only imple-
ment the so-
lution of first 
period  
Interval of 
the first 
period 
(minutes) 
Look-
ahead in-
terval 
(minutes) 
Co-opti-
mize en-
ergy and 
reserve 
Model 
PJM 5 single NA 15 15 Yes LP 
MISO 5 single NA 5 5 Yes LP 
ISO-NE 5 single NA 15 15 Yes LP 
NYISO 5 multiple Yes 5 ~60 Yes Unknown 
CAISO 5 multiple Yes 5 Unknown Yes Unknown 
ERCOT 5 single NA 5 5 No QP 
NA denotes not applicable and “Unknown” means the associated information is not available publicly. 
 
2.5 False Data Injection Attacks 
In the EMS of modern power systems, state estimation executes regularly in real-
time and serves as a core function in EMS for monitoring system condition. State esti-
mation can effectively estimate the system status with the data transmitted from remote 
terminal units or local control centers through a communication network. As many ap-
plications such as RTCA and RT SCED rely on state estimation, it is critical to ensure 
the results of state estimation are accurate. Traditional bad data detection in state esti-
mation can detect random bad data that are introduced by large measurement errors. 
However, recent efforts in the literature show that power system state estimation is 
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subject to false data injection attack [105]-[123]. A biased system condition caused by 
an FDI attack may mislead system operators to take incorrect actions which may cause 
severe violations or damage to power systems. Thus, a detection method that can effi-
ciently detect FDI attacks is essential to enhance reliability of power system real-time 
operations. 
2.5.1 FDI Attacks 
FDI attack on power system state estimation has gained significant attention since 
it was first proposed by Liu in [105]. Both random FDI attacks and targeted FDI attacks 
are investigated and case studies show both attacks can change the DC state estimation 
results in an unobservable manner. Even if the attacker only has access to a specific 
subset of meters or can only compromise a limited number of meters, the proposed FDI 
attack can still efficiently launch an attack that will bypass the DC state estimation 
[105]. This proposed FDI attack is extended by the same authors to a generalized FDI 
attack [106]. The attack vector and attack impact are further analyzed and more detailed 
results are presented in [106]. 
Two regimes of attacks, a strong regime and a weak regime, are presented in [107]. 
The strong regime attack has access to a sufficient number of meters and can launch 
unobservable attacks. For the weak regime attack, unobservable attacks cannot be 
launched due to the fact that only a limited number of meters are under attackers’ con-
trol. A generalized likelihood ratio detector is proposed in [107] to detect the weak 
regime attack. 
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A graph theory based algorithm is proposed in [108] to identify the locations where 
attackers can attack with the least-number measurements to keep the attack from being 
detected by AC state estimation. Hacking the least-number measurements would re-
quire minimal efforts of attacker to conduct an attack. Thus, the locations identified by 
the proposed algorithm would be the system vulnerabilities and may need more protec-
tion due to potential FDI attacks. 
It is shown in [109] that attacker is capable of conducting an unobservable attack 
to power systems by introducing false measurements only within a subgraph that is 
determined by the subgraph algorithm proposed in [108]. An unobservable attack may 
result in a false estimated system state and mislead operators to take actions that could 
cause damage to the physical system. Simulation results also show that DC model based 
attacks can be easily detected by AC state estimation while AC model based attacks are 
unobservable. 
Reference [110] extends [109] to investigate the physical consequences of false 
data injection attacks on power system state estimation. In the proposed FDI attack 
approach, a bi-level optimization is first conducted to determine the values of the state 
variables associated with the attack subgraph, which can result in the maximum physi-
cal flow on a target branch; then, those values are used to calculate the false measure-
ments that can bypass AC state estimation. Numerical simulations demonstrate the pro-
posed unobservable attack can cause physical overloads that may result in system dam-
age or even outages. 
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Though the FDI attack approach proposed in [110] can launch an attack that is 
unobservable to system operators and causes branch overloads,  it cannot converge for 
the IEEE-118 test system in a reasonable time [111], which indicates it does not scale. 
Therefore, three computationally efficient algorithms are proposed in [111] to speed-
up the solution time and provide boundaries on system vulnerability. In addition to the 
three algorithms presented in [111], reference [112] proposes a Benders’ decomposition 
based algorithm that can also solve large-scale systems in a reasonable time. In [112], 
vulnerability assessments are performed and conclude that there is a positive correlation 
between the level of congestion and the level of vulnerability. 
Though references [109]-[112] show that the unobservable FDI attack approach 
can physically overload a branch, they all assume that the attacker has knowledge of 
the entire network topology, branch parameters, and generator parameters, status, and 
cost functions. However, all this information is actually very hard to obtain. Therefore, 
an FDI attack model with limited information is proposed in [113]. Simulation results 
demonstrate that the proposed attack model can launch successful attacks with limited 
local information. Built upon [113], [114] proposes an FDI attack model that uses even 
less information than [113]. The information used in this proposed FDI attack model is 
strictly limited to the attack sub-network only. The information outside the attack sub-
network are estimated with measurements within the attack sub-network. Simulation 
results illustrate that the proposed attack model with information only from the attack 
sub-network can launch a successful attack. 
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As illustrated in [105]-[114], attacker can compromise system state through FDI 
attack. Furthermore, attacker can also launch topology attack. In [115], state-preserving 
topology attack is investigated and an algorithm is proposed to determine the minimal 
attack sub-network. With the proposed algorithm, state-preserving topology attack can 
change the topology without being detected and thus is unobservable. 
Built upon [115], a systematic malicious state-and-topology attack strategy is pro-
posed in [116]. This topology attack changes both the state data and topology data of a 
sub-network in order to cover a physical topology attack, which is taking a single or 
multiple branches out of service physically. Numerical simulations show that the pro-
posed state-and-topology attack can cause physical branch overloads and the successful 
rate of such attacks is very high, which indicates that the system is vulnerable to the 
proposed state-and-topology attack. 
2.5.2 FDI Attack Detection 
As introduced above, recent work [105]-[116] demonstrates that power systems 
are subject to FDI attacks which are unobservable and can cause severe physical con-
sequences. Therefore, it is very important to develop effective approaches to detect FDI 
attacks. 
In [117], a specific set of measurements are selected and protected in order to detect 
the FDI attack that is proposed in [105]. Two approaches, brute-force search and pro-
tecting basic measurements, are proposed to strategically identify the smallest set of 
measurements that need to be protected from being manipulated.  
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Random bad data injection and stealth bad data injection are discussed in [118]. 
Random bad data injection can be identified and will not bypass state estimation. How-
ever, state estimation cannot detect stealth bad data injection. Thus, a detection method 
against stealth bad data injection is proposed in [118]. This proposed defense strategy 
conducts real-time statistical analysis on a sequence of data and minimizes the detection 
delay while enforcing the error probability constraints. Numerical simulations demon-
strate that the proposed defense strategy can detect a stealth data injection attack in real-
time at the minimum cost of delay. 
As attacker is typically restricted to a small sub-graph, injected false data is sparse 
in the temporal measurements matrix. In addition, intrinsically, the dimensionality of 
temporal measurements of power grid states is low [119]. Based on these two facts, a 
novel FDI attack detection mechanism is proposed in [119]. Two different methods, 
nuclear norm minimization and low rank matrix factorization, are used in this detection 
mechanism to separate the nominal power grid states and the anomalies. Numerical 
simulations demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed mechanism. 
A real-time mechanism is proposed in [120] to detect FDI attack on power system 
state estimation. Potential anomalies can be identified by evaluating spatiotemporal 
correlation between system states. The proposed detection mechanism consists of three 
phases, spatial-pattern recognition and temporal-pattern-consistencies evaluation, trust-
based voting, and system condition inference. Simulation results demonstrate that the 
proposed FDI attack detection mechanism can provide an accurate and reliable solution. 
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A novel FDI attack detection method is proposed in [121] with the assumption that 
the probability distributions derived from measurement variations among adjacent time 
steps should be consistent or similar. The distance between two probability distribu-
tions, which is calculated by Kullback-Leibler distance, should be small under normal 
condition but can be very large under an FDI attack. Numerical simulations demonstrate 
that the proposed approach can detect most of the attacks by tracking the dynamics of 
measurement variations. 
Based on the generalized likelihood ratio, a new centralized sequential detector is 
proposed in [122] to efficiently detect FDI attacks. The proposed detection approach 
can scale with the number of measurements in the system. In addition, a distributed 
sequential detector that employs the adaptive level-triggered sampling technique is pro-
posed for wide-area monitoring in power systems. Simulation results demonstrate the 
effectiveness of the proposed centralized and distributed FDI detectors. 
A least-budget defense strategy is proposed in [123] to protect power system state 
estimation against FDI attacks. The behavior of a rational attacker is first formulated, 
followed by the investigation of how the attacker and defender interact with each other. 
Selection of the meters that need to be protected is formulated as a mixed integer non-
linear programming problem. Benders’ decomposition is applied to efficiently solve 
this meter selection problem. Numerical simulations demonstrate that the proposed ap-
proach can achieve quality solutions in a reasonable time. 
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2.6 Parallel Computing 
As the rapid development of computer technology, computers with multiple cores 
are easily available today. High performance computing employs multiple threads to 
run computationally heavy programs such as weather forecasting [124]. With the high 
performance computing techniques, a problem can be divided into separate sub-prob-
lems that will be solved simultaneously with multiple processes. High performance 
computing has gained a lot of attention since it can significantly reduce the solution 
time. Another commonly used term for high performance computing is parallel com-
puting. 
Based on memory access pattern, there are basic two types of parallel platforms: 
shared memory and distributed memory. For shared memory based parallel computing, 
the memory of a single computer can be accessed by each thread and all threads share 
the same memory. For distributed memory based parallel computing, the memory ac-
cessed by each thread is private to itself and cannot be accessed by other threads. 
A number of tools that provide user-friendly interfaces have been developed to 
support parallel programming. It makes parallel programming attainable for real-world 
applications. Some popular parallel computing tools include Pthreads [125], Message 
Passing Interface [126], MPJ Express [127]-[128], Compute Unified Device Architec-
ture [129], and Coarray [130]. 
There is a tradeoff between the costs and benefits of implementing parallel com-
puting. The costs include the added programming difficulty, new classes of bugs in a 
parallel program, and expensive hardware. In general, small-scale problems are not 
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worth the effort for implementing parallel computing. For computationally intense ap-
plications, the benefits may outweigh the costs as the solution time can be significantly 
reduced. 
2.6.1 Motivation of Parallelism 
Though parallel programming is much more complex to implement than sequential 
programming and it is harder to maintain parallel programs than sequential programs, 
parallel computing is gradually gaining popularity. A variety of reasons for using par-
allel computing are listed below: 
• Sequential program is not able to fully use the computer resources with multiple 
central processing units (CPUs). 
• A number of standardized parallel libraries are available, which makes the im-
plementation of parallel programming easier. 
• There is a need to solve large-scale computationally expensive problems in a 
limited time window. With the speed-up benefit provided by parallelism, it be-
comes possible for solving computationally challenging problems in real-time. 
• Computers with multiple cores can be easily obtained. 
• The cost of cluster, large parallel platform, keeps decreasing while the quality 
keeps increasing. 
• Multicore systems with parallel computing can break the bottleneck caused by 
the limited efficiency improvement of one single CPU. 
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Thus, parallel computing is implemented in this dissertation to speed-up the solu-
tion time for contingency analysis and corrective transmission switching since both of 
them are parallelizable and easily to implement. 
It is worth mentioning that there may be some serial sections that cannot be divided 
into sub-tasks in a parallel program. In addition, certain problems are very hard to par-
allelize and have to be solved sequentially. 
2.6.2 Amdahl’s Law 
The concept of speedup that could be achieved by parallel computing is defined as 
the equation given below, 
𝑆𝑛 = 𝑇𝑠/𝑇𝑛      (2.5) 
where, n denotes the number of threads; Ts  denotes the computational time of the se-
quential program; and Tn  denotes the computational time of the parallel program with 
n threads. 
It is intuitive that the serial sections of a parallel program will pose a limit to the 
efficiency of the parallel effectiveness. This is expressed by Amdahl’s Law [131], 
which denotes the maximum possible speedup 𝑆𝑝,𝑚𝑎𝑥 that could be achieved with n 
threads, as given by the equation below, 
𝑆𝑝,𝑚𝑎𝑥 =
1
(1−𝑝)+𝑝 𝑛⁄
     (2.6) 
where p is the proportion of the program for which the code can be parallelized. For 
example, if p=8/9, then the maximum speed-up is 9 no matter how many threads/CPUs 
are used. Application of Amdahl’s Law is to decide whether parallelization is worth-
while. Ideal linear scale may occur when the speedup is n with n threads, i.e. Sn=n. 
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However, serial sections of a program are obstacles to achieve it. It is important to 
recognize the performance bottlenecks of parallel computing in each specific problem. 
They may vary for different applications. 
Though Amdahl’s Law determines maximum speed-up, it is very difficult to 
achieve the maximum speed-up in reality due to the following possible reasons: 
• parallel tasks are not evenly assigned to each thread, 
• cost of communications and synchronizations between threads, 
• cost of invoking and killing threads, 
• cache availability and memory availability. 
Another metric to measure the effectiveness of parallel computing is the parallel 
efficiency as defined below, 
𝐸𝑝 =
𝑆𝑝
𝑝
=
𝑇𝑠
𝑝𝑇𝑝
      (2.7) 
A strategy that may increase parallel efficiency is using n-1 CPUs where n is the 
number of CPUs on a single computer while one CPU is kept idle to deal with the 
regular tasks of operating systems. 
2.6.3 Parallel Computing in Power Systems 
Parallel computing can significantly reduce the computational time as compared to 
sequential simulations. Thus, parallel computing techniques are applied to solve the 
computationally expensive problems in power systems. 
A parallel particle swarm optimization (PSO) algorithm is developed in [132] to 
solve the OPF problem. Numerical studies show that solution time of the PSO algorithm 
can be reduced with parallel computing while quality solutions retain. Another parallel 
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computing based PSO algorithm is developed to solve the dynamic optimal reactive 
power dispatch problem [133]. It is divided into several independent sub-problems that 
can be solved simultaneously. Simulation results show that parallel computing achieves 
significant reduction in solution time. 
A transient stability-constrained unit commitment model is presented in [134]. In 
this model, transient stability constraints are incorporated in the unit commitment prob-
lem. Thus, transient stability-constrained unit commitment is a very intensive problem. 
Parallel computing is conducted to speed up the solution time and simulation results 
demonstrate the effectiveness of parallel computing. 
Transient stability-constrained optimal power flow can minimize the total cost 
while maintaining the stability performance. However, Transient stability-constrained 
optimal power flow is a very complex and intensive problem. To deal with this diffi-
culty, a two-level parallel reduced-space interior point method is proposed in [135]. 
Case studies indicate that the proposed two-level method can obtain quality solutions 
and convergence properties while computational time is largely reduced. A hybrid dy-
namic optimization approach is proposed in [136] to solve stability-constrained optimal 
power flow problem. It is shown that the efficiency and scalability of the proposed 
approach can be improved with parallel acceleration. 
A transient stability analysis application using parallel computing runs in real-time 
at PJM [137]-[138]. This application can complete the simulation every 7 minutes per 
circle on the large-scale practical PJM system that has about 15,000 buses and around 
3,000 generators. In each circle, about 1,000 contingencies are simulated. 
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As described in Section 2.3, transmission switching can benefit the system in var-
ious aspects such as cost reduction. Quality solutions can be obtained even with a single 
switching action. The process to investigate each single switching action is independ-
ent. Thus, parallel computing can be used to develop a scalable TS algorithm. With 
parallel computing, it is possible to implement advanced transmission switching algo-
rithms in real-time. For instance, a parallel implementation of three TS algorithms is 
presented in [139]. 
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3. REAL-TIME CONTINGENCY ANALYSIS 
Flow violations and voltage violations can compromise secure operations of power 
systems and cause system damage. It is worth noting that even if no violation exist in 
the base case, severe violations may still be observed when contingencies occur. In 
addition, contingencies may have negative impact on system stability. Therefore, power 
systems are subject to contingencies and it is very important to conduct real-time con-
tingency analysis to identify critical contingencies that would cause violations. 
As an essential EMS function, real-time contingency analysis runs a series of 
power flow studies simulating each contingency in the contingency list and determines 
the critical contingencies and the associated flow violations and voltage violations, 
which allows operators to be aware of the potential system vulnerabilities beforehand. 
Thus, with RTCA, operators can make corrective control schemes such as the proposed 
CTS strategy in advance and implement them to handle post-contingency violations 
only when a critical contingency actually occurs; alternatively, operators can also pro-
actively adjust the system to eliminate those potential post-contingency violations. 
To determine the system vulnerabilities and examine the performance of the pro-
posed CTS strategy for post-contingency violation management, RTCA is first per-
formed and the results are analyzed in this chapter; then, the proposed CTS technique 
to handle the potential post-contingency violations is studied in the next chapter. 
An assumption made in this dissertation is that all elements are equipped with pro-
tection devices. Thus, an element that is under contingency would be completely de-
energized and removed from the system. 
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Most of the work presented in this chapter and the next chapter have been done as 
a part of the project, “Robust Adaptive Topology Control”, under the Green Electricity 
Network Integration program funded by Advanced Research Projects Agency - Energy 
under U.S. DOE. 
3.1 Modeling 
OpenPA version 1 [140] is used as the AC power flow solver in this dissertation. 
It is an open-source tool written in Java and it was initially developed in 2013. It does 
not have the capability of enforcing the generator reactive power limits. However, the 
author of this dissertation has implemented that functionality in this tool. Note that 
switched shunts and transformer taps are fixed in the fast decoupled power flow algo-
rithm implemented in this tool. This tool also assumes that the contingency element is 
isolated from the main grid and is entirely removed from the system model. 
In the case of a branch contingency, it is assumed that all generators remain at the 
same generation level as the pre-contingency condition. The change in losses is re-
flected by the slack bus. 
In the case of a generator contingency, it is not practical to pick up the entire gen-
eration loss only by the slack bus. Thus, a simple fast participation factor based ap-
proach is used in this dissertation to re-dispatch the generations after a generator con-
tingency. Due to data availability, inertia and reserve are not used to calculate the par-
ticipation factors. The upper limit of generator’s active power may be violated if a ca-
pacity based participation factor is implemented. Therefore, as shown in (3.1) and (3.2), 
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an available capacity based participation factor is implemented in this dissertation to 
perform generation re-dispatch after a generator contingency,  
𝐹𝑔𝑐 =
𝑃𝑔,𝑚𝑎𝑥−𝑃𝑔
0
∑ (𝑃𝑔,𝑚𝑎𝑥−𝑃𝑔
0)∀𝑔,𝑔≠𝑐
    (3.1) 
𝑃𝑔
𝑐 = 𝑃𝑔
0 + 𝑃𝑐
0𝐹𝑔𝑐     (3.2) 
where 𝐹𝑔𝑐 is the participation factor of unit g under generator contingency c; 𝑃𝑔
0 is the 
active power output of unit g in the pre-contingency state; 𝑃𝑐
0 is the MW output of the 
contingency generator c in the pre-contingency state; and 𝑃𝑔
𝑐 is the active power output 
of unit g under generator contingency c in the post-contingency situation. Note that this 
method can be easily modified to consider generator ramping limits or use other partic-
ipation factors. 
3.2 Contingency List 
For a large-scale system, there could be thousands of possible contingencies. As 
introduced in Section 2.2.5, the ISOs only simulate selected contingencies. However, 
to provide a comprehensive study, all potential important contingencies excluding ra-
dial branches are simulated in this dissertation. The low-voltage network is usually re-
ferred to as distribution network or sub-transmission network, which is not a main con-
cern to the ISOs. Thus, low-voltage (less than or equal to 70 kV) branches are not in-
cluded in the contingency lists for ERCOT and PJM. Similarly, low-voltage branches 
and low-voltage buses are excluded in the monitored set for ERCOT and PJM. For a 
transformer, the voltage of high-voltage end is considered to be its voltage level in this 
dissertation. 
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A bus is defined as a one-bus-island if it connects to only one bus. In Fig. 3.1, load 
bus m is a one-bus-island since it only connects to bus n. If branch 1 experiences a 
forced outage, the flow on it in the pre-contingency situation will be entirely transferred 
to branch 2 in the post-contingency situation and no other network flow would change. 
If a contingency on branch 1 causes flow violation on branch 2, the only solution for 
reducing that violation is to shed the load at bus m; and transmission switching will not 
provide any benefit in this case. The main goal of this chapter and Chapter 4 is to in-
vestigate the potential benefits of corrective transmission switching in terms of post-
contingency violation reduction. Therefore, the branches that connect to one-bus-is-
lands are excluded in the contingency list in this dissertation. 
 
m n
Transmission 
networkBranch 2
Branch 1
 
Fig. 3.1 Illustration of a One-Bus-Island. 
 
3.3 Critical Contingencies 
A contingency that does not cause any violation will not be considered as a critical 
contingency in this dissertation. It is not uncommon that a contingency only causes a 
very small amount of violations, which is negligible. Therefore, tolerances are used to 
determine the critical contingencies that would cause significant violations. A contin-
gency is considered to be critical if it causes violations beyond the tolerances. In this 
dissertation, the tolerances are set to 5 MVA for flow violation and 0.005 per unit for 
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voltage violation. Both metrics are based on an aggregate level. To be more specific, 
only contingencies that cause a total flow violation greater than 5 MVA or a total volt-
age violation greater than 0.005 per unit will be considered to be critical. In this disser-
tation, the voltage upper limit and lower limit are set to 0.9 per unit and 1.1 per unit 
respectively. 
3.4 Case Studies 
Three large-scale real power systems are used for the studies in this chapter and 
Chapter 4. They are the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) system, the ERCOT sys-
tem, and the PJM system. The computer platform used in Section 3.4 and Section 4.4 
is a 64-bit Windows 7 Enterprise operating system that has four physical Intel(R) 
Core(TM) i7-3770 3.40 GHz CPUs. Each physical core can be hyper-threaded, which 
means that eight logical threads are available on that computer platform. The simulation 
for the TVA model and the ERCOT model are performed with one single thread via a 
sequential program, while the simulations for the PJM model are performed with six 
threads via a parallel program due to the computationally complexity of the PJM model. 
The TVA cases are created based on the data provided for three days (72 hours) of 
September 2012. The modified TVA network contains about 1,800 buses and 2,300 
branches and more detailed information can be found in [141]. The data received from 
ERCOT and PJM are the original EMS snapshots. Three snapshots of the ERCOT sys-
tem and 167 snapshots of the PJM system are studied in this dissertation. No modifica-
tion is made to those EMS real-time cases. The 167 snapshots of the PJM system rep-
resent the data of seven consecutive days, from July 14th (Sunday) to July 20th 2013, in 
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hourly resolution. The ERCOT system consists of around 6,400 buses and 7,800 
branches. PJM is the largest system among those three systems and it contains about 
15,500 buses and 20,500 branches. The details of those three systems are presented in 
Table 3.1. One difference between the TVA system and the other two systems is that 
the network topology is fixed for the TVA cases while it varies in different scenarios 
for the ERCOT system and the PJM system. 
 
Table 3.1 Description of the Practical Systems 
System # of sce-
narios 
Load (Real GW, 
Reactive GVAr) 
# of 
buses 
# of gen-
erators 
# of 
branches 
# of 
lines 
# of trans-
formers 
TVA 72 ~(24.0, 4.0) ~1,800 ~350 ~2,300 ~1700 ~600 
ERCOT 3 ~(56.9, 7.6) ~6,400 ~700 ~7,800 ~6,150 ~1,650 
PJM 167 ~(139.0, 22.4) ~15,500 ~2,800 ~20,500 ~14,300 ~6,200 
 
Power flow convergence is a common technical hurdle that has received a lot of 
attention in the literature. This issue is beyond the scope of this dissertation and the 
contingency power flows that do not converge are simply ignored. It is worth mention-
ing that the divergence rate for the three practical systems is around 0.1%, which is very 
low and will not affect the statistical results and the associated conclusions in this dis-
sertation. 
Table 3.2 shows the cumulative statistical results of TVA, ERCOT, and PJM over 
all cases examined. The last row presents the cumulative results of those three systems. 
Over 1.5 million contingencies are checked for potential system vulnerabilities. Though 
less than 1% of the contingencies simulated cause network violations, the system secu-
rity is still subject to a subset of contingencies. 
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Table 3.3 shows the average statistical results of TVA, ERCOT, and PJM over all 
cases examined. There are about 59, 13, and 48 critical contingencies per scenario on 
average for the TVA system, the ERCOT system, and the PJM system, respectively. 
 
Table 3.2 Cumulative Statistics of Contingency Analysis 
System 
# of sce-
narios 
# of contingen-
cies simulated 
# of contingencies 
not converged 
# of contingencies 
that cause violations 
# of critical contin-
gencies 
TVA 72 126,449 130 15,540 4,272 
ERCOT 3 13,044 12 52 40 
PJM 167 1,437,749 1,757 11,100 8,064 
"Sum" 242 1,577,242 1,899 26,692 12,376 
Table 3.3 Average Statistics of Contingency Analysis 
System 
# of sce-
narios 
# of contingencies 
simulated 
# of contingencies 
not converged 
# of contingencies 
that cause violations 
# of critical 
contingencies 
TVA 72 1,756 1.8 215.8 59.3 
ERCOT 3 4,348 4 17.3 13.3 
PJM 167 8,609.3 10.5 66.5 48.3 
 
3.5 Parallel Computing 
The parallel computing tool used for the analysis in this dissertation is MPJ Ex-
press, an open source Java parallel computing library. The hardware used for the paral-
lel computing simulations conducted in this section and Section 4.5 is cluster “cab” 
[142] at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. 
Table 3.4 shows the average solution time with different threads for the contin-
gency analysis simulations conducted on three large-scale practical systems. Note that 
simulations with less than 8 threads are not performed on the PJM system due to com-
putational complexity. It is observed that as the number of threads increases, the solu-
tion time decreases as expected. The solution time for the TVA system comes down to 
0.70 seconds with 128 threads as compared to 48.55 seconds for a sequential run with 
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a single thread. The sequential contingency analysis takes about 900 seconds for the 
ERCOT system, which is reduced to around 10 seconds by using parallel computing 
with 128 threads. For the PJM system, the solution time reduces to about two minutes 
with 128 threads from almost half an hour with 8 threads. Therefore, it demonstrates 
the effectiveness and efficiency of parallel computing for contingency analysis problem 
on the TVA, ERCOT, and PJM systems. 
 
Table 3.4 Average Solution Time of RTCA with Different Threads 
 Average solution time / s 
# of threads 1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 
TVA 48.55 24.54 12.72 6.88 3.67 2.00 1.11 0.70 
ERCOT 898.84 454.82 231.12 122.69 62.96 33.04 17.56 10.09 
PJM NA NA NA 1633.76 855.72 444.75 233.78 128.41 
NA: not applicable. 
 
Fig. 3.2 shows the solution time of RTCA with different threads on the ERCOT 
system. It is obvious that the solution time decreases as the number of threads increases 
and it is very convincing that parallel computing can significantly relieve computational 
burden. 
Overhead, the indirect or excess undesired computation time, would increase as the 
number of threads increases, which would result in reduction of parallel efficiency. As 
shown in Fig. 3.3, the parallel efficiency for contingency analysis decreases as the num-
ber of threads increases. However, the parallel efficiency is still very high (80%) with 
128 threads, which indicates parallel computing for contingency analysis is worth im-
plementing. 
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Fig. 3.2 Average Solution Time of RTCA on the ERCOT System. 
 
 
Fig. 3.3 Average Parallel Efficiency of RTCA on the PJM System. 
 
3.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter, traditional real-time contingency analysis is performed on three 
large-scale practical power systems, TVA, ERCOT, and PJM. The contingency list is 
first generated and, then, critical contingencies are identified by performing contin-
gency analysis. Numerical simulations show that each system is vulnerable and the sys-
tem security is subject to several critical contingencies. Since the simulation for each 
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contingency scenario is independent, parallel computing is implemented to speed up 
the RTCA process. In the next chapter, corrective transmission switching will be per-
formed on those critical contingencies and the potential benefits, with respect to post-
contingency violation reduction, that can be achieved with CTS will be investigated. 
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4. REAL-TIME CONTINGENCY ANALYSIS WITH CORREC-
TIVE TRANSMISSION SWITCHING 
Failure of system elements may have negative effects on the power system secu-
rity. Thus, real-time contingency analysis is essential to examine the system condition. 
With RTCA, the potential post-contingency violations would be identified and reported 
to system operators. Then, preventive and corrective strategies can be determined in 
advance to eliminate the system vulnerabilities. Transmission switching is proposed in 
this dissertation as a corrective strategy to reduce violations and maintain a reliable 
system. 
In Chapter 3, it is assumed that the contingency element would be entirely removed 
from the system model. This assumption also holds for corrective transmission switch-
ing. A branch that is switched out of service is also modeled as fully de-energized with 
breakers at both ends of the branch opened. 
Real-time contingency analysis is an essential module of modern energy manage-
ment systems and is the key to foreseeing the potential post-contingency violation that 
may reduce system security margin as introduced in Section 2.2 and Chapter 3. Multiple 
traditional strategies such as economic dispatch are available to deal with post-contin-
gency violations. However, they may be costly. Therefore, corrective transmission 
switching is proposed as an inexpensive alternative to the traditional corrective strate-
gies. CTS is a switching action that temporarily reconfigures the network by taking a 
branch out of service shortly after a contingency occurs to achieve a particular goal, 
which is violation reduction in this dissertation. 
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The procedure for real-time contingency analysis with corrective transmission 
switching is illustrated in Fig. 4.1. The system condition in the pre-contingency situa-
tion, referred to as the initial point, is simulated by running a power flow program for 
the basic case. Contingency analysis is then performed to identify critical contingencies 
that would cause violations beyond the thresholds. Those identified critical contingen-
cies are then examined by the corrective transmission switching routine. For each crit-
ical contingency, switching candidates in the CTS list will be enumerated and the top 
five beneficial switching solutions will be identified, which will provide system opera-
tors with choices. This process repeats until all critical contingencies are examined. 
 
Start
Monitor system states
Perform contingency 
analysis
Identify critical 
contingencies
Generate switching 
candidate rank list
Check each CTS action
Select top 5 switching 
solutions
End
c=1
c=c+1
All critical 
contingencies 
checked?
Yes
No
 
Fig. 4.1 Procedure of Contingency Analysis with Corrective Transmission Switching. 
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4.1 Concept of CTS 
Transmission switching disconnects a transmission element out of service shortly 
after a contingency occurs to reduce violations. This is referred to as corrective trans-
mission switching, which is the proposed approach for handling post-contingency vio-
lations. Note that only one corrective switching action will be implemented at a time. 
This section will present the fundamentals on how corrective transmission switch-
ing functions as an effective corrective mechanism in terms of post-contingency viola-
tion reduction. 
The voltage contours of the pre-contingency, post-contingency, and post-switching 
stages in Fig. 4.2 show that CTS fully eliminates all the voltage violations caused by a 
transmission contingency. The network shown in Fig. 4.2 is a 500 kV level portion of 
the TVA system, which is lightly loaded for this particular case. In the pre-contingency 
state, the line that is the CTS solution produces reactive power, which travels through 
the contingency line into the eastern area of this network. In the post-contingency state, 
more than the required reactive power has to stay in the affected area since the contin-
gency line is no longer available to deliver the excessive reactive power out of this area, 
which leads to over-voltage violations. In the post-switching state, the source element 
producing the excessive reactive power, which is identified as the switching solution, 
is removed from the system; hence, all the over-voltage violations are eliminated. 
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Fig. 4.2 An Example of Voltage Violations Fully Eliminated by CTS [141]. 
 
Fig. 4.3 shows an example in which CTS fully eliminates the flow violations 
caused by a transmission contingency. It is simplified from an actual example of the 
TVA system. The branch loading levels in the pre-contingency, post-contingency, and 
post-switching states are presented in Table 4.1. This example demonstrates flow vio-
lations can be eliminated with CTS. 
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Fig. 4.3 An Example of Flow Violations Fully Eliminated by CTS. 
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Table 4.1 Branch Loading Levels in the Pre-Contingency, Post-Contingency, and Post-Switching 
States for the Example Shown in Fig. 4.3 
Branch 
FromBus - toBus 
Loading level 
Pre-contingency Post-contingency Post-switching 
1-2 44% NA NA 
2-3 40% -4% -4% 
1-4 74% 104% 46% 
4-5 75% 122% 29% 
5-6 49% 96% NA 
1-7 2% 7% 27% 
8-10 26% 31% 45% 
9-10 38% 46% 67% 
10-11 9% 22% 56% 
 
The two parallel lines connecting bus 1 and bus 4 are identical, which indicates that 
the power flows on them will be the same. The negative sign in Table 4.1 means the 
flows travel in the opposite direction of the reference direction. All branch flows are 
within the capacity limits in the pre-contingency state. In the post-contingency state, 
more power must travel through the path with bus 1, 4, 5, and bus 6 on it to serve the 
load pocket area, which causes overloads on line 1-4 and line 4-5. By simply switching 
line 5-6 out of service, the power can still be delivered to the same load pocket through 
other route while the post-contingency flow violations are eliminated. This particular 
case represents a total flow violation of 96.1 MVA which is fully eliminated with one 
single switching action and no additional violation is introduced. 
Though the switching action significantly increases flows on lines 9-10 and 10-11 
in the post-switching situation in this example, it may not cause a significant change in 
market settlement as CTS is proposed as a corrective action for contingency situations 
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only. The market settlement for emergency situations is different with the market set-
tlement for normal situations. Manual adjustments may be involved and abnormal mar-
ket results would be avoided. 
4.2 Metrics 
Two metrics, average violation reduction at an aggregate level and Pareto improve-
ment (PI) at an elemental level, are proposed in this dissertation to determine whether 
a switching action is beneficial. Another metric, depth, is proposed to estimate the ef-
fectiveness of the proposed CTS algorithms. Note that depth will not be used to identify 
the beneficial CTS solutions. 
4.2.1 Average Violation Reduction 
Average of violation reduction in percent (average violation reduction) is proposed 
in this dissertation to investigate how much violation can be reduced with CTS. This 
metric measures the effectiveness of CTS at an aggregate level and is defined in (4.1), 
𝜂𝐶𝑇𝑆 = ∑ 𝑤𝑐(𝑣𝑐0 − 𝑣𝑐1)/𝑣𝑐0
𝑁𝑐
𝑐=1 × 100%    (4.1) 
where, 𝑣𝑐0 denotes the aggregate violation in the post-contingency situation under con-
tingency c; 𝑣𝑐1 denotes the aggregate violation in the post-switching situation under 
contingency c; 𝑤𝑐 denotes the probability of contingency c; and 𝑁𝑐 denotes the number 
of critical contingencies identified in the RTCA simulations. 
Note that this metric can also be used to perform overall statistical analysis over 
multiple scenarios for the same system. For instance, 𝑁𝑐 could be the total number of 
critical contingencies across the entire week with scenarios of hourly resolution and c 
is the index of critical contingency in the 167 scenarios simulated on the PJM system. 
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In this dissertation, for simplicity, it is assumed that the probabilities for each contin-
gency are equal. Then, (4.1) can be replaced by (4.2) to calculate average violation 
reduction. 
𝜂𝐶𝑇𝑆 =
1
𝑁𝑐
∑ (𝑣𝑐0 − 𝑣𝑐1)/𝑣𝑐0
𝑁𝑐
𝑐=1 × 100%   (4.2) 
4.2.2 Pareto Improvement 
Though the post-contingency violations may be reduced at an aggregate level by 
implementing a switching action, certain individual violations may increase or addi-
tional violations may be introduced. Therefore, analyzing the effect of CTS at an ele-
mental level is also very important and Pareto improvement is proposed to investigate 
this issue. A switching action can be considered as a solution with Pareto improvement 
only when it does not cause any new violation and does not increase any existing post-
contingency violation. A beneficial switching action with Pareto improvement can re-
duce the post-contingency violation at an aggregate level without causing additional 
violation on any element. 
The proposed concept of Pareto improvement for CTS can be illustrated with Table 
4.2. This table shows the results of four independent CTS solutions for the same con-
tingency, which causes overloading violations on line 1 and line 2. 
The first switching action can completely eliminate the violations on line 1 and line 
2 at the cost of introducing an additional violation on line 3. Though the overall viola-
tion is reduced by 90%, it is not a solution that provides Pareto improvement due to the 
additional violation on line 3. The second CTS solution eliminates the flow violation 
on line 2 and does not cause any new violation; however, it increases the flow violation 
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on line 1 by 10 MVA, which means this solution also does not provide Pareto improve-
ment. In the post-switching state with implementation of the third CTS solution, no 
flow violation exists; however, a new voltage violation introduced by CTS is detected. 
Hence, the third switching action will not be considered as a beneficial CTS solution 
when Pareto improvement is required. The last solution is the only CTS solution in this 
example that provides Pareto improvement. Though the flow violation on line 1 remain 
the same after implementation of this CTS action, the total violation is reduced and no 
additional violation is observed. Therefore, the fourth CTS action is a solution with 
Pareto improvement. 
 
Table 4.2 Examples for Illustrating the Concept of Pareto Improvement for CTS 
State CTS Solution Flow violation Voltage violation 
Post-contingency 
NA Line 1: 40MVA flow violation, 
Line 2: 60MVA flow violation, 
No flow violation on other lines. 
No voltage violation 
Post-switching 
1 Line 3: 10MVA flow violation, 
No flow violation on other lines. 
No voltage violation 
2 Line 1: 50MVA flow violation, 
No flow violation on other lines. 
No voltage violation 
3 No flow violation 0.1 per unit over-voltage 
violation at bus 1 
4 Line 1: 40MVA flow violation No voltage violation 
 
Small amounts of additional violation beyond post-contingency violations after 
switching will be considered as noise and will not be considered as a violation of Pareto 
improvement. Thus, tolerances are used to measure PI. In this dissertation, the tolerance 
is 0.005 per unit for individual voltage violation and 5 MVA for individual flow viola-
tion. For instance, for the example shown in Table 4.2, if the flow violation on line 1 is 
just 41 MW for the second CTS solution, then, the second CTS action is considered to 
80 
 
 
be a beneficial solution that provides PI, since the additional 1 MW violation is within 
the tolerance and thus is ignored. 
4.2.3 Depth 
In this dissertation, depth is proposed to estimate the effectiveness of the proposed 
CTS algorithms. Depth is defined as the location of the identified beneficial switching 
action in the candidate list for a particular contingency. It is worth mentioning that depth 
is proposed to evaluate the efficiency of the proposed CTS algorithm rather than iden-
tifying a beneficial switching solution. The average depth can be calculated with the 
equation below, 
𝐷𝐶𝑇𝑆 =
1
𝑀𝑐
∑ 𝐿𝐶𝑇𝑆,𝑐
𝑀𝑐
𝑐=1       (4.3) 
where 𝐿𝐶𝑇𝑆,𝑐 denotes the location of the CTS solution in the candidate list for contin-
gency 𝑐 and 𝑀𝑐 is the number of critical contingencies for which at least a beneficial 
CTS solution exists. 
4.3 Algorithms 
Four heuristic algorithms are proposed in this dissertation to generate the candidate 
switching list. They are listed below. 
• Closest branches to contingency element (CBCE), 
• Closest branches to violation element (CBVE), 
• Regular Data mining (RDM), 
• Enhanced Data Mining (EDM). 
The beneficial switching branches are typically very close to the contingency ele-
ment or violation elements. Thus, two proximity based algorithms CBCE and CBVE 
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are proposed to create the candidate list. Inspired by the observation that the switching 
branches come from a small subset of branches, RDM is proposed to generate the can-
didate CTS list. Customizing the candidate switching list for different contingencies 
may substantially improve algorithm performance. Thus, EDM, an enhanced version 
of RDM, is developed. Complete enumeration (CE) is also implemented in this disser-
tation as a benchmark to gauge the performance of the proposed heuristics. 
4.3.1 CBCE and CBVE 
Theoretically, the CBVE method may have a more robust performance than the 
CBCE method. In the case of a branch contingency, the violations are very close to the 
contingency branch. The candidate list of switching lines generated by CBCE would be 
very similar to CBVE. Therefore, CBVE method would perform almost the same with 
CBCE method. In the case of a generator contingency, it is possible that the violations 
are far away from the contingency-generator since the generators including those that 
are far from the contingency are re-dispatched. This may cause violations that are not 
close to the contingency. In this case, the candidate list for CBCE may consist of 
branches that are not near the violations and CBCE may not be able to relieve the vio-
lation. Therefore, CBVE would perform better than CBCE. In this dissertation, the 
lengths of the candidate list for CBCE and CBVE are the same and each of the candidate 
list consists of exactly 100 branches. 
The distance of one element to another element used by CBCE and CBVE is the 
number of branches in the shortest path connecting these two elements. The shortest 
path has the smallest sum of the weights of its constituent branches. In this dissertation, 
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the weights of all branches are equal. Therefore, neither the electrical distance in ohms 
nor the real distance in miles is involved. The proximity of two elements is only deter-
mined by the network topology, which makes it easy to implement the proposed algo-
rithms CBCE and CBVE. 
4.3.2 RDM 
Data mining method shows that beneficial switching actions are limited to a subset 
of branches that can be determined by enumerating all possible switching actions on 
the historical real-time EMS data. The candidate CTS list for a particular scenario con-
sists of the beneficial switching solutions identified in advance with other scenarios of 
the same system. Tolerances can be used to filter out the solutions that provide trivial 
benefits. Three different RDM methods with different tolerances are investigated in this 
dissertation. They are referred to as RDM1, RDM2, and RDM3. No tolerance is applied 
for RDM1; thus, even the CTS solution that provide negligible benefit will be listed as 
a beneficial candidate. RDM2 uses 5% as the tolerance so that only the solutions that 
provide more than 5% improvement will be considered as CTS candidates. RDM3 uses 
10% as the tolerance; thus, the length of the candidate switching list for RDM3 is min-
imal, which would result in the least computational time. 
The RDM method is examined only on the TVA system in this dissertation. Due 
to the fact that only a very small number of the ERCOT cases are available, it is not 
reasonable to conduct the RDM approach on the ERCOT system. The RDM algorithm 
is also not performed on the PJM system due to the following two reasons: 1) it is 
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extremely time-consuming to identify the beneficial CTS solutions by performing com-
plete enumeration on all the 167 scenarios of the PJM system because of its large-scale 
feature and computational challenge; 2) PJM real-time data have different network to-
pologies for different hours and it is extremely difficult to match the branch between 
different hourly scenarios given that only very limited data are available. 
For the TVA system, there are three days’ data or 72 cases that are divided into two 
categories, training set and test set. The training set contains two days’ data while the 
test set contains the other day’s data. CE is performed for each critical contingency on 
the training cases and identifies the beneficial switching actions; those identified 
switching actions form the candidate CTS list for the cases in the test set. Note that the 
candidate CTS list is the same for different critical contingencies. 
4.3.3 EDM 
The candidate list of the RDM approach contains the same set of switching actions 
for all the critical contingencies. However, this would unnecessarily make the list 
lengthy and inefficient since the beneficial switching solutions for a contingency may 
fail to reduce the violations caused by other contingencies. 
A switching action that reduces the violation for a particular contingency in one 
scenario may also provide benefits for the same contingency under a different scenario 
but may not provide any benefit for other contingencies. Inspired by this idea, the EDM 
approach that uses different candidate switching lists for different contingencies is pro-
posed. Similar to the regular data mining heuristic, the EDM heuristic is also a static 
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lookup table based approach. Though the switching list for each contingency is identi-
fied beforehand for both heuristics, EDM is much faster and more effective than RDM, 
since the candidate switching list for EDM is customized for each contingency and is 
much shorter than RDM. 
PJM switching solutions as listed in [48] indicate that the beneficial switching so-
lutions for the same contingency would probably remain the same even if load profile 
varies, which is consistent with the philosophy behind the proposed EDM approach. 
The procedure for the EDM study in this dissertation consists of two stages. The 
first stage is to determine the candidate switching actions using historical data in the 
training set and the second stage is to investigate the performance of the EDM heuristic, 
with the candidate CTS actions identified in the first stage, on different cases in the test 
set. 
Stage 1: Determination of Candidates CTS List 
To illustrate the methodology of the proposed EDM heuristic, it is assumed that 
multiple historical scenarios of the system conditions are available, which is reasonable 
and practical for real power systems. These scenarios form the training set for deter-
mining the static lookup table offline. The associated procedure is described below: 
1) For each scenario, RTCA is conducted to identify the critical contingencies. 
2) For each critical contingency identified in step 1), complete enumeration of 
all switchable branches is performed to determine the best switching action. 
3) By examining all historical scenarios, a lookup table consisting of beneficial 
switching solutions for the CTS application can then be created. 
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The lookup table contains the critical contingencies and the associated best CTS solu-
tions identified from the scenarios in the training set. 
Fig. 4.4 shows the flowchart of the proposed EDM heuristic for the CTS applica-
tion. RTCA is conducted on the historical scenarios to identify critical contingencies 
with potential violations. All the identified critical contingencies are sent to the CTS 
routine along with all possible solutions in the candidate list. After this process is com-
pleted, the best CTS solutions for the same contingency in different scenarios can then 
form the candidate switching list for the test cases that will be examined in stage 2. 
 
Start
Scenario s in training set
Record the best 
CTS solution 
for contingency 
c  in scenario s
Run RTCA to determine 
critical contingencies Cs
Perform CE for critical 
contingency c in Cs
All critical 
contingencies in Cs 
checked?
No
Yes
All scenarios 
in training set 
examined?
No
End
Yes
 
Fig. 4.4 Flowchart of the Proposed EDM Heuristic. 
 
Stage 2: Performance of the proposed EDM heuristic 
Stage 2 investigates the performance of the proposed EDM heuristic by examining 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the same CTS solutions, pre-determined for each 
critical contingency in stage 1, on cases that are different with the historical scenarios 
used in stage 1. 
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Similar to the RDM approach, only the TVA system is used to validate the effec-
tiveness of the EDM approach in this dissertation. The first two days or 48 hours that 
represent the historical cases are used to determine the candidate switching list for each 
critical contingency identified on those cases, which corresponds to stage 1. Then, those 
pre-determined candidate lists are checked for the CTS performance on the remaining 
24 cases in stage 2. The EDM heuristic that uses a candidate list without any tolerance 
for improvement is referred to as EDM1. Candidate list with a tolerance of 5% is re-
ferred to as EDM2, while the list for EDM3 corresponds to a tolerance of 10%. 
4.3.4 Complete Enumeration 
Complete enumeration is implemented in this dissertation to evaluate the effective-
ness of the proposed heuristics. Complete enumeration can guarantee the optimal solu-
tion but that comes at the cost of a long solution time, which is not practical for real-
time applications. Thus, it is only used to provide a basis for evaluating the proposed 
heuristics. 
4.4 Case Studies 
Numerical simulations are performed on the TVA, ERCOT, and PJM systems to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed CTS algorithms for relieving the post-
contingency violations. The computer platform used in Section 4.4 is the same as the 
computer used in Section 3.4. The simulations on the TVA system and the ERCOT 
system are performed with only one single thread via a sequential program. Due to 
computationally complexity, parallel computing with six threads is applied to solve the 
PJM system. 
87 
 
 
Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 show the cumulative statistical results and the average 
statistical results respectively. The results are associated with the first best switching 
actions reported from the CBVE method without consideration of Pareto improvement. 
The first best switching action is defined as the solution that the associated violation 
reduction at an aggregate level is at least as good as the other candidates. 
 
Table 4.3 Cumulative Statistics for the TVA, ERCOT, and PJM Systems 
System 
# of sce-
narios  
# of critical 
contingencies 
# of contingencies 
with violations fully 
eliminated by CTS 
# of contingencies 
with partial violation 
reduced by CTS 
# of contingencies 
with no violation 
reduced by CTS 
TVA 72 4,272 427 (10.0%) 3,535 (82.7%) 310 (7.3%) 
ERCOT 3 40 6 (15%) 27 (67.5%) 7 (17.5%) 
PJM 167 8,064 2,684 (33.3%) 4,554 (56.5%) 826 (10.2%) 
"Sum" 242 12,376 3,117 (25.2%) 8,116 (65.6%) 1,143 (9.2%) 
 
Table 4.4 Average Statistics per Scenario 
System 
# of sce-
narios  
# of critical 
contingencies 
# of contingencies 
with violations fully 
eliminated by CTS 
# of contingencies 
with partial violation 
reduced by CTS 
# of contingencies 
with no violation 
reduced by CTS 
TVA 72 59.3 5.9 49.1 4.3 
ERCOT 3 13.3 2 9 2.3 
PJM 167 48.3 16.1 27.3 4.9 
 
The percentage values in the last column of Table 4.3 denote the ratios of critical 
contingencies where there is no beneficial corrective switching action to the total num-
ber of critical contingencies. They are just around 7%, 18%, and 10% for the TVA, 
ERCOT, and PJM systems respectively. The last row in Table 4.3 shows the statistics 
over the three systems. The overall percent of critical contingencies that have no bene-
ficial CTS solutions is less than 10% among the three systems. The post-contingency 
violations can be completely eliminated for over 25% of the critical contingencies iden-
tified for those three practical systems. 
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Note that there is no minimum threshold used for identifying beneficial CTS in 
Table 4.3 and Table 4.4. Therefore, even the switching actions that provide negligible 
improvement are considered. With 5% and 10% as the thresholds for determining the 
beneficial CTS solutions, the associated results are shown in Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 
respectively. With a threshold of 5%, the CTS solutions that provide less than 5% im-
provement will not be considered to be beneficial solutions and switching actions that 
provide more than 95% improvement will be considered as the solutions that can fully 
eliminate all the post-contingency violations. The statistics are calculated in the same 
manner for a threshold of 10%. As the threshold increases from 0 to 10%, the number 
of critical contingencies where the violations are fully eliminated with CTS increases, 
as well as the number of critical contingencies where there is no beneficial solution. 
Though the overall percent of critical contingencies for which at least a beneficial CTS 
solution exists drops to 61% with a threshold of 10%, the application of CTS for post-
contingency violation reduction is still very promising. 
Table 4.7 shows the average of violation reduction in percentage with CTS. The 
results correspond to the first best switching solutions reported by the CBVE method. 
The average reductions in flow violations are 40%, 53%, and 59% for the TVA, ER-
COT, and PJM systems respectively and the average reductions in voltage violations 
are 36%, 12%, and 20% for those three systems respectively. Note that these statistics 
are associated with the solutions that do not enforce Pareto improvement. If the CTS 
solutions that do not provide Pareto improvement are ignored, only slight negligible 
differences will be observed in those statistics. This implies that most CTS solutions 
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can reduce the violations at an aggregate level while each individual element is not 
adversely affected. 
 
Table 4.5 Cumulative Statistics per System with 5% Tolerance 
System 
# of sce-
narios  
# of critical 
contingencies 
# of contingencies 
with violations fully 
eliminated by CTS 
# of contingencies 
with partial violation 
reduced by CTS 
# of contingencies 
with no violation 
reduced by CTS 
TVA 72 4,272 445 (10.4%) 2,962 (69.3%) 865 (20.2%) 
ERCOT 3 40 9 (22.5%) 11 (27.5%) 20 (50.0%) 
PJM 167 8,064 2,756 (34.2%) 2,049 (25.4%) 3,259 (40.4%) 
"Sum" 242 12,376 3,210 (25.9%) 5022 (40.6%) 4144 (33.5%) 
 
Table 4.6 Cumulative Statistics per System with 10% Tolerance 
System 
# of sce-
narios  
# of critical 
contingencies 
# of contingencies 
with violations fully 
eliminated by CTS 
# of contingencies 
with partial violation 
reduced by CTS 
# of contingencies 
with no violation 
reduced by CTS 
TVA 72 4,272 458 (10.7%) 2,845 (66.6%) 969 (22.7%) 
ERCOT 3 40 9 (22.5%) 8 (20.0%) 23 (57.5%) 
PJM 167 8,064 2,802 (34.7%) 1,433 (17.8%) 3,829 (47.5%) 
"Sum" 242 12,376 3,269 (26.4%) 4,286 (34.6%) 4,821 (39.0%) 
 
Table 4.7 Average Violation Reduction with CTS per System 
System 
Average flow violation reduction Average voltage violation reduction 
Without Pareto 
improvement 
With Pareto im-
provement 
Without Pareto 
improvement 
With Pareto im-
provement 
TVA 40.0% 40.0% 36.2% 35.6% 
ERCOT 53.1% 49.3% 12.3% 12.3% 
PJM 59.3% 59.0% 19.5% 19.3% 
 
4.4.1 TVA Cases 
Table 4.8 lists the results of various CTS methods on the TVA system. Note that 
the results of the EDM heuristic are analyzed from a probabilistic view and are pre-
sented separately later in the same section. 
Typically, it is expected that the CBCE method would perform similar to the CBVE 
method. However, this is not the case for the TVA system since the majority of critical 
contingencies are generator contingencies, which involve generation re-dispatch 
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throughout the entire network and cause violations that are far away from the contin-
gency element. This is the main reason why the results obtained from CBCE and CBVE 
are so different. The CBVE method can reduce flow violations by 40%, which is very 
close to what CE achieves. For the voltage violation reduction, it achieves around 36% 
which is roughly 12% less than CE. However, the solution time for CBVE is less than 
7% of the time that CE takes. The solution time for the CTS methods is averaged over 
all the scenarios simulated and it does not include the solution time for RTCA. To be 
consistent, the solution time for CTS is presented in the same manner throughout this 
dissertation. 
 
Table 4.8 Results of Various CTS Methods on the TVA System 
CTS 
methods 
Average 
solution 
time (s) 
Average flow violation reduction Average voltage violation reduction 
Without Pareto 
improvement 
With Pareto 
improvement 
Without Pareto 
improvement 
With Pareto im-
provement 
CBCE 166.7 15.6% 15.0% 31.8% 30.9% 
CBVE 177.8 40.0% 40.0% 36.2% 35.6% 
RDM1 201.9 40.6% 40.1% 48.1% 47.8% 
RDM2 106.6 40.5% 40.0% 48.1% 47.7% 
RDM3 98.3 40.5% 40.0% 48.0% 47.7% 
CE 2585.3 40.8% 40.3% 48.2% 47.9% 
 
Table 4.8 also presents the results obtained with the three RDM methods intro-
duced in Section 4.3. The RDM methods achieve almost the same results with CE while 
the computational time is significantly reduced. The violation reductions with the three 
RDM methods are very similar. However, RDM3 is the fastest since it has the shortest 
list and it is 26 times faster than CE. 
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Table 4.9 shows the solution time of RTCA and various CTS methods on the TVA 
system. The solution time that CBVE takes is about 4 times longer than the computa-
tional time of RTCA while RDM3 takes just twice the time that is required for perform-
ing RTCA. It is worth noting that RDM3 is over 50 times faster than CE for the case 
that corresponds to the maximum solution time. 
 
Table 4.9 Solution Time of RTCA and Various CTS Methods on the TVA System 
 Solution time (s) 
Average Min Max 
RTCA 45.0 43.4 47.7 
CTS - CBCE 166.7 16.6 346.4 
CTS - CBVE 177.8 17.7 373.0 
CTS - RDM1 201.9 17.9 464.2 
CTS - RDM2 106.6 9.9 230.8 
CTS - RDM3 98.3 9.7 207.0 
CTS - CE 2585.3 208.5 10523.7 
 
Table 4.10 presents the statistics for violation reductions corresponding to the 5 
best switching solutions with the CBVE heuristic. It is observed that the results with 
and without enforcing Pareto improvement are very alike. This means that even if Pa-
reto improvement is not a requirement, most of the identified beneficial switching ac-
tions do not cause any additional violation while the total violations are reduced. The 
average depth of the first best CTS solution for flow violation reduction is just 11, 
which demonstrates that the beneficial switching elements are located very close to the 
violation elements. For voltage violation, the average depths associated with the top 5 
CTS solutions are similar and are around 40. This means that the heuristic algorithm 
CBVE performs in a more effective way on the TVA system for flow violation reduc-
tion as compared to voltage violation reduction. 
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Fig. 4.5 shows the flow violation reductions and voltage violation reductions that 
are associated with the top 5 CTS solutions identified by CBVE without imposing Pa-
reto improvement. The average flow violation reduction and average voltage violation 
reduction are similar with the first best switching actions. However, the curve for volt-
age violation reduction is relatively flat while the flow violation reduction drops signif-
icantly as the rank of beneficial CTS solution decreases. Only top 2 CTS solutions iden-
tified for flow violation reduction provide improvement more than 15% while the fifth 
best CTS solution for voltage violation reduction can achieve over 15% improvement. 
 
Table 4.10 Results of the 5 Best Switching Actions on the TVA System using CBVE 
CTS 
Average flow violation reduction Average voltage violation reduction 
Without Pareto 
improvement 
With Pareto im-
provement 
Without Pareto 
improvement 
With Pareto im-
provement 
Reduc-
tion 
Depth 
Reduc-
tion 
Depth 
Reduc-
tion 
Depth 
Reduc-
tion 
Depth 
1st Best 40.0% 11.0 40.0% 11.1 36.2% 46.1 35.6% 48.8 
2nd Best 27.8% 23.9 27.7% 24.4 25.1% 46.1 24.8% 45.3 
3rd Best 11.7% 54.0 11.7% 54.2 21.8% 39.3 21.6% 37.6 
4th Best 8.6% 52.8 8.5% 52.9 19.5% 39.2 19.3% 38.8 
5th Best 7.2% 47.8 7.2% 47.7 17.9% 39.9 17.7% 37.5 
 
Analysis of Simulation in Stage 1 for EDM 
With RTCA conducted on the scenarios of day 1 and day 2 for the TVA system, 
153 different critical contingencies are identified. CE is performed on all 48 scenarios 
to determine the best CTS solutions for each critical contingency. The best CTS solu-
tions for the same contingency under various historical scenarios in the training set form 
the candidate list for that contingency. 
Random variable 𝛼 is defined as the number of cases for which the same contin-
gency is identified as a critical contingency. Table 4.11 presents the statistics for this 
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random variable. From this table, it is observed that most of the critical contingencies 
could cause violations for different system conditions corresponding to different his-
torical cases. In other words, a contingency that causes violations in one scenario may 
also cause violations in other scenarios. 
 
 
Fig. 4.5 Violation Reduction with the 5 Best Switching Actions Identified by CBVE on TVA. 
 
Random variable 𝜏 is defined in (4.4). In (4.4), 𝛼𝑐 is number of cases where con-
tingency c is identified as a critical contingency and nT is the total number of cases 
examined in this stage. nT is 48 in this dissertation. Thus, 𝜏 denotes the probability of 
a contingency being identified as a critical contingency. 
The statistics for 𝜏 is presented in Table 4.11. The maximum probability of a con-
tingency being identified as a critical contingency is as high as around 90%. The aver-
age number of scenarios in which the same contingency will be identified as a critical 
contingency is 18.7 out of 48, corresponding to a probability of 39.0%. 
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𝜏𝑐 = 𝛼𝑐 𝑛𝑇⁄        (4.4) 
Table 4.11 Statistics for Random Variables 𝛼 and 𝜏 
 Max Min Median Average Standard deviation 
𝛼 43 1 20 18.7 11.1 
𝜏 89.6% 2.1% 41.7% 39.0% 23.1% 
 
Fig. 4.6 shows the cumulative distribution function 𝐹𝜏 of variable 𝜏. It is observed 
that the probability of a contingency being identified as a critical contingency, among 
153 identified critical contingencies obtained in stage 1, is primarily in the range be-
tween 20% and 80%. 
To verify the idea that the beneficial CTS solutions for a contingency will also 
provide violation reduction for the same contingency in a different scenario of the sys-
tem, two random variables γ and β are proposed. Random variable γ denotes the number 
of scenarios where a beneficial CTS solution exists for a critical contingency. Then β, 
as defined in (4.5), denotes the probability that at least a beneficial CTS solution exists 
for an identified critical contingency. The subscript c in (4.5) denotes critical contin-
gency c. 
𝛽𝑐 =
𝛾𝑐
𝛼𝑐
× 100%      (4.5) 
Table 4.12 presents the statistics for random variable β. It shows that the probability 
of existence of beneficial CTS solutions for a critical contingency is extremely high. 
Even if 10% improvement is used as the tolerance for defining a beneficial switching 
action, on average, beneficial CTS solutions are still available to relieve violations 
caused by the same critical contingency for more than 80% of the scenarios. 
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Fig. 4.6 Cumulative Distribution Function of Random Variable 𝜏. 
 
Table 4.12 Statistics for Random Variable β 
Heuristic Tolerance Max Min Median Average Standard deviation 
EDM1 0 100% 0 100% 97.1% 13.84% 
EDM2 5% 100% 0 100% 86.6% 29.0% 
EDM3 10% 100% 0 100% 83.5% 31.3% 
 
Random variable φ is defined as the number of switching actions in the candidate 
list for a critical contingency. Table 4.13 presents the statistics for this random variable. 
The candidate list obtained from EDM is extremely short. The average length is just 
around two, which implies that the added computational time per contingency due to 
CTS is just the solution time that is needed to perform two power flow simulations. 
There are 153 numbers in the sample space for each random variable α, 𝜏, γ, β, and 
φ since there were 153 critical contingencies identified in stage 1. 
 
Table 4.13 Statistics for Random Variable φ 
Tolerance Max Min Median Average Standard deviation 
0 18 0 2 2.39 2.35 
5% 6 0 1 1.66 0.99 
10% 5 0 1 1.58 0.96 
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Analysis of Simulation in Stage 2 for EDM 
Stage 2 aims to justify the proposed data-driven heuristic. Simulations were per-
formed on the 24 hourly scenarios of day 3 for the TVA system to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of the proposed EDM approach. In this stage, RTCA is first conducted on 
the 24 scenarios in the test set from day 3. Overall, 152 critical contingencies that would 
cause network violations are identified. Among those critical contingencies identified 
in stage 2, 84.2% or 128 contingencies are found in the critical contingency list identi-
fied from the 48 scenarios of day 1 and day 2 in the training set. For each critical con-
tingency in stage 2, only the beneficial switching actions identified in stage 1 for the 
corresponding contingencies are examined for the proposed EDM heuristic. 
Table 4.14 presents detailed statistics of the results obtained from RDM, EDM, and 
CE methods respectively. The maximum, minimum, median, average, and standard de-
viation of the solution times per scenario for the different CTS methods are presented 
in Table 4.14. For both RDM and EDM approaches, as the tolerance for defining ben-
eficial CTS solutions increases from 0% to 5%, the solutions time reduces by a large 
factor while the violation reductions stay almost the same; however, further increase in 
the tolerance from 5% to 10% only has a very small effect on the reduction in solution 
time. 
Both voltage violation reduction and flow violation reduction are reported in Table 
4.14. Both RDM and EDM methods are proven to be very effective as they provide 
almost the same violation reductions in comparison to the CE method. The violation 
reductions obtained by the proposed EDM heuristic is only around 1% lower than the 
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RDM and CE methods, while EDM achieves the results in much less solution time. 
EDM1 is around 20 times faster than RDM1 and EDM3 is over 10 times faster than 
RDM3. Moreover, EDM is over 200 times faster than the CE method. In conclusion, 
the proposed EDM heuristics provide near optimal solutions while adding the least 
overhead to the solution time for contingency analysis, which is very promising for 
real-time CTS applications. 
Table 4.15 shows the average number of switching actions in the candidate list per 
contingency and the average solution time for the CTS routine per scenario. In Table 
4.15, nCTS denotes the average number of switching actions per contingency; and T1 
denotes the average solution time of the CTS routine per scenario. It is observed that 
the solution time is linearly correlated with the number of switching actions in the can-
didate list. Obviously, one reason why EDM is much faster than RDM is that the can-
didate list of the proposed EDM approach is much shorter. 
 
Table 4.14 Results of the TVA Cases in the Third Day 
Methods 
Solution times (s) Violation reduction 
max min median average std Flow Voltage 
RDM1 464.2 22.1 208.7 219.5 161.4 39.77% 51.09% 
RDM2 225.9 11.0 103.6 108.3 79.5 39.77% 51.07% 
RDM3 200.7 9.7 90.9 96.1 70.8 39.76% 50.95% 
EDM1 20.9 1.5 10.7 11.1 7.5 38.74% 50.24% 
EDM2 18.0 1.4 9.1 9.6 6.5 38.73% 50.22% 
EDM3 17.6 1.1 8.9 9.3 6.3 38.73% 50.03% 
CE 9636.5 208.5 2003.5 2458.2 2316.9 39.77% 51.22% 
 
Table 4.15 Comparison among a Variety of CTS Methods on the TVA Cases in the Third Day 
 CE RDM1 RDM2 RDM3 EDM1 EDM2 EDM3 
nCTS 1528.9 145.0 64.0 55.0 2.4 1.7 1.6 
T1 (s) 2316.9 219.5 108.3 96.1 11.1 9.6 9.3 
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4.4.2 ERCOT Cases 
Table 4.16 lists the results of various CTS approaches on the ERCOT system. 
CBVE provides almost the same performance with CBCE in terms of voltage violation 
reduction while it results in 10% more reduction in flow violation than CBCE. The 
violation reductions achieved through those two heuristics are very similar to that 
achieved with CE. However, the proposed heuristics are 47 times faster. Note that the 
solution time is the average solution time for the three available scenarios of the ER-
COT system. 
 
Table 4.16 Results of Various CTS Methods on the ERCOT System 
CTS 
methods 
Average 
solution 
time (s) 
Average flow violation reduction Average voltage violation reduction 
Without Pareto 
improvement 
With Pareto 
improvement 
w/o Pareto im-
provement 
w/ Pareto im-
provement 
CBCE 245 40.8% 37.7% 12.1% 12.1% 
CBVE 244 53.1% 49.3% 12.3% 12.3% 
CE 11,505 53.3% 49.3% 14.3% 14.3% 
 
Table 4.17 presents the average, minimum, and maximum solution times of RTCA 
and different CTS heuristics. The overall solution times of the CTS heuristics are found 
to be less than the time taken for RTCA since the number of critical contingencies that 
require CTS is smaller for the ERCOT system compared to the TVA system. The max-
imum solution time to find the CTS actions is close to 6 minutes even for the sequential 
implementation of the CTS heuristics. Note that the solution time of the proposed CTS 
heuristics highly depends on the number of the identified critical contingencies. If all 
contingencies in the contingency list are trivial, then CTS will not be implemented since 
there will be no network violation and the associated solution time for CTS will just be 
zero. 
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Table 4.17 Solution Time of RTCA and Various CTS Methods on the ERCOT System 
 Average (s) Min (s) Max (s) 
RTCA 766.7 575.3 784.9 
CTS - CBCE 244.8 181.5 356.1 
CTS - CBVE 244.2 184.7 349.6 
CTS - CE 11504.7 8728.3 16733.8 
 
Fig. 4.7 shows violation reductions with the 5 best switching actions identified by 
the CBVE algorithm on the ERCOT system. Pareto improvement is not imposed for 
the results shown in Fig. 4.7. All top 5 switching actions can reduce the flow violations 
significantly while the performance of CTS voltage violation reduction is less promis-
ing. The top CTS solutions can reduce the flow violations by 53.1% and even the fifth 
best CTS solutions can reduce the flow violations by 47.2% on average. As for voltage 
violation, the first best CTS solutions provide 12.3% improvement; however, the im-
provement provided by the second best CTS solutions is less than 10% on average and 
the fifth best switching actions provide only 2.8% improvement which is negligible. 
 
 
Fig. 4.7 Violation Reduction with the 5 Best Switching Actions on the ERCOT System. 
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4.4.3 PJM Cases 
Due to large-scale feature of the PJM system, the solution time for simulating 
RTCA and CTS on the PJM system is significantly high. Thus, the PJM system is 
solved with parallel computing using six threads rather than one single thread. 
Table 4.18 shows the results obtained with CBCE and CBVE on the PJM system. 
The flow violation reductions and voltage violation reductions achieved with CBCE 
and CBVE are very similar. The solution times presented in Table 4.18 do not include 
the time of RTCA and it is the average time over all 167 hourly scenarios. It is observed 
from Table 4.19 that the average, minimum, and maximum solution times of those two 
CTS heuristics are very similar. 
Table 4.20 shows the statistics related to the 5 best switching actions identified by 
the CBVE heuristic. The reductions in flow violations for the first and fifth best CTS 
solutions are 59% and 46% respectively. However, for voltage violation, the reduction 
ranges from 20% to 6% for the top 5 CTS solutions. All top 5 switching solutions pro-
vide substantial reduction for flow violation while only top 3 switching solutions pro-
vide reduction more than 10% for voltage violation. The depths of the beneficial CTS 
solutions in the ranked candidate list are small for flow violation, which implies that 
the beneficial switching branches are very close to the violation elements. The depths 
of CTS that handles voltage violation are much larger than the depths of CTS that han-
dles flow violation, which indicates that the proximity-based heuristic is more efficient 
for flow violation reduction than voltage violation reduction on the PJM system. The 
101 
 
 
violation reductions without Pareto improvement, obtained with CBVE, are presented 
in Fig. 4.8. 
 
Table 4.18 Results of Various CTS Methods on the PJM System 
CTS 
methods 
Avg. 
solution 
time (s) 
Average flow violation reduction Average voltage violation reduction 
Without Pareto 
improvement 
With Pareto 
improvement 
Without Pareto 
improvement 
With Pareto 
improvement 
CBCE 1592.6 61.6% 60.2% 19.1% 18.8% 
CBVE 1611.8 59.3% 59.0% 19.5% 19.3% 
 
Table 4.19 Solution Times of RTCA and Various CTS Methods on the PJM System 
 Average (s) Min (s) Max (s) 
RTCA 2617.3 2186.5 3100.1 
CTS - CBCE 1592.6 236.9 3499.4 
CTS - CBVE 1611.8 241.9 3441.1 
 
Table 4.20 Results of the 5 Best Switching Actions on the PJM System using CBVE 
CTS 
Average flow violation reduction Average voltage violation reduction 
Without Pareto im-
provement 
With Pareto im-
provement 
Without Pareto im-
provement 
With Pareto im-
provement 
Reduction Depth Reduction Depth Reduction Depth Reduction Depth 
1st Best 59.3% 13.9 59.0% 14.4 19.5% 36.8 19.3% 37.6 
2nd Best 57.7% 16.4 57.3% 16.7 14.6% 37.8 14.4% 38.1 
3rd Best 52.6% 22.9 51.9% 23.7 11.5% 37.2 11.2% 37.9 
4th Best 49.0% 26.5 48.7% 25.9 7.8% 39.9 7.7% 39.7 
5th Best 46.3% 27.1 45.5% 27.4 6.4% 41.2 6.1% 41.4 
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Fig. 4.8 Violation Reduction with the 5 Best Switching Actions on the PJM System. 
 
For the PJM system, the simulation for CE can take an extremely long time even 
with 6 threads running in parallel. Therefore, CE is only performed on 6 selected sce-
narios out of 167 EMS snapshots. The 6 selected cases are hour 1, 5, 9, 13, 17, and hour 
21 on day 1. They represent various system loading conditions for peak hours, off-peak 
hours, and shoulder hours. 
Table 4.21 shows the statistics for results obtained from CBCE, CBVE, and CE on 
the selected scenarios of the PJM system. The heuristics achieve very similar results 
with CE in terms of violation improvement. However, the two heuristics are approxi-
mately 110 times faster than the complete enumeration. 
Table 4.21 Results of Various CTS Methods on the PJM System for the Selected Hours 
CTS 
Average 
solution 
time (s) 
Average flow violation reduction Average voltage violation reduction 
Without Pareto 
improvement 
With Pareto im-
provement 
Without Pareto 
improvement 
With Pareto im-
provement 
CBCE 872.3 62.1% 61.0% 19.4% 19.4% 
CBVE 874.8 59.4% 59.4% 19.4% 19.4% 
CE 96921.5 62.5% 62.5% 21.0% 20.4% 
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The results of the 5 best switching actions identified by CBCE, CBVE, and CE are 
presented in Table 4.22, Table 4.23, and Table 4.24 respectively. It is found that the 
statistics for reductions in violations achieved with CBCE, CBVE, and CE are very 
similar. This demonstrates the effectiveness of the proposed heuristic methods on the 
PJM system. 
 
Table 4.22 Results of the 5 best CTS Solutions on the PJM System for the Selected Hours using CBCE 
CTS 
Average flow violation reduction Average voltage violation reduction 
Without Pareto im-
provement 
With Pareto im-
provement 
Without Pareto im-
provement 
With Pareto im-
provement 
Reduction Depth Reduction Depth Reduction Depth Reduction Depth 
1st Best 62.1% 12.2 61.0% 12.3 19.4% 31.3 19.4% 31.3 
2nd Best 58.9% 15.5 58.6% 16.6 15.2% 34.8 15.0% 34.7 
3rd Best 57.8% 21.1 57.7% 21.1 10.5% 32.4 10.4% 31.4 
4th Best 50.2% 25.6 50.2% 24.5 7.1% 38.3 6.8% 39.6 
5th Best 47.2% 24.6 47.2% 24.1 5.8% 39 5.7% 37.6 
 
 
Table 4.23 Results of the 5 best CTS Solutions on the PJM System for the Selected Hours using CBVE 
CTS 
Average flow violation reduction Average voltage violation reduction 
Without Pareto im-
provement 
With Pareto im-
provement 
Without Pareto im-
provement 
With Pareto im-
provement 
Reduction Depth Reduction Depth Reduction Depth Reduction Depth 
1st Best 59.4% 11.4 59.4% 11.4 19.4% 31.1 19.4% 31.1 
2nd Best 58.2% 13.8 58.2% 13.8 15.2% 34.9 15.0% 35.4 
3rd Best 50.6% 18.6 50.6% 18.6 10.7% 32.0 10.4% 30.8 
4th Best 48.1% 20.9 48.1% 20.1 7.2% 41.2 6.8% 40.7 
5th Best 46.2% 22.7 46.2% 22.6 6.1% 34.9 5.7% 34.4 
 
Table 4.24 Results of the 5 best Switching Actions on the PJM System for the Selected Hours using CE 
CTS 
Average flow violation reduction Average voltage violation reduction 
Without Pareto im-
provement 
With Pareto im-
provement 
Without Pareto im-
provement 
With Pareto im-
provement 
Reduction Depth Reduction Depth Reduction Depth Reduction Depth 
1st Best 62.5% NA 62.5% NA 21.0% NA 20.4% NA 
2nd Best 61.3% NA 60.9% NA 17.8% NA 17.0% NA 
3rd Best 60.2% NA 59.5% NA 12.9% NA 12.7% NA 
4th Best 51.2% NA 50.9% NA 9.5% NA 9.4% NA 
5th Best 49.1% NA 49.1% NA 7.9% NA 7.7% NA 
NA means not applicable. 
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4.5 Parallel Computing 
Since the candidate switching list contains only 100 branches for CBVE and 
CBCE, using more than 100 threads will be a waste of resources. Thus, up to 100 
threads are used to investigate the efficiency of parallel computing with the proposed 
CBVE and CBCE heuristics. 
Table 4.25 lists the average CTS solution time with various threads on the TVA, 
ERCOT, and PJM systems. To give a more intuitive understanding of how much time 
can be reduced with multiple threads, the average CTS solution time with different 
threads on the ERCOT system is shown in Fig. 4.9. It is clearly observed that the com-
puting time decreases as the number of threads used increases. Note that the solution 
times shown in Table 4.25 and Fig. 4.9 are the average time over multiple scenarios for 
the same system and thus are the average CTS solution time per system rather than the 
average CTS solution time per contingency. 
 
Table 4.25 Average CTS Solution Time per System with Different Threads 
 Average CTS solution time per system / s 
# of threads 1 2 4 8 16 25 50 100 
TVA 172.24 89.08 46.56 27.02 15.79 10.68 7.22 6.61 
ERCOT 279.53 141.87 74.01 40.90 22.97 14.62 8.44 5.55 
PJM NA NA NA 999.46 565.90 322.94 172.70 96.18 
NA: not applicable 
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Fig. 4.9 Average CTS Solution Time per Scenario/Hour with Different Threads on the ERCOT System. 
 
4.6 Conclusions 
Violation reduction that can be achieved with CTS is studied in this chapter. Four 
heuristic based CTS algorithms are proposed to determine the candidate switching list. 
Numerical results on three large-scale practical systems demonstrate the effectiveness 
of CTS for reducing post-contingency violations in an AC setting. 
Promising results on the TVA system are obtained from the data mining methods, 
RDM and EDM, in a reasonable solution time. All scenarios of the TVA system share 
the same network topology. Thus, the performance of data mining methods on dynamic 
network, for instance, caused by transmission maintenance outage, needs further inves-
tigations. Two other heuristic methods, CBCE and CBVE, have similar performance to 
complete enumeration on the ERCOT system and the PJM system. However, CBCE 
does not perform well on the TVA system while CBVE still shows a good performance. 
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generator contingencies, which may cause violations that are far away from that the 
contingency-generator and the candidate list generated from CBCE may not benefit the 
system at all. 
Complete enumeration is guaranteed to find the best solution. However, that comes 
with the cost of a long computational time, which is impractical. Overall, CBVE heu-
ristic is considered to be the most efficient and robust CTS method among the proposed 
heuristics in order to provide valid solutions for reducing post-contingency violations. 
Based on the analysis on three large-scale practical power systems, the beneficial 
switching solutions for flow violation reduction are typically found to be the overloaded 
branches, or the branches that are in parallel or on the same path with the overloaded 
branch. The reason for why CTS can reduce overloads without load shedding is that 
CTS reconfigures the transmission network and transfers the flows on overloaded 
branches to other paths that have extra available capacity. For voltage violation reduc-
tion, the identified CTS solutions typically carry a significant amount of reactive power 
or have shunts connected to it. Thus, switching those CTS actions can change the reac-
tive power in the nearby area and, then change the voltage profile in the same area, 
which may reduce over voltage violations or under voltage violations. 
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5. REAL-TIME SECURITY-CONSTRAINED ECONOMIC DIS-
PATCH WITH CORRECTIVE TRANSMISSION SWITCHING 
Real-time security-constrained economic dispatch aims to provide the least cost 
dispatch solution for the online generating units while meeting all system requirements 
including network constraints. The system total operation cost includes energy cost and 
reserve cost. No-load cost is not considered in RT SCED as it does not affect the results 
at all. Typically, SCED uses the linearized DC power flow model rather than the AC 
power flow model due to concerns regarding computational complexity and algorithm 
convergence. In addition, RT SCED does not change generators’ status and network 
topology. Thus, RT SCED is just a linear programming problem without any binary 
variables and thus can be solved to optimality quickly if it is feasible. 
The system monitoring function of EMS performs state estimation with the data 
received from remote terminal units or local control center and determines the system 
condition in real-time. Then, base-case power flow and RTCA execute and provide a 
list of network constraints for RT SCED. This list of network constraints can be divided 
into two categories: base-case network constraints (actual network constraints) and con-
tingency-case network constraints (potential network constraints). RT SCED considers 
those two categories of network constraints as well as other requirements in its linear 
optimization engine which will solve the associated problem and obtain a new set of 
dispatch points that meet all requirements with minimum cost. 
It is worth noting that RT SCED is based on the DC power flow model while base-
case power flow and contingency analysis use the full AC power flow model. Thus, 
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model conversion between RTCA and RT SCED is needed. This dissertation proposes 
Procedure-A for connecting RTCA and RT SCED. The proposed Procedure-A is im-
plemented to mimic the industrial practice. Network constraints identified from base-
case power flow and RTCA are modeled in RT SCED. 
Several SCED models are proposed and compared. To evaluate the quality of so-
lutions obtained from the different SCED models, SCED solutions are fed back to EMS 
and then, base-case AC power flow and full AC contingency analysis are performed 
again. The SCED model that has the best performance is selected. Simulation results 
demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed Procedure-A. It is observed that the so-
lution obtained from DC power flow model based SCED can pass AC feasibility check. 
Due to network congestion, cheap generators may have to hold their power outputs, 
which would result in significant congestion cost. As demonstrated in Chapter 4, CTS 
can reduce post-contingency violations; in other words, CTS can relieve network con-
gestions. Therefore, as an enhanced version of Procedure-A, Procedure-B is proposed 
to relieve congestions with CTS. With CTS, pseudo limits that are higher than the actual 
limits can be used for the network constraints in the SCED model. The SCED using 
pseudo limits in Procedure-B is referred to as enhanced SCED. With the use of pseudo 
limits in E-SCED, the reliability benefits provided by CTS can be translated into sig-
nificant congestion cost savings due to substantially reduced need for expensive gener-
ation re-dispatch. 
For solutions obtained from the proposed Procedure-B, branch overloads may be 
observed under some critical contingencies in the post-SCED stage; this is because 
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pseudo limits that are higher than actual limits are used for the contingency-case net-
work constraints. However, the flow violations can be eliminated by implementing the 
CTS solutions identified in the pre-SCED stage. Simulation results demonstrate the ef-
fectiveness of the proposed E-SCED approach as well as the proposed Procedure-B. 
Voltage violations are typically handled locally. Moreover, SCED does not con-
sider voltage and reactive power. Therefore, in this chapter, RTCA focuses on flow 
violations only. In addition, RTCA used in this chapter is performed only on transmis-
sion contingencies, which is consistent with existing industrial practice. 
5.1 EMS Procedures 
This section presents the proposed Procedure-A and Procedure-B in detail. In the 
proposed Procedure-A, the network constraints formulated in DC model based RT 
SCED are determined from AC model based RTCA; Procedure-A can perform model 
conversion and connect RT SCED with the traditional RTCA. In fact, the proposed 
Procedure-A represents existing industrial practice. Based on Procedure-A, Procedure-
B is proposed to utilize the flexibility in the transmission network. Procedure-B is a 
procedure for connecting SCED with CTS-based RTCA. 
Procedure-A uses the actual limits, calculated by RTCA, to enforce network con-
straints while higher pseudo limits are used in Procedure-B, which is the main differ-
ence between Procedure-A and Procedure-B. The pseudo limits are determined by 
CTS-based RTCA. With the use of higher pseudo limits, the extra reliability provided 
by CTS can then be captured in SCED and be translated into economic benefits. 
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Theoretically, the proposed Procedure-A can be replaced by an AC power flow 
model based SCED model or ACOPF. However, AC based SCED is a non-linear and 
non-convex problem and is extremely difficult to solve for large-scale real power sys-
tems in a limited time. In addition, convergence and robustness are also big concerns. 
Therefore, the proposed Procedure-A, which is consistent with the industrial practice, 
is preferred. 
Theoretically, instead of using pseudo limits in E-SCED of the proposed Proce-
dure-B, CTS can be directly modeled in SCED and binary variables would be used to 
indicate the status of switching element, which will convert SCED from an LP problem 
into an MILP problem. This will cause a serious computational burden and substantially 
increase the solution time. Therefore, directly modeling CTS in SCED is impractical 
and Procedure-B with pseudo limits is preferred. In addition, the proposed Procedure-
B requires no change to existing tools and the solution time for SCED will not change 
significantly. 
Procedure-A and Procedure-B are presented in detail in Section 5.1.1 and Section 
5.1.2 respectively. The detailed SCED mathematical models are presented in Section 
5.2. 
5.1.1 Procedure-A: SCED with RTCA 
This section describes the proposed Procedure-A in detail. Fig. 5.1 illustrates the 
flowchart of the proposed Procedure-A representing existing industrial practice. As 
shown in Fig. 5.1, Procedure-A consists of four steps as listed below. 
Step 1) Monitor system status. 
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Step 2) Perform base-case power flow and RTCA to determine the active net-
work constraints for SCED. 
Step 3) Run SCED with the network constraints identified in Step 2). 
Step 4) Evaluate the SCED solutions. 
 
Start
Monitor System Status
Perform Base Case 
Power Flow
Perform RTCA
Record Network 
Constraints
Execute SCED
Evaluate the SCED 
Dispatch Points
End
 
Fig. 5.1 Flowchart of the Proposed Procedure-A for Connecting SCED with RTCA. 
 
With the data collected from local control centers and remote terminal units in real-
time, state estimation is performed to determine the system status in Step 1). In Step 2), 
with the starting point determined in Step 1), base-case power flow and RTCA are per-
formed sequentially; this step will identify the active network constraints that have to 
be enforced in SCED for secure operations of power systems. Then, the SCED that is 
subject to those active network constraints is solved and the optimal solution is reported 
to operators. The last step of Procedure-A evaluates the SCED solution by rerunning 
the base-case power flow and contingency analysis with the updated generators’ out-
puts; the contingency list simulated in this step is the same with Step 2). 
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Determination of Network Constraints 
Due to large-scale feature of real power systems, it is impractical to model all con-
tingencies with all elements monitored in RT SCED. Thus, generation reserve is pro-
posed and modeled in RT SCED aiming to have extra backup power for handling con-
tingency in real-time and make sure the system is N-1 secure. However, reserve deliv-
erability cannot be guaranteed due to congestion. Thus, extra network constraints are 
required to be enforced in RT SCED. With a limited number of extra network con-
straints modeled in SCED, it can still be solved within a short timeframe and be em-
ployed in real-time. 
As described before, the network constraints can be divided into two categories, 
actual base-case network constraints and potential contingency-case network con-
straints. Each base-case network constraint contains three items: transmission element 
k under monitoring, initial active power flow 𝑃𝑘0 in the base case, and long-term normal 
MW limit 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝐴𝑘 . Each contingency-case network constraint contains four items: 
contingency element c, transmission element k under monitoring, initial active power 
flow 𝑃𝑘,𝑐,0 under contingency c, and short-term emergency MW limit 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑘𝑐 under 
contingency c. 
In reality, thermal limits for transmission elements are in the unit of MVA instead 
of MW. However, approximate MW limits are used for SCED and they can be derived 
by assuming that the reactive power flows do not change in the look-ahead period of 
SCED. Then, the branch normal limit 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝐴𝑘 for base-case network constraint and 
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the emergency limit 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑘𝑐 for contingency-case network constraint can be calcu-
lated by (5.1) and (5.2) respectively, 
𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝐴𝑘 = √𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐴2 − (max⁡(|𝑄𝑘,𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚|, |𝑄𝑘,𝑡𝑜|))2   (5.1) 
𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑘𝑐 = √𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐶2 − (max⁡(|𝑄𝑘𝑐,𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚|, |𝑄𝑘𝑐,𝑡𝑜|))2   (5.2) 
where 𝑄𝑘,𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 and 𝑄𝑘,𝑡𝑜 denote the reactive power on line k flowing out of from-bus 
and to-bus in the base case respectively; 𝑄𝑘𝑐,𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 and 𝑄𝑘𝑐,𝑡𝑜 denote the reactive power 
on line k flowing out of from-bus and to-bus under contingency c respectively. 
In case that contingency analysis is not available, branch emergency limit 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑘 
under contingency can be approximately calculated by (5.3) which assumes reactive 
power flows do not change under contingency, 
𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑘 = √𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐶2 − (max⁡(|𝑄𝑘,𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚|, |𝑄𝑘,𝑡𝑜|))2   (5.3) 
To reduce computational complexity, only a small subset of transmission elements 
will be monitored. Active network constraints can be determined by comparing the 
branch loading level with the tolerance 𝑃𝑐𝑡 for the base case or the tolerance 𝑃𝑐𝑡𝐶 for 
the contingency cases. Tolerances 𝑃𝑐𝑡 and 𝑃𝑐𝑡𝐶  are pre-defined percentages with a 
range between 0 and 100%. The branch loading level 𝐿𝐿𝑘 in the base case is defined in 
(5.4) while the branch loading level 𝐿𝐿𝑘𝑐 under contingency c can be calculated with 
(5.5), 
𝐿𝐿𝑘 =⁡max(|𝑆𝑘,𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚|, |𝑆𝑘,𝑡𝑜|) /𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐴    (5.4) 
𝐿𝐿𝑘𝑐 =⁡max(|𝑆𝑘𝑐,𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚|, |𝑆𝑘𝑐,𝑡𝑜|) /𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐶   (5.5) 
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where 𝑆𝑘,𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 and 𝑆𝑘,𝑡𝑜 denote the complex power on line k flowing out of from-bus 
and to-bus in the base case respectively; 𝑆𝑘𝑐,𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 and 𝑆𝑘𝑐,𝑡𝑜 denote the complex power 
on line k flowing out of from-bus and to-bus under contingency c respectively. 
Therefore, a branch k will be monitored in the base case if its loading level 𝐿𝐿𝑘 is 
greater than 𝑃𝑐𝑡. Similarly, a branch k will be monitored under contingency c if the 
associated loading level 𝐿𝐿𝑘𝑐 is greater than 𝑃𝑐𝑡𝐶. Those monitored branch constraints 
are referred to active network constraints. An active network constraint is referred to as 
a critical network constraint if the associated flow exceeds the branch capacity. A con-
tingency is called active contingency if it causes one or multiple active network con-
straints. Similarly, a critical contingency is a contingency that would cause at least one 
critical network constraint. 
If 𝑃𝑐𝑡 is set to 1, only the actual congested and overloaded branches will be moni-
tored in the base case. Similarly, if 𝑃𝑐𝑡𝐶 is set to 1, then only the potential congested 
and overloaded branches will be monitored under the associated contingencies.  
The initial branch flow for base-case network constraints and contingency-case 
network constraints that are modeled in SCED are determined by (5.6) and (5.7) re-
spectively, 
𝑃𝑘0 = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑃𝑘,𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚) ∙ max⁡(|𝑃𝑘,𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚|, |𝑃𝑘,𝑡𝑜|)    (5.6) 
𝑃𝑘𝑐0 = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑃𝑘𝑐,𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚) ∙ max⁡(|𝑃𝑘𝑐,𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚|, |𝑃𝑘𝑐,𝑡𝑜|)   (5.7) 
where 𝑃𝑘,𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 and 𝑃𝑘,𝑡𝑜 denote the active power on line k flowing out of from-bus and 
to-bus in base-case respectively; 𝑃𝑘𝑐,𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 and 𝑃𝑘𝑐,𝑡𝑜 denote the active power on line k 
flowing out of from-bus and to-bus under contingency c respectively. 
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Representation of Transmission Losses 
System losses in transmission network typically accounts for 2% to 4% of the total 
demand. It would be impractical if all losses are picked up by slack bus. Thus, losses 
should be precisely and properly modeled in SCED. Losses can either be modeled as 
virtual loads or be calculated with loss coefficients. In this work, transmission losses 
are not explicitly represented in the proposed SCED mathematical model; instead, vir-
tual loads are used to represent the transmission losses. 
Multiple methods as listed below are available to convert losses in an AC model 
into virtual loads in a DC model. 
• assign losses to load buses, 
• assign losses to generator buses, 
• assign the loss on each branch to the actually receiving buses, 
• assign the loss on each branch to the actually sending buses, 
• assign the loss on each branch evenly to the from-bus and the to-bus. 
In this work, the loss on each branch is evenly distributed to the two buses that are 
connected to that branch and modeled as virtual loads. In addition, the losses are as-
sumed to remain the same. Note that, for the incremental PTDF based SCED models, 
there is no need to model losses as virtual loads since they are already implicitly repre-
sented in those models. 
5.1.2 Procedure-B: SCED with CTS based RTCA 
The proposed Procedure-A, which represents the industrial practice for RT SCED, 
is introduced in detail in Section 5.1.1. As demonstrated in Chapter 4, CTS is able to 
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enhance the system reliability by reducing violation under contingency. In this section, 
Procedure-B is proposed to enhance Procedure-A by considering the benefits that are 
provided by CTS. The proposed Procedure-B can substantially relieve network conges-
tion and significantly reduce the congestion cost as compared to Procedure-A. To dis-
tinguish the regular SCED in Procedure-A, the SCED that considers the effect of CTS 
in Procedure-B is referred to as enhanced SCED. 
The flowchart of the proposed Procedure-B is illustrated in Fig. 5.2. As shown in 
Fig. 5.2, Procedure-B consists of six steps, which are listed below, 
Step 1) Monitor system status. 
Step 2) Perform base-case power flow and RTCA. 
Step 3) Perform CTS on critical contingencies only and identify beneficial 
switching actions for each critical contingency. 
Step 4) Update the thermal limit in MW for critical network constraints. 
Step 5) Run E-SCED and obtain a new set of dispatch points. 
Step 6) Evaluate the E-SCED solution. 
 
Start
Monitor System Status
Perform Base Case 
Power Flow
Perform RTCA
Record Network 
Constraints
Execute E-SCED
Evaluate the E-SCED 
Dispatch Points
End
Perform CTS Only on 
Critical Contingencies
Update MW Limit of 
Network Constraints
 
Fig. 5.2 Flowchart of the Proposed Procedure-B. 
117 
 
 
 
The first two steps of Procedure-B are the same as in Procedure-A. The third step 
of Procedure-B is to perform CTS on critical contingencies only and identify switching 
actions that can reduce post-contingency violations. Note that CTS is performed only 
on critical contingencies aiming to relieve critical network constraints, which is time-
efficient as compared to that CTS is performed on all active contingencies. In Step 4), 
the limits of critical network constraints are updated with (5.8) and details are provided 
below. 
For a critical contingency c, if the identified beneficial switching solutions can re-
duce the total violation and no single violation is worse off, then, the pseudo limit of 
the associated constraint can be calculated by the equation presented below, 
𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑘𝑐 = √(𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐶 + 𝑣𝑘𝑐𝑃𝑘𝑐,𝐶𝑇𝑆)⁡2 − (max⁡(|𝑄𝑘𝑐,𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚|, |𝑄𝑘𝑐,𝑡𝑜|))2     (5.8) 
where 𝑣𝑘𝑐 denotes the violation on branch k under contingency c and 𝑃𝑘𝑐,𝐶𝑇𝑆 denotes 
the violation reduction in percent for branch k under contingency c with CTS and is 
calculated by (5.9), 
𝑃𝑘𝑐,𝐶𝑇𝑆 = (𝑣𝑘𝑐 − 𝑣𝑘𝑐,𝐶𝑇𝑆)/𝑣𝑘𝑐     (5.9) 
where 𝑣𝑘𝑐,𝐶𝑇𝑆 is the violation on branch k under contingency c with CTS action imple-
mented. 
In Step 5), E-SCED executes with the pseudo limits of critical network constraints 
and then a new set of dispatch points for dispatchable units are obtained. The last step 
of Procedure-B is to evaluate the E-SCED solutions. With the updated generation in the 
post-SCED stage, RTCA is performed on the same contingencies with Step 2) and it 
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will probably report violations as higher pseudo limits are used in E-SCED rather than 
the actual limits; however, those post-contingency violations are expected to occur on 
the same element under the same contingencies that are reported by RTCA in the pre-
SCED stage. For the critical contingencies causing those post-contingency violations, 
the beneficial CTS solutions identified in Step 3) in the pre-SCED stage are also ex-
pected to reduce violations under the same contingencies in the post-SCED stage, which 
is demonstrated in Section 5.3. 
5.2 SCED Mathematical Formulation 
A SCED mathematical model is first proposed in this section, followed by several 
model variants. Based on availability of network flow information and different forms 
of network constraints, five SCED models are proposed in this dissertation. They are 
cold-start PTDF based SCED, warm-start PTDF based SCED, hot-start PTDF based 
SCED, cold-start B-𝜃 based SCED, and hot-start B-𝜃 based SCED. 
The proposed SCED models co-optimize energy and reserve simultaneously while 
enforcing physical restrictions such as power balance constraints and security require-
ments such as reserve requirements. 
Load shedding is included in both the base case and the contingency cases to handle 
the potential infeasibility and prevent the SCED software from terminating without re-
porting any information. Load shedding is modeled as slack variables in the power bal-
ance constraints.  
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It is worth mentioning that in the commercial RT SCED tools used by ISOs, all 
constraints are relaxed with slack variables; for different set of slack variables, the pen-
alty factors for the associated penalty terms in objective function can be different as 
different types of constraints to be enforced have different priorities. Thus, the ISOs’ 
commercial RT SCED tools will not terminate even in the worst case; instead, they can 
inform operators of what may be the sources causing SCED infeasibility and enable 
operators to manually adjust the system to avoid any potential damage. 
5.2.1 Unit Cost Curve 
ISOs including PJM, MISO, and NYISO typically require generators to submit in-
cremental energy offer that is represented by MW quantity and price pairs [143]-[145]. 
For instance, both MISO and PJM accept up to 10 price-quantity segments. There are 
two types of energy offers: slope cost curve and block cost curve. 
Fig. 5.3 shows an example that illustrates the unit block incremental cost curve. 
The lengths of the three segments are 𝑃𝑔,𝑠1, (𝑃𝑔,𝑠2 − 𝑃𝑔,𝑠1), and (𝑃𝑔,𝑠3 − 𝑃𝑔,𝑠2) while 
the associated constant costs are C1, C2, and C3 respectively. 𝑝𝑔1, 𝑝𝑔2, and 𝑝𝑔3 denotes 
the net MW outputs associated with segment 1, 2, and 3 respectively. For the same 
generator, the optimal SCED solution will not schedule any power outputs on a segment 
if any other segment with a lower price is not entirely selected since the objective func-
tion is to minimize the total cost. 
Fig. 5.4 illustrates the unit slope incremental cost curve. Obviously, the costs of the 
second segment and third segment are not constant, which would create non-linearity 
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when calculating the total cost. As non-linearity may create computational issues, line-
arization of the slope cost curve is required. The slope cost curve can be divided into 
several block sub-segments with the same length and, then, the total cost of a slope 
segment can be calculated by summing up those block sub-segments. Fig. 5.5 illustrates 
the linearization of a slope segment. 
The procedure for linearizing a slope segment is presented below. 
1) determine the number of sub-segments, 
𝑛𝑆𝑆 = 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑(
𝑃𝑔,𝑠2−𝑃𝑔,𝑠1
∆𝑏𝑖
)     (5.10) 
where 𝑛𝑆𝑆 denotes the number of sub-segments for a slope segment; ∆𝑏𝑖 denotes the 
initially selected breadth of a sub-segment; and round(x) is a function that returns the 
integer number that is closest to x. 
2) calculate the sub-segment breadth with (5.11), 
∆𝑠 = (𝑃𝑔,𝑠2 − 𝑃𝑔,𝑠1)/𝑛𝑆𝑆     (5.11) 
where ∆𝑠 denotes the actual breadth of each sub-segment. 
3) the cost for each sub-segment can be determined by (5.12). 
𝐶𝑖 = 𝐶1 + (𝑖 − 0.5)
(𝑃𝑔,𝑠2−𝑃𝑔,𝑠1)
(𝐶2−𝐶1)
∆𝑠,⁡⁡⁡𝑖 = 1. . 𝑛𝑆𝑆   (5.12) 
With the above procedure, a slope segment that is not flat can be converted into a 
series of small block segments. Therefore, a slope cost curve can be converted into a 
block cost curve, which enables the objective function to maintain linearity. It is worth 
noting that for both block cost curves and slope cost curves, the first segment is flat 
with zero slope and probably corresponds to the generator economic minimum 𝑃𝑔,𝑠1 
and the no-load cost C1. 
121 
 
 
 
Pg (MW)
Price ($/MWh)
Segment 1 Segment 2 Segment 3
C1
C2
C3
Pg,s10 Pg,s2 Pg,s3
pg1
pg2
pg3
 
Fig. 5.3 Block Cost Curve of Generator g. 
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Fig. 5.4 Slope Cost Curve of Generator g. 
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Fig. 5.5 Illustration of Linearization of a Slope Segment. 
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5.2.2 Objective Function 
The proposed SCED models share the same objective function as existing industry 
practice, which is to minimize the total cost including operating energy cost and reserve 
cost. The objective function used in this work is shown below, 
𝑚𝑖𝑛⁡⁡⁡ ∑ ∑ 𝑝𝑔,𝑖 ∙ 𝐶𝑔,𝑖
𝑁𝑆𝑔
𝑖=1𝑔∈𝐺𝐷 + ∑ 𝑠𝑟𝑔 ∙ 𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑔𝑔∈𝐺 + 𝑃𝐹_𝑃𝐷𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑 ∙ (∑ 𝑝𝑑,𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑑∈𝐷 +
∑ ∑ 𝑝𝑑,𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑,𝑐𝑑∈𝐷𝑐∈𝐶 )      (5.13) 
Note that slope cost curves are converted into block cost curves before solving 
SCED. 
5.2.3 Constraints 
The constraints of a basic SCED can be expressed by (5.14)-(5.37). There are five 
sets of constraints: power balance constraints, load shedding constraints, generators 
constraints, reserve constraints, and network constraints. Those types of constraints are 
first introduced below and then several alternative constraints are presented. 
Power Balance Constraints 
One single system-wide power balance constraint per scenario is enough to model 
the power balance constraint for the PTDF based SCED formulation. System-wide 
power balance between generation and demand are enforced in (5.14) and (5.15) for the 
base case and the contingency cases respectively. For B-𝜃 power flow model based 
formulation, node power balance constraints are used instead of one single system-wide 
constraint, which will be introduced later in this section. 
∑ 𝑝𝑔𝑔∈𝐺 = ∑ (𝑃𝑑 − 𝑝𝑑,𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑)𝑑∈𝐷      (5.14) 
∑ 𝑝𝑔,𝑐𝑔∈𝐺 = ∑ (𝑃𝑑 − 𝑝𝑑,𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑,𝑐)𝑑∈𝐷 ⁡ , 𝑐 ∈ C    (5.15) 
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Load Shedding Constraints 
In a real power system, negative load may be used in the EMS to model fixed flows 
on the tie lines from energy market solutions. It is not reasonable to shed loads that are 
used to represent tie-line transfer flows with other neighboring systems. Similarly, it is 
not right to shed virtual loads that are used to represent losses. Thus, shedding load on 
negative loads and virtual loads is not allowed in this work, which is guaranteed by 
(5.16) and (5.17). For an actual positive demand, the shedded load cannot exceed the 
amount of that demand, which is guaranteed by (5.18) and (5.19). 
𝑝𝑑,𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑 = 0⁡⁡, 𝑑 ∈ {DN, DV}⁡      (5.16) 
𝑝𝑑,𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑,𝑐 = 0⁡⁡,⁡⁡⁡𝑑 ∈ {DN, DV}, 𝑐 ∈ C⁡    (5.17) 
0 ≤ 𝑝𝑑,𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑 ≤ 𝑃𝑑 ⁡⁡, 𝑑 ∈ {D}\{DN, DV}    (5.18) 
0 ≤ 𝑝𝑑,𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑,𝑐 ≤ 𝑃𝑑 ⁡⁡,⁡⁡⁡𝑑 ∈ {D}\{DN, DV}, 𝑐 ∈ C   (5.19) 
Generator Constraints 
Some generators such as self-scheduling units in practical power systems may not 
be available for dispatch to system operators. Therefore, those generators’ outputs are 
fixed in RT SCED, which is expressed with (5.20) and (5.21). 
Dispatchable generators typically offer stepwise incremental cost curves that con-
sist of one or multiple pairs of segment prices and segment lengths. Equation (5.22) 
ensures that a generator’s output equals the summation of the power outputs on all seg-
ments. Constraint (5.23) can guarantee that the power scheduled for each segment will 
not exceed the associated segment breadth. 
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Constraints (5.24) and (5.25) enforce the active power outputs of generators to be 
within their upper limits as well as lower limits for the base case and contingency cases 
respectively. Generators’ energy ramping limit is modeled in (5.26) while generators’ 
spinning ramping restriction is enforced by (5.27). Note that the ramping rates for en-
ergy re-dispatch and reserve deployment for the same unit may be different. 
𝑝𝑔 = 𝑃𝑔0⁡⁡, 𝑔 ∈ (𝐺 − 𝐺𝐷)     (5.20) 
𝑝𝑔,𝑐 = 𝑃𝑔0⁡⁡, 𝑔 ∈ (𝐺 − 𝐺𝐷), 𝑐 ∈ C    (5.21) 
𝑝𝑔 = ∑ 𝑝𝑔,𝑖
𝑁𝑆𝑔
𝑖=1 ⁡ , 𝑔 ∈ 𝐺𝐷     (5.22) 
0 ≤ 𝑝𝑔,𝑖 ≤ 𝐵𝑆𝑔,𝑖⁡⁡, 𝑔 ∈ 𝐺𝐷     (5.23) 
𝑃𝑔,𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≤ 𝑝𝑔 ≤ 𝑃𝑔,𝑚𝑎𝑥⁡⁡,⁡⁡⁡𝑔 ∈ 𝐺    (5.24) 
𝑃𝑔,𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≤ 𝑝𝑔,𝑐 ≤ 𝑃𝑔,𝑚𝑎𝑥⁡⁡,⁡⁡⁡𝑔 ∈ 𝐺, 𝑐 ∈ C   (5.25) 
−𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑔 ∙ 𝑇𝐸𝐷 ≤ 𝑝𝑔 − 𝑃𝑔0 ≤ 𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑔 ∙ 𝑇𝐸𝐷⁡⁡,⁡⁡⁡𝑔 ∈ 𝐺   (5.26) 
−𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑔 ∙ 𝑇𝑆𝑅 ≤ 𝑝𝑔,𝑐 − 𝑝𝑔 ≤ 𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑔 ∙ 𝑇𝑆𝑅⁡⁡,⁡⁡⁡𝑔 ∈ 𝐺, 𝑐 ∈ C  (5.27) 
Reserve Constraints 
The spinning reserve that an online unit can provide is subject to its ramping capa-
bility, which is expressed in (5.28). Constraint (5.29) guarantees that the sum of a unit’s 
output and reserve cannot exceed its maximum limit. In other words, reserve is also 
restricted by unit’s available capacity in addition to ramping limit. The “largest gener-
ator” rule is used for the reserve requirements as defined in (5.30), which ensures that 
there would be enough reserve to cover any of loss of a single generation. 
0 ≤ 𝑠𝑟𝑔 ≤ 𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑔 ∙ 𝑇𝑆𝑅⁡⁡,⁡⁡⁡∀𝑔 ∈ 𝐺     (5.28) 
𝑝𝑔 + 𝑠𝑟𝑔 ≤ 𝑃𝑔,𝑚𝑎𝑥⁡⁡,⁡⁡⁡∀𝑔 ∈ 𝐺      (5.29) 
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∑ 𝑠𝑟𝑔𝑔∈𝐺 ≥ 𝑝𝑔 + 𝑠𝑟𝑔⁡⁡,⁡⁡⁡∀𝑔 ∈ 𝐺     (5.30) 
Network Constraints 
Though the largest generator contingency reserve requirement is modeled in 
SCED, there may still exist potential network violations due to congestion which limits 
reserve deliverability. Thus, it is necessary to model active network constraints in 
SCED. Branch thermal limits for the base case and contingency cases are enforced in 
(5.31) and (5.32) respectively. The branch monitor sets can be different for the base 
case and different contingency cases. 
Due to concerns regarding voltage stability and transient stability, the total transfer 
capacity of the ties connecting two areas cannot exceed a specific limit which is referred 
to as interface limit or transfer limit. In SCED, the stability limit can be addressed by 
including constraints on the sum of active power flows on the branches that form the 
interface. The interface limit constraints are represented by (5.33) and (5.34) for the 
base case and contingency cases respectively. Note that the interface limit under con-
tingency may be different with the limit in the base case especially when the contin-
gency element is one of branches forming that interface. 
Equations (5.35) and (5.36) that are used to calculate branch flows take the effects 
of generation re-dispatch, load shedding, and demand fluctuation into account. Note 
that (5.31) and (5.32) are only for branches in the monitor sets and (5.33) and (5.34) are 
only for critical interfaces; however, (5.35) and (5.36) are for both branches in the mon-
itor sets and branches forming the active interfaces. The flow on contingency branch c 
is forced to be zero via (5.37). 
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−𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝐴𝑘 ≤ 𝑝𝑘 ≤ 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝐴𝑘⁡⁡, 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾𝑀(0)    (5.31) 
−𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑘 ≤ 𝑝𝑘,𝑐 ≤ 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑘⁡⁡, 𝑘 ∈ KM(c)⁡, 𝑐 ∈ C   (5.32) 
∑ 𝑝𝑘𝑘∈𝐾𝐼(𝑖) ≤ 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑖⁡⁡, 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼𝑀(0)     (5.33) 
∑ 𝑝𝑘,𝑐𝑘∈𝐾𝐼(𝑖) ≤ 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐⁡⁡, 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼𝑀(𝑐), 𝑐 ∈ C    (5.34) 
𝑝𝑘 = 𝑃𝑘0 + ∑ (𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑛,𝑘 ∙ (∑ (𝑝𝑔 − 𝑃𝑔0)𝑔∈𝐺(𝑛) + ∑ (𝑝𝑑,𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑 + 𝑃𝑑0 −𝑑∈𝐷(𝑛)𝑛∈𝑁
𝑃𝑑))) ⁡⁡,⁡⁡⁡𝑘 ∈ {𝐾𝑀(0), 𝐼𝐾𝑀(0)}      (5.35) 
𝑝𝑘,𝑐 = 𝑃𝑘0 + 𝐿𝑂𝐷𝐹𝑘,𝑐 ∙ 𝑃𝑐0 + ∑ (𝑂𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑛,𝑘,𝑐 ∙ (∑ (𝑝𝑔,𝑐 − 𝑃𝑔0)𝑔∈𝐺(𝑛) +𝑛∈𝑁
∑ (𝑝𝑑,𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑,𝑐 + 𝑃𝑑0 − 𝑃𝑑)𝑑∈𝐷(𝑛) ))⁡⁡ , 𝑘 ∈ {𝐾𝑀(𝑐), 𝐼𝐾𝑀(𝑐)}\{𝑐}, 𝑐 ∈ C (5.36) 
𝑝𝑘,𝑐 = 0⁡⁡, 𝑘 ∈ {𝑐}, 𝑐 ∈ C      (5.37) 
Alternative Constraints 
Constraints (5.14)-(5.37) along with the objective function (5.13) form a basic 
SCED mathematical model. Enhancement can be made to this model. Some of those 
constraints can be replaced with alternative constraints as illustrated below. 
Adding 𝑃𝑔0 to each expression in inequality constraint (5.26) would reformulate it 
to (5.38), which shares the same form with (5.24). By simply taking the minimum of 
upper limits for 𝑝𝑔 as the new upper limit and using the maximum of lower limits for 
𝑝𝑔 as the new lower limit, constraints (5.38) and (5.24) can be combined as (5.39). In 
other words, constraints (5.24) and (5.26) can be replaced by one single constraint 
(5.39), which would reduce the number of constraints and may increase the perfor-
mance in terms of computational time. 
𝑃𝑔0 −𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑔 ∙ 𝑇𝐸𝐷 ≤ 𝑝𝑔 ≤ 𝑃𝑔0 +𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑔 ∙ 𝑇𝐸𝐷⁡⁡,⁡⁡⁡𝑔 ∈ 𝐺   (5.38) 
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max{𝑃𝑔0 −𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑔 ∙ 𝑇𝐸𝐷 , 𝑃𝑔,𝑚𝑖𝑛} ≤ 𝑝𝑔 ≤ min{𝑃𝑔0 +𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑔 ∙ 𝑇𝐸𝐷 , 𝑃𝑔,𝑚𝑎𝑥} , 𝑔 ∈ 𝐺 
   (5.39) 
When branch reactive power flow under contingency is available, 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑘𝑐 can be 
calculated by (5.2) and should replace 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑘 in (5.32). Thus, (5.32) would be con-
verted into the constraint shown below. 
−𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑘,𝑐 ≤ 𝑝𝑘,𝑐 ≤ 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑘,𝑐⁡⁡, 𝑘 ∈ KM(c)⁡, 𝑐 ∈ C  (5.40) 
Similarly, if the initial branch flow 𝑃𝑘,𝑐,0 under contingency c is available from 
contingency analysis, the model would be more accurate by replacing 𝑃𝑘0 +
𝐿𝑂𝐷𝐹𝑘,𝑐𝑃𝑐0 with 𝑃𝑘,𝑐,0 in (5.36). Thus, (5.36) can be replaced by (5.41). 
𝑝𝑘,𝑐 = 𝑃𝑘,𝑐,0 + ∑ (𝑂𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑛,𝑘,𝑐 ∙ (∑ (𝑝𝑔,𝑐 − 𝑃𝑔0)𝑔∈𝐺(𝑛) + ∑ (𝑝𝑑,𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑,𝑐 + 𝑃𝑑0 −𝑑∈𝐷(𝑛)𝑛∈𝑁
𝑃𝑑)))⁡ , 𝑘 ∈ {𝐾𝑀(𝑐), 𝐼𝐾𝑀(𝑐)}\{𝑐}, 𝑐 ∈ C   (5.41) 
If the initial branch flow for both the base case and contingency case are not avail-
able, then, incremental PTDF based equations (5.35) and (5.36) can be replaced by 
cold-start PTDF based equations (5.42) and (5.43) respectively. 
𝑝𝑘 = ∑ (𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑛,𝑘 ∙ (∑ 𝑝𝑔𝑔∈𝐺(𝑛) + ∑ (𝑝𝑑,𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑 − 𝑃𝑑)𝑑∈𝐷(𝑛) )𝑛∈𝑁 ⁡⁡ , 𝑘 ∈
{𝐾𝑀(0), 𝐼𝐾𝑀(0)}     (5.42) 
𝑝𝑘,𝑐 = ∑ (𝑂𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑛,𝑘,𝑐 ∙ (∑ 𝑝𝑔,𝑐𝑔∈𝐺(𝑛) + ∑ (𝑝𝑑,𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑,𝑐 − 𝑃𝑑)𝑑∈𝐷(𝑛) ))𝑛∈𝑁 ⁡⁡ , 𝑘 ∈
{𝐾𝑀(𝑐), 𝐼𝐾𝑀(𝑐)}\{𝑐}, 𝑐 ∈ C   (5.43) 
Instead of using PTDF formulation, calculation of branch flow can use B-θ formu-
lation, which are defined in (5.44) and (5.45). It is worth mentioning that all branch 
flows have to be calculated with B-θ formulation because there are mutual effects be-
tween voltage angle θ of all buses, while only the flows on branches of interests need 
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to be calculated with PTDF formulation. With B-θ formulation being used in SCED, 
system-wide power balance constraints (5.14) and (5.15) should be replaced with node 
power balance constraints (5.46) and (5.47) respectively. 
𝑝𝑘 = (𝛿𝑛(𝑘−) − 𝛿𝑛(𝑘+) + 𝛼𝑘)/𝑋𝑘⁡⁡, 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾    (5.44) 
𝑝𝑘,𝑐 = (𝛿𝑛(𝑘−),𝑐 − 𝛿𝑛(𝑘+),𝑐 + 𝛼𝑘)/𝑋𝑘⁡⁡, 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾\{𝑐}, 𝑐 ∈ C  (5.45) 
∑ 𝑝𝑔𝑔∈𝐺(𝑛) + ∑ 𝑝𝑘𝑘∈𝐾(𝑛+) − ∑ 𝑝𝑘𝑘∈𝐾(𝑛−) = ∑ (𝑃𝑑 − 𝑝𝑑,𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑)𝑑∈𝐷(𝑛) , 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁  (5.46) 
∑ 𝑝𝑔,𝑐𝑔∈𝐺(𝑛) + ∑ 𝑝𝑘,𝑐𝑘∈𝐾(𝑛+) − ∑ 𝑝𝑘,𝑐𝑘∈𝐾(𝑛−) = ∑ (𝑃𝑑 − 𝑝𝑑,𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑,𝑐)𝑑∈𝐷(𝑛) ⁡⁡ , 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁,
𝑐 ∈ C   (5.47) 
5.2.4 Models 
Based on the availability of network flow information and different power flow 
formulations, five different SCED models are proposed in this dissertation. They are 
listed below: 
• Model 1: hot-start PTDF based SCED model, 
• Model 2: warm-start PTDF based SCED model, 
• Model 3: cold-start PTDF based SCED model, 
• Model 4: hot-start B-𝜃 based SCED model, 
• Model 5: cold-start B-𝜃 based SCED model. 
The first three SCED models use PTDF power flow formulation while B-𝜃 power flow 
formulation is used in the last two SCED models. 
There are two types of SCED: corrective SCED (CSCED) and preventive SCED 
(PSCED). Generation re-dispatch is allowed for CSCED in the post-contingency sce-
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narios; in other words, with CSCED model, the generation dispatch points under con-
tingency are not necessary to be the same with the base-case generation schedule. How-
ever, the base-case generation schedule remains the same for all contingency cases with 
PSCED model. PSCED repositions online generators in advance to satisfy the opera-
tional requirements in both the base case and contingency cases. Therefore, PSCED is 
more conservative than CSCED, which would result in high variable operation cost. 
However, PSCED can provide a more secure and reliable solution than CSCED as the 
solution obtained from PSCED can withhold the loss of a single contingency without 
adjustment. Most, if not all, ISOs implement PSCED model rather than CSCED model 
due to security concerns. 
Corrective SCED Models 
The constraints described in Section 5.2.3 are general constraints for CSCED as 
variable 𝑝𝑔,𝑐 is defined and used to represent unit generation under various contingency 
scenarios. The five proposed SCED models with corrective control strategy are de-
scribed in Table 5.1. Those proposed SCED models share most of the constraints. For 
instance, the three SCED models that use PTDF formulation share the same system-
wide power balance constraints while the two SCED models that use B-𝜃 formulation 
share the same node power balance constraints. 
The initial branch flow 𝑃𝑘,𝑐,0 under contingency and the emergency limit 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑘𝑐 
that can be obtained from RTCA are available to Model 1, while Model 2 uses 𝑃𝑘,0 and 
line outage distribution factor (LODF) to calculate branch flow under contingency and 
uses 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑘 as the emergency limits of all contingency-case network constraints. A 
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cold-start branch flow calculation formulation is used in Model 3 rather than the incre-
mental branch flow calculation formulations used in Model 1 and Model 2. SCED is 
built on the linearized DC power flow model; thus, apart from model error, the error of 
PTDF based branch flow calculation also depends on unit generation. Model 3 uses the 
entire generator output to calculate branch flow; however, incremental models only use 
the change in generator output, which is typically much smaller than the entire genera-
tor output, to calculate branch flow. Thus, the model precision of Model 3 would be 
less than Model 1 and Model 2. Model 4 and Model 5 are based on traditional B-𝜃 
power flow model. The difference between them is that Model 4 uses customized 
𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑘𝑐 as the emergency limits for different contingency cases while Model 5 uses 
𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑘 as the emergency limit for all modeled active contingencies. 
 
Table 5.1 Multiple Corrective SCED Models 
 
Shared set of 
constraints 
Power balance 
constraints 
Network constraints 
CSCED Model 1 (5.16)-(5.23), 
(5.25), 
(5.27)-(5.31), 
(5.33), (5.34), 
(5.37), (5.39) 
(5.14), (5.15) 
(5.35), (5.40), (5.41) 
CSCED Model 2 (5.32), (5.35), (5.36) 
CSCED Model 3 (5.32), (5.42), (5.43) 
CSCED Model 4 
(5.46), (5.47) 
(5.40), (5.44), (5.45) 
CSCED Model 5 (5.32), (5.44), (5.45) 
 
Preventive SCED Models 
Corrective SCED allows the units’ outputs under contingency to deviate from the 
base-case dispatch point, which would result in cheaper cost than preventive SCED. 
However, due to security and reliability concerns, preventive SCED is more popular in 
industry than corrective SCED. This section illustrates the mathematical model for 
SCED using preventive control strategy. 
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Given a CSCED model, a simple way to form a PSCED model is to add one more 
set of constraints (5.48), which force units’ outputs under contingency to remain the 
same with units’ outputs in the base case, into that CSCED model. 
𝑝𝑔,𝑐 = 𝑝𝑔⁡⁡,⁡⁡⁡𝑔 ∈ 𝐺,⁡⁡⁡𝑐 ∈ 𝐶     (5.48) 
To construct a concise PSCED formulation, (5.48) can be simply substituted into 
the constraints that are involved with 𝑝𝑔,𝑐. Thus, with adjustment, constraints (5.15), 
(5.36), (5.41), (5.43), and (5.47) can be transformed into the constraints below, (5.49) 
through (5.53), respectively. Moreover, with (5.48), constraints (5.21) and (5.25) will 
be equivalent to (5.20) and (5.24) respectively and constraint (5.27) will definitely hold; 
therefore, constraints (5.21), (5.25), and (5.27) should be removed in the PSCED model. 
∑ 𝑝𝑑,𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑑∈𝐷 = ∑ 𝑝𝑑,𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑,𝑐𝑑∈𝐷 ⁡ , 𝑐 ∈ C    (5.49) 
𝑝𝑘,𝑐 = 𝑃𝑘0 + 𝐿𝑂𝐷𝐹𝑘,𝑐𝑃𝑐0 + ∑ (𝑂𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑛,𝑘,𝑐(∑ (𝑝𝑔 − 𝑃𝑔0)𝑔∈𝐺(𝑛) +𝑛∈𝑁
∑ (𝑝𝑑,𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑,𝑐 + 𝑃𝑑0 − 𝑃𝑑)𝑑∈𝐷(𝑛) ))⁡⁡ , 𝑘 ∈ {𝐾𝑀(𝑐), 𝐼𝐾𝑀(𝑐)}\{𝑐}, 𝑐 ∈ C (5.50) 
𝑝𝑘,𝑐 = 𝑃𝑘,𝑐,0 + ∑ (𝑂𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑛,𝑘,𝑐(∑ (𝑝𝑔 − 𝑃𝑔0)𝑔∈𝐺(𝑛) + ∑ (𝑝𝑑,𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑,𝑐 + 𝑃𝑑0 −𝑑∈𝐷(𝑛)𝑛∈𝑁
𝑃𝑑)))⁡ , 𝑘 ∈ {𝐾𝑀(𝑐), 𝐼𝐾𝑀(𝑐)}\{𝑐}, 𝑐 ∈ C     (5.51) 
𝑝𝑘,𝑐 = ∑ (𝑂𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑛,𝑘,𝑐(∑ 𝑝𝑔𝑔∈𝐺(𝑛) + ∑ (𝑝𝑑,𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑,𝑐 − 𝑃𝑑)𝑑∈𝐷(𝑛) ))𝑛∈𝑁 ⁡ , 𝑘 ∈
{𝐾𝑀(𝑐), 𝐼𝐾𝑀(𝑐)}\{𝑐}⁡, 𝑐 ∈ C    (5.52) 
∑ 𝑝𝑔𝑔∈𝐺(𝑛) + ∑ 𝑝𝑘,𝑐𝑘∈𝐾(𝑛+) − ∑ 𝑝𝑘,𝑐𝑘∈𝐾(𝑛−) = ∑ (𝑃𝑑 − 𝑝𝑑,𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑,𝑐)𝑑∈𝐷(𝑛) , 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁, 𝑐 ∈ C
   (5.53) 
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To further reduce the problem complexity, contingency-case load shedding varia-
ble 𝑝𝑑,𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑,𝑐 can be replaced by base-case load shedding variable 𝑝𝑑,𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑. Thus, con-
straints (5.17), (5.19), and (5.49) can be ignore and constraints (5.50)-(5.53) can be 
converted to the constraints listed below, (5.54)-(5.57), respectively. 
𝑝𝑘,𝑐 = 𝑃𝑘0 + 𝐿𝑂𝐷𝐹𝑘,𝑐𝑃𝑐0 + ∑ (𝑂𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑛,𝑘,𝑐(∑ (𝑝𝑔 − 𝑃𝑔0)𝑔∈𝐺(𝑛) +𝑛∈𝑁
∑ (𝑝𝑑,𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑 + 𝑃𝑑0 − 𝑃𝑑)𝑑∈𝐷(𝑛) )) , 𝑘 ∈ {𝐾𝑀(𝑐), 𝐼𝐾𝑀(𝑐)}\{𝑐}, 𝑐 ∈ C (5.54) 
𝑝𝑘,𝑐 = 𝑃𝑘,𝑐,0 + ∑ (𝑂𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑛,𝑘,𝑐(∑ (𝑝𝑔 − 𝑃𝑔0)𝑔∈𝐺(𝑛) + ∑ (𝑝𝑑,𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑 + 𝑃𝑑0 −𝑑∈𝐷(𝑛)𝑛∈𝑁
𝑃𝑑)))⁡ , 𝑘 ∈ {𝐾𝑀(𝑐), 𝐼𝐾𝑀(𝑐)}\{𝑐}, 𝑐 ∈ C  (5.55) 
𝑝𝑘,𝑐 = ∑ (𝑂𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑛,𝑘,𝑐(∑ 𝑝𝑔𝑔∈𝐺(𝑛) + ∑ (𝑝𝑑,𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑 − 𝑃𝑑)𝑑∈𝐷(𝑛) ))𝑛∈𝑁 ⁡⁡⁡,⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑘 ∈
{𝐾𝑀(𝑐), 𝐼𝐾𝑀(𝑐)}\{𝑐}, 𝑐 ∈ C   (5.56) 
∑ 𝑝𝑔𝑔∈𝐺(𝑛) + ∑ 𝑝𝑘,𝑐𝑘∈𝐾(𝑛+) − ∑ 𝑝𝑘,𝑐𝑘∈𝐾(𝑛−) = ∑ (𝑃𝑑 − 𝑝𝑑,𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑)𝑑∈𝐷(𝑛) , 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁, 𝑐 ∈ C
   (5.57) 
 
Table 5.2 Multiple Preventive SCED Models 
 Shared set of constraints Power balance constraints Network constraints 
PSCED Model 1 
(5.16), (5.18), (5.20), 
(5.22), (5.23), (5.28)-
(5.31), (5.33), (5.34), 
(5.37) (5.39) 
(5.14) 
(5.35), (5.40), (5.55) 
PSCED Model 2 (5.32), (5.35), (5.54) 
PSCED Model 3 (5.32), (5.42), (5.56) 
PSCED Model 4 
(5.46), (5.57) 
(5.40), (5.44), (5.45) 
PSCED Model 5 (5.32), (5.44), (5.45) 
 
Similar to the proposed CSCED models, the proposed SCED models with preven-
tive control strategy are described in Table 5.2. The differences between the proposed 
PSCED models are the availability of network flow information and different branch 
flow calculation formulations, which are consistent with the differences between the 
proposed CSCED models. 
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5.2.5 Market Implication 
In addition to providing updated real-time dispatch solutions, SCED is also used to 
determine real-time energy market solutions including LMP. As the proposed E-SCED 
takes advantage of transmission network flexibility by using pseudo limit rather than 
actual limit used by a traditional SCED, it is important to analyze the effect of utiliza-
tion of pseudo limit on market results. Thus, LMP, load payment, generator revenue, 
generator cost, generator rent, congestion cost, and congestion revenue are introduced 
and analyzed in this work.  
Locational marginal pricing is a market mechanism that is used to clear wholesale 
energy markets that are managed by ISOs. A locational marginal price at a specific bus 
reflects the least cost of supplying the next increment load at that bus while meeting all 
physical and reliability constraints. LMP consists of three components: energy compo-
nent, congestion component, and loss component. If a system had a network with infi-
nite capacity and no losses, all LMPs would be the same over the entire system. How-
ever, in reality, losses cannot be avoided and network congestion issue typically exists. 
In this work, losses are represented by virtual loads for SCED models 3-5 and are im-
plicitly incorporated in the initial branch flows for SCED models 1-2; thus, the loss 
component is ignored in this work. The nodal LMP for PSCED model 1 can be calcu-
lated by the following equation, 
𝐿𝑀𝑃𝑛 = 𝐿𝑀𝑃𝑠 + 𝐿𝑀𝑃𝑐𝑔,𝑛⁡, 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁    (5.58) 
where 𝐿𝑀𝑃𝑐𝑔,𝑛 denotes the congestion component of the LMP at bus n, which can be 
calculated below, 
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𝐿𝑀𝑃𝑐𝑔,𝑛 = ∑ 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑛,𝑘(𝐹𝑘
+ − 𝐹𝑘
−)𝑘∈𝐾𝑀(0) +∑ ∑ 𝑂𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑛,𝑘,𝑐(𝐹𝑘,𝑐
+ − 𝐹𝑘,𝑐
− )𝑘∈𝐾𝑀(𝑐)𝑐∈𝐶 +
∑ ∑ 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑛,𝑘(𝐹𝑖
+ − 𝐹𝑖
−)𝑘∈𝐾𝐼(𝑖)𝑖∈𝐼𝑀(0) + ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑂𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑛,𝑘,𝑐(𝐹𝑖,𝑐
+ −𝑘∈𝐾𝐼(𝑖)𝑖∈𝐼𝑀(0)𝑐∈𝐶
𝐹𝑖,𝑐
− ) , 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁      (5.59) 
Proof of (5.58) 
This proof is only for deriving the nodal LMP equation (5.58); thus, for simplicity, 
the constraints and variables that are not of interest are ignored, as well as the objective 
function. As strong duality theory is used to prove (5.58), the constraints for a simpli-
fied but sufficient primal problem are listed below. 
∑ 𝑃𝐼𝑛𝑛∈𝑁 = 0       (𝐿𝑀𝑃𝑠)   (5.60) 
∑ 𝑝𝑔𝑔∈𝐺(𝑛) + ∑ 𝑝𝑑,𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑑∈𝐷(𝑛) − 𝑃𝐼𝑛 = ∑ 𝑃𝑑𝑑∈𝐷(𝑛) ⁡⁡ , 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁  (𝐿𝑀𝑃𝑛)  (5.61) 
𝑃𝑘0 + ∑ (𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑛,𝑘(𝑃𝐼𝑛 − 𝑃𝐼𝑛,0))𝑛∈𝑁 ≤ 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝐴𝑘 ⁡, 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾𝑀(0) (𝐹𝑘
+) (5.62) 
−𝑃𝑘0 − ∑ (𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑛,𝑘(𝑃𝐼𝑛 − 𝑃𝐼𝑛,0))𝑛∈𝑁 ≤ 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝐴𝑘⁡, 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾𝑀(0) (𝐹𝑘
−) (5.63) 
𝑃𝑘,𝑐,0 + ∑ (𝑂𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑛,𝑘(𝑃𝐼𝑛 − 𝑃𝐼𝑛,0))𝑛∈𝑁 ≤ 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑘𝑐⁡, 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾𝑀(𝑐) (𝐹𝑘,𝑐
+ ) (5.64) 
−𝑃𝑘,𝑐,0 − ∑ (𝑂𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑛,𝑘(𝑃𝐼𝑛 − 𝑃𝐼𝑛,0))𝑛∈𝑁 ≤ 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑘𝑐⁡, 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾𝑀(𝑐) (𝐹𝑘,𝑐
− ) (5.65) 
∑ (𝑃𝑘0 + ∑ (𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑛,𝑘(𝑃𝐼𝑛 − 𝑃𝐼𝑛,0)𝑛∈𝑁 )𝑘∈𝐾𝐼(𝑖) ≤ 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑖, 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼𝑀(0)  (𝐹𝑖
+) (5.66) 
−∑ (𝑃𝑘0 + ∑ (𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑛,𝑘(𝑃𝐼𝑛 − 𝑃𝐼𝑛,0)𝑛∈𝑁 )𝑘∈𝐾𝐼(𝑖) ≤ 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑖, 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼𝑀(0)  (𝐹𝑖
−)  (5.67) 
∑ (𝑃𝑘,𝑐,0 + ∑ (𝑂𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑛,𝑘(𝑃𝐼𝑛 − 𝑃𝐼𝑛,0)𝑛∈𝑁 )𝑘∈𝐾𝐼(𝑖) ≤ 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐, 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼𝑀(𝑐)  (𝐹𝑖,𝑐
+ )  (5.68) 
−∑ (𝑃𝑘,𝑐,0 + ∑ (𝑂𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑛,𝑘(𝑃𝐼𝑛 − 𝑃𝐼𝑛,0)𝑛∈𝑁 )𝑘∈𝐾𝐼(𝑖) ≤ 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐, 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼𝑀(𝑐)  (𝐹𝑖,𝑐
− )  (5.69) 
Constraint (5.60) ensures the system-wide power balance while constraint (5.61) is 
for nodal power balance. Constraint (5.60) is redundant for B-θ based SCED (SCED 
model 4 - SCED model 5) while constraint (5.61) is not needed for PTDF based SCED 
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(SCED model 1 - SCED model 3); however, they are listed in this model just for deriv-
ing the relationship between nodal LMP and system LMP. Constraints (5.62)-(5.65) 
show that the system is subject to branch thermal limit. Moreover, power systems are 
also restricted by interface limits, which is guaranteed by (5.66)-(5.69). Variables 
𝐿𝑀𝑃𝑠, 𝐿𝑀𝑃𝑛, 𝐹𝑘
+, 𝐹𝑘
− 𝐹𝑘,𝑐
+ , 𝐹𝑘,𝑐
− , 𝐹𝑖
+, 𝐹𝑖
−, 𝐹𝑖,𝑐
+ , and 𝐹𝑖,𝑐
−  are the dual variables that are as-
sociated with these constraints of the primal problem. 
Note that variable 𝑃𝐼𝑛 denotes power net injection at bus n, which can either posi-
tive or non-positive; then, it is unconstrained in the primal problem. Therefore, the as-
sociated constraints in the dual problem are the equality constraints as expressed in 
(5.70), 
𝐿𝑀𝑃𝑛 − 𝐿𝑀𝑃𝑠 + ∑ 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑛,𝑘(𝐹𝑘
+ − 𝐹𝑘
−)𝑘∈𝐾𝑀(0) + ∑ ∑ 𝑂𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑛,𝑘,𝑐(𝐹𝑘,𝑐
+ −𝑘∈𝐾𝑀(𝑐)𝑐∈𝐶
𝐹𝑘,𝑐
− ) + ∑ ∑ 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑛,𝑘(𝐹𝑖
+ − 𝐹𝑖
−)𝑘∈𝐾𝐼(𝑖)𝑖∈𝐼𝑀(0) +
∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑂𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑛,𝑘,𝑐(𝐹𝑖,𝑐
+ − 𝐹𝑖,𝑐
− )𝑘∈𝐾𝐼(𝑖)𝑖∈𝐼𝑀(0)𝑐∈𝐶 = 0, 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁   (5.70) 
where 𝐿𝑀𝑃𝑠  and 𝐿𝑀𝑃𝑛  are unconstrained; 𝐹𝑘
+, 𝐹𝑘
− 𝐹𝑘,𝑐
+ , 𝐹𝑘,𝑐
− , 𝐹𝑖
+, 𝐹𝑖
−, 𝐹𝑖,𝑐
+ , and 𝐹𝑖,𝑐
−  are 
non-positive. Then, (5.58) can be obtained by reformatting (5.70). 
Average LMP is proposed to analyze the effect of modeling CTS implicitly in 
SCED on LMP. Average LMP over the entire system is defined in (5.71). Similarly, 
average congestion LMP is defined in (5.72). 
𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐿𝑀𝑃 = ∑ 𝐿𝑀𝑃𝑛𝑛∈𝑁 ⁡ , 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁     (5.71) 
𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐿𝑀𝑃𝑐𝑔 = ∑ 𝐿𝑀𝑃𝑐𝑔,𝑛𝑛∈𝑁 ⁡⁡ , 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁    (5.72) 
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Load payment is calculated by (5.73) and generator revenue is determined by 
(5.74). Equation (5.75) calculates the generator cost which is part of the objective func-
tion. Generator rent is calculated by (5.76). Note that in this work, the generator rent 
only accounts energy and does not include reserve rent. Congestion revenue, which is 
used to fund the financial transmission rights markets, is the difference between gener-
ator revenue and load payment, as calculated by (5.77). 
𝐿𝑑𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑡 = ∑ (𝐿𝑀𝑃𝑛(∑ 𝑃𝑑)𝑑∈𝐷(𝑛) )𝑛∈𝑁      (5.73) 
𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑅𝑣𝑛 = ∑ (𝐿𝑀𝑃𝑛(∑ 𝑝𝑔𝑔∈𝐺(𝑛) ))𝑛∈𝑁      (5.74) 
𝐺𝑒𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 = ∑ ∑ 𝑝𝑔,𝑖𝐶𝑔,𝑖
𝑁𝑆𝑔
𝑖=1𝑔∈𝐺𝐷       (5.75) 
𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑅𝑣𝑛 − 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡     (5.76) 
𝐶𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑣𝑛 = 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑅𝑣𝑛 − 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡     (5.77) 
In addition to congestion revenue, congestion cost is also proposed to measure the 
degree of network congestion. Congestion cost is defined as (5.78), 
𝐶𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡1 − 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡2    (5.78) 
where 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡1 denotes the optimal objective value of either an E-SCED or a SCED 
and 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡2 denotes the optimal objective value obtained by solving the same E-
SCED or SCED but without any network constraints. 
Thus, the congestion cost reduction 𝐶𝐶𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑆 achieved by E-SCED as compared to 
a traditional SCED can be calculated with (5.79). 
𝐶𝐶𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑆 = 𝐶𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐸−𝑆𝐶𝐸𝐷 − 𝐶𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑆𝐶𝐸𝐷   (5.79) 
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5.3 Case Studies 
In this section, the Cascadia system [140] is used to verify the proposed Procedure-
A and Procedure-B, as well as the proposed SCED models. This test case contains 179 
buses, 40 online generators, and 245 branches. The total in-service load is 7324 MW 
while the total online generation capacity is 9323 MW. 
5.3.1 Procedure-A: SCED with RTCA 
To fully evaluate the proposed Procedure-A, base-case power flow is first per-
formed; then, RTCA is conducted on a contingency list consisting of all non-radial 
branches. 
There is no violation observed in the base case. Fig. 5.6 shows the initial system 
condition of a key portion of the Cascadia system where contains two critical contin-
gency-element and the beneficial switching branches. 
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Fig. 5.6 System Condition of a Portion of the Cascadia System in the Base Case. 
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The RTCA results on the Cascadia system are listed in Table 5.3. Two out of 150 
contingencies cause violations and, thus, they are considered to be critical contingen-
cies. Those two critical contingencies, which are branch 228 and branch 229 respec-
tively, are two parallel branches. When one of them is out of service, the other branch 
will be overload by 241.6 MVA or 18.69% beyond the emergency rating. Fig. 5.7 shows 
branch 229 is overloaded under the outage of branch 228. As those two critical contin-
gencies are equivalent and cause the same consequences, only the results for the con-
tingency on branch 228 will be presented for the rest of this section. 
 
Table 5.3 Results of RTCA on the Cascadia System 
Contingency 
Branch 
Monitor 
Branch 
Branch Flow 
(MVA) 
Emergency 
Rating (MVA) 
Violation 
(MVA) 
Violation in 
Percent 
228 229 1534.1 1292.5 241.6 18.69% 
229 228 1534.1 1292.5 241.6 18.69% 
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Fig. 5.7 System Condition of a Portion of the Cascadia System under the Outage of Branch 228. 
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As existing SCED application in industry uses preventive control strategy rather 
than corrective control strategy, only the proposed PSCED models presented in Table 
5.2 are studied in this section. In this study, 𝑃𝑐𝑡 and 𝑃𝑐𝑡𝐶 are set to 50% and 90% re-
spectively unless they are explicitly described. The proposed SCED models share most 
of the constraints and the difference between them is the form of network constraints. 
In this report, Gurobi [146] is used as the optimization solver to solve SCED. 
Table 5.4 presents the cost results with different SCED models. Cold-start PTDF 
power flow formulation based Model 3 and cold-start B-𝜃 power flow formulation 
based Model 5 are essentially equivalent and they share the same lowest total cost 
among all SCED models. As shown in Table 5.5, the solution times for solving different 
SCED models are very similar. 
It is essential to evaluate the SCED solution in an AC setting since the DC power 
flow model used in SCED is an approximation and the accuracy cannot be guaranteed. 
Thus, the SCED solution, mainly the generators’ active power output setting points, is 
fed back into the base-case power flow simulation and N-1 contingency analysis. The 
results for both SCED application and Post-SCED contingency analysis are shown in 
Table 5.6. 
 
Table 5.4 Cost for Different PSCED Models on the Cascadia System 
 Total cost ($/h) Energy cost ($/h) Reserve cost ($/h) 
SCED Model 1 50169.0 42943.3 7225.7 
SCED Model 2 50011.8 42930.7 7081.1 
SCED Model 3 49862.1 42903.7 6958.4 
SCED Model 4 49903.8 42920.4 6983.3 
SCED Model 5 49862.1 42903.7 6958.4 
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Table 5.5 Computational Time for Solving Different PSCED Models on the Cascadia System 
 Total time (s) Presolve time (s) LP solver time (s) 
SCED Model 1 0.09 0.01 0.01 
SCED Model 2 0.11 0.01 0.01 
SCED Model 3 0.11 0.01 0.01 
SCED Model 4 0.14 0.01 0.02 
SCED Model 5 0.17 0.01 0.02 
 
Table 5.6 Results of SCED and Post-SCED N-1 check with Different PSCED Models on Cascadia 
 
SCED Post-SCED N-1 check 
Limit 
(MW) 
Flow 
(MW) 
Dual 
($/MWh) 
Rating 
(MVA) 
Flow 
(MVA) 
Violation 
(MVA) 
Over 
Loading 
SCED Model 1 1284.0 1284.0 -10.49 
1292.5 
1294.0 1.5 0.11% 
SCED Model 2 1291.7 1291. -9.76 1310.6 18.0 1.40% 
SCED Model 3 1291.7 1291.7 -2.44 1329.7 37.2 2.88% 
SCED Model 4 1284.0 1284.0 -9.76 1322.4 29.8 2.31% 
SCED Model 5 1291.7 1291.7 -2.44 1329.7 37.2 2.88% 
 
Obviously, the generation re-dispatch solution obtained from SCED Model 1 out-
performs any other models in the AC based N-1 check (contingency analysis) in the 
post-SCED stage. With the dispatch points obtained from SCED Model 1, the flow 
violation on branch 229 under contingency 228 is reduced from 241.6 MVA down to 
only 1.5 MVA, corresponding to an overloading of 0.11% beyond the emergency limit, 
which is negligible; moreover, there is no other post-contingency violation or base-case 
violation. 
Model 2 has the second best performance. In this model, LODF is used to calculate 
the initial post-contingency branch flow. The solution of SCED Model 2 causes 18.0 
MVA violation, which is 16.5 MVA violation more than Model 1, under the same con-
tingency 228. The extra 16.5 MVA overload comes from two sources: 1) DC model 
based LODF cannot accurately calculate the post-contingency branch flow, and 2) the 
branch emergency limit calculated by (5.2) is less precise than (5.3). 
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As expected, cold-start PTDF based Model 3 and cold-start B-𝜃 based Model 5 
share the least performance and result in 37.2 MVA post-contingency violation on 
branch 229 under contingency 228. Model 4 has a better performance than Model 5 
since the branch emergency limit used in Model 4 is more accurate than Model 5. 
Though Model 1 results in the highest total cost as shown in Table 5.4, it provides 
the best performance in the accurate AC setting. On the contrary, the dispatch points 
obtained by other SCED models would cause severe violations. In other words, Model 
2 though Model 5 provide a cheaper solution at the cost of system security, which would 
violate the security standards and put the system in a dangerous situation. Thus, Model 
1 is preferred than other models and the rest analysis of this work will use Model 1 
only. 
Note that the dual variable of the network constraint on branch 229 under contin-
gency 228 with Model 1 is 10.49 $/MWh, which implies that the total cost will be 
reduced by 10.49 $/h if the emergency limit of branch 229 increases by 1 MW. 
As network constraints can largely affect the SCED performance especially for 
large-scale real power systems, the sensitivity of thresholds 𝑃𝑐𝑡 and 𝑃𝑐𝑡𝐶 on the SCED 
performance is investigated and the results for system performance, cost, and compu-
tational time are presented in Table 5.7, Table 5.8, and Table 5.9 respectively. It is 
interesting to observe that the system performance with different thresholds for select-
ing network constraints are the same, as well as the SCED cost. 
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Table 5.7 Results with Different Pct and PctC on the Cascadia System 
Pct PctC 
SCED Model 1 N-1 check 
Limit 
(MW) 
Flow 
(MW) 
Dual 
($/MWh) 
Rating 
(MVA) 
Flow 
(MVA) 
Violation 
(MVA) 
Over 
Loading 
1% 1% 
1284.0 
1284.0 -10.49 
1292.5 
1294.0 1.5 0.11% 
50% 50% 1284.0 -10.49 1294.0 1.5 0.11% 
80% 80% 1284.0 -10.49 1294.0 1.5 0.11% 
100% 100% 1284.0 -10.49 1294.0 1.5 0.11% 
 
Table 5.8 SCED Cost with Different Pct and PctC on the Cascadia System 
Pct PctC 
SCED Model 1 
Total cost 
($/hr) 
Energy 
cost ($/h) 
Reserve 
cost ($/h) 
1% 1% 50169.0 42943.3 7225.7 
50% 50% 50169.0 42943.3 7225.7 
80% 80% 50169.0 42943.3 7225.7 
100% 100% 50169.0 42943.3 7225.7 
 
Table 5.9 Computational Time for Solving SCED with Different Pct and PctC on the Cascadia System 
Pct PctC 
SCED Model 1 
Total 
time (s) 
Presolve 
time (s) 
LP solver 
time (s) 
1% 1% 5.27 1.05 1.63 
50% 50% 1.60 0.23 0.34 
80% 80% 0.12 0.01 0.02 
100% 100% 0.06 0.00 0.01 
 
As shown in Table 5.9, the case with both 𝑃𝑐𝑡 and 𝑃𝑐𝑡𝐶 being set to 100% takes 
much less time than other cases while obtaining exactly the same solutions. This is 
consistent with industrial practice. For a real power system, the initial dispatch point 
for RT SCED is not far away from the optimal solution, which is the key why only 
modeling a very small subset of critical network constraints can maintain the system 
security. 
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5.3.2 Procedure-B: SCED with CTS-based RTCA 
Procedure-B is an enhanced version of Procedure-A by taking CTS into consider-
ation. To focus on the potential benefits that would be provided by CTS, the duplicate 
results shared by both procedures will not be presented again in this section. 
In Procedure-B, RTCA with CTS is implemented rather than just a traditional 
RTCA. Table 5.10 shows the results of CTS for contingency 228. The top five best 
switching actions that provide Pareto improvement can reduce the post-contingency 
violation by 30.78%, 30.78%, 29.01%, 20.11%, and 19.85% respectively. Fig. 5.8 
shows the system condition with branch 37 switching out of service for relieving the 
overload that is caused by outage of branch 228. Though the overload on branch 229 
still exists, it can be reduced by 74.4 MVA with the top CTS solution. 
 
Table 5.10 Results of RTCA with CTS on the Cascadia System 
Contingency 
branch 
Original 
violation 
(MVA) 
CTS 
ranking 
CTS 
branch 
Pareto im-
provement 
flag 
Violation 
reduction 
(MVA) 
Violation 
reduction 
in percent 
228 241.6 1st Best 37 Yes 74.4 30.78% 
2nd Best 38 Yes 74.4 30.78% 
3rd Best 85 Yes 70.1 29.01% 
4th Best 86 Yes 48.6 20.11% 
5th Best 87 Yes 48.0 19.85% 
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Fig. 5.8 System Condition of a Portion of the Cascadia System in the Post-Switching Situation (CTS 
Branch 37) under the Outage of Branch 228. 
 
Table 5.11 lists the emergency limits of branch 229 in the SCED applications with 
and without CTS. Without consideration of CTS, the actual emergency limit for SCED 
is 1284.0 MW calculated by (5.2). However, considering the violation reduction benefit 
provided by CTS, pseudo emergency limits, which can be calculated by (5.8) and are 
higher than the actual emergency limits, are used to replace actual emergency limits in 
E-SCED. E-SCED1, E-SCED2, E-SCED3, E-SCED4, and E-SCED5 in Table 5.11 
considers different pseudo emergency limits that are associated with the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 
and 5th best switching actions respectively. 
With the best switching solution, the associated pseudo emergency limit of branch 
229 under contingency 228 for SCED is 1358.8 MW, which is 74.4 MW higher than 
the actual emergency limit. In addition, the emergency limit of branch 229 for E-SCED 
can increase by 48 MW even with the 5th best switching action. 
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Table 5.11 Emergency Limits of Branch 229 under Contingency 228 with and without CTS on the Cas-
cadia System 
 CTS 
ranking 
CTS 
branch 
Actual emergency limit 
(in MW) w/o CTS 
Pseudo emergency limit 
(in MW) w. CTS 
SCED NA NA 1284.0 NA 
E-SCED1 1st Best 37 
NA 
1358.8 
E-SCED2 2nd Best 38 1358.8 
E-SCED3 3rd Best 85 1354.5 
E-SCED4 4th Best 86 1332.9 
E-SCED5 5th Best 87 1332.3 
NA denotes “not applicable”. 
 
To be consistent with previous analysis, 𝑃𝑐𝑡 and 𝑃𝑐𝑡𝐶 are set to be 50% and 90% 
respectively for E-SCED that considers CTS. Table 5.12 shows the results of a tradi-
tional SCED without CTS, E-SCEDs with different CTS actions, and a relaxed SCED 
without any network constraint. 
 
Table 5.12 Results of Various SCED Models on the Cascadia System 
 SCED Model 1 
Branch 229  
under contingency 228 
Total 
cost 
($/h) 
Congestion 
cost ($/h) 
Congestion 
cost reduc-
tion w. CTS 
Total 
solution 
time (s) 
Limit 
(MW) 
Flow 
(MW) 
Dual 
($/MWh) 
E-SCED1 
with 
CTS 
1st Best 1358.8 1358.8 -1.23 49797.9 34.5 91.49% 0.11 
E-SCED2 2nd Best 1358.8 1358.8 -1.23 49797.9 34.5 91.49% 0.11 
E-SCED3 3rd Best 1354.5 1354.5 -1.37 49803.6 40.2 90.09% 0.12 
E-SCED4 4th Best 1332.9 1332.9 -1.82 49834.6 71.2 82.45% 0.12 
E-SCED5 5th Best 1332.3 1332.3 -1.82 49835.8 71.6 82.35% 0.12 
SCED w/o. CTS 1284.0 1284.0 -10.49 50169.0 405.6 NA 0.09 
Relaxed 
SCED 
With no network 
constraint 
NA 49763.4 0.0 NA 0.04 
NA denotes “not applicable”. 
 
A binding branch constraint may prevent the cheap units from producing more 
power, which is the cause of congestion cost and unnecessary high total cost. The re-
sults of a SCED without consideration of network constraints are used as the benchmark 
to gauge the effect of CTS on SCED. By comparing the total cost of a traditional SCED 
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and the total cost of a SCED without any network constraints, the congestion cost of 
the traditional SCED without CTS can be calculated and it is 405.6 $/h. 
It is intuitive that the congestion cost would drop with a higher limit of the bottle-
neck branch, which is illustrated in Table 5.12. The congestion cost of E-SCED can be 
reduced by 91.49% to 82.35% with the top five identified switching solutions. Fig. 5.9 
presents the congestion cost associated with the traditional SCED and different E-
SCED models on the Cascadia system. With the top five identified CTS solutions being 
considered in E-SCEDs respectively, the congestion cost is reduced from 405.6 $/h to 
a much smaller value ranging from 34.5 $/h to 71.6 $/h. 
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Fig. 5.9 Congestion Costs of the Traditional SCED and Various E-SCEDs on the Cascadia System. 
 
It is interesting that the top switching action can reduce the congestion cost by 
91.49% while it can only reduce the post-contingency violation by 30.78%. By imple-
menting one single switching action, the congestion cost reduction in percent for SCED 
with CTS is much higher than post-contingency violation reduction in percent for 
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RTCA with CTS. One possible reason is that the marginal cost reduction with 1 MW 
increase on branch limit may drop as the associated branch limit becomes higher. 
Relieving the binding branch constraint by increasing the branch limit would first 
allow the cheapest available unit to ramp up and force the most expensive unit to reduce 
its output. After that, if that branch is still binding, further increasing the branch limit 
may allow second cheapest available units to ramp up and reduce the outputs of the 
second most expensive units, which would still reduce the total cost but the cost reduc-
tion for each MW relieved in the branch limit would decline. 
The above conclusion can also be made from the viewpoint of flowgate pricing, 
the dual variable of network constraint. With the actual emergency limit 1284.0 MW 
of branch 229, the associated dual variable is -10.49 $/h, which implies that the total 
cost will drop by 10.49 $/h if the emergency limit of branch 229 increase by 1 MW 
from 1284.0 MW. However, when the pseudo emergency limit 1332.3 MW is used, the 
associated dual variable becomes -1.82 $/h, which implies that the total cost will only 
drop by 1.82 $/h if the emergency limit of branch 229 increase by 1 MW from 1332.3 
MW. Thus, as the branch limit increases, the marginal total cost reduction may drop, 
which implies that small post-contingency violation reduction in percent with CTS may 
result in high cost reduction in percent for SCED. 
Though it has been demonstrated that congestion cost can be significantly reduced 
with CTS by using the pseudo emergency limits in SCED, the violation reduction per-
formance of CTS in the post-SCED stage should also be examined as the system con-
dition changes. 
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In the pre-SCED stage, the post-contingency violation reductions would be differ-
ent by implementing different switching actions and, thus, the associated pseudo limits 
calculated by (5.8) would also be different in the SCED stage, which may result in 
different SCED solutions. The results of traditional RTCA in the post-SCED stage, with 
different CTS or pseudo limits considered in SCED, are shown in Table 5.13. The re-
sults in this table are for branch 229 under contingency 228. As expected, the post-
contingency violation increases with higher ranked beneficial switching action consid-
ered in SCED. 
 
Table 5.13 Results of the Post-SCED RTCA with Different CTS Considered in SCED on Cascadia 
CTS 
Actual Emergency 
Rating (MVA) 
Flow (MVA) Violation (MVA) Over Loading 
1st Best 
1292.5 
1376.5 84.0 6.50% 
2nd Best 
3rd Best 1371.6 79.0 6.11% 
4th Best 1346.6 54.1 4.18% 
5th Best 1345.8 53.3 4.12% 
 
Table 5.14 shows the results of RTCA with CTS in the post-SCED stage. The 
SCED solution used for Table 5.14 corresponds to the 1st best CTS solution identified 
in the pre-SCED stage on the Cascadia system. The results in this table are for branch 
229 under contingency 228. Before CTS, contingency 228 causes a violation of 84 
MVA on branch 229 as shown in Table 5.13. However, that violation can be eliminated 
with CTS. All five beneficial CTS actions identified in the pre-SCED stage are inves-
tigated in the post-SCED stage. In this case, the top two switching actions that are iden-
tified in the pre-SCED situation can reduce the post-contingency violation by about 
85% while the other three switching actions can all fully eliminate the violation. 
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Table 5.14 Results of RTCA with CTS in the Post-SCED Stage with the SCED Solution Correspond-
ing to the 1st Best CTS Solution Identified in the Pre-SCED Stage on the Cascadia System 
CTS 
Flow 
(MVA) 
Flow change 
caused by 
CTS (MVA) 
Percent vio-
lation be-
yond limit 
Violation 
(MVA) 
Violation 
reduction 
(MVA) 
Violation 
reduction in 
percent 
1st Best 1304.9 -71.5 0.96% 12.4 71.5 85.20% 
2nd Best 1304.9 -71.5 0.96% 12.4 71.5 85.20% 
3rd Best 1235.6 -140.9 0.0% -56.9 84.0 100% 
4th Best 1285.8 -90.7 0.0% -6.7 84.0 100% 
5th Best 1280.2 -96.3 0.0% -12.3 84.0 100% 
 
Though the amounts of violation reduction with CTS in the post-SCED scenario 
are different with the pre-SCED scenario, all CTS actions identified in the pre-SCED 
scenario can reduce the flow on the overloaded branch. This demonstrates that CTS is 
able to provide benefits even when the system condition has changed. 
The results for considering the benefits provided by the 2nd best CTS action in 
SCED would be the same with 1st best CTS action considered, since the 1st best CTS 
branch and the 2nd best CTS branch are equivalent as they are in parallel and share the 
same parameters. 
Table 5.15, Table 5.16, and Table 5.17 show the results of RTCA with CTS in the 
post-SCED stage, corresponding to different generator dispatch points obtained from 
the SCEDs that considers the 3rd, 4th, and 5th best CTS solutions respectively. If the 
pseudo emergency limit associated with the 3rd best CTS action is used in SCED, RTCA 
simulated in the post-SCED stage results in an overload of 79 MVA on branch 229 
under contingency 228; however, three of the five CTS actions can fully eliminate that 
post-contingency violation while the other two CTS solutions can reduce overload by 
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more than 90%. For E-SCED with the 4th or 5th best CTS action, all five CTS actions 
can fully eliminate the post-contingency overload. 
Table 5.15 Results of RTCA with CTS in the Post-SCED Stage with the SCED Solution Correspond-
ing to the 3rd Best CTS Solution Identified in the Pre-SCED Stage on the Cascadia System 
CTS 
Flow 
(MVA) 
Flow change 
caused by 
CTS (MVA) 
Percent vio-
lation be-
yond limit 
Violation 
(MVA) 
Violation 
reduction 
(MVA) 
Violation 
reduction in 
percent 
1st Best 1300.0 -71.5 0.58% 7.5 71.5 90.53% 
2nd Best 1300.0 -71.5 0.58% 7.5 71.5 90.53% 
3rd Best 1228.5 -143.1 0.0% -64.1 79.0 100% 
4th Best 1282.2 -89.3 0.0% -10.3 79.0 100% 
5th Best 1277.0 -94.5 0.0% -15.5 79.0 100% 
 
Table 5.16 Results of RTCA with CTS in the Post-SCED Stage with the SCED Solution Correspond-
ing to the 4th best CTS Solution Identified in the Pre-SCED Stage on the Cascadia System 
CTS 
Flow 
(MVA) 
Flow change 
caused by 
CTS (MVA) 
Percent vio-
lation be-
yond limit 
Violation 
(MVA) 
Violation 
reduction 
(MVA) 
Violation 
reduction in 
percent 
1st Best 1275.3 -71.3 0.0% -17.2 54.1 100% 
2nd Best 1275.3 -71.3 0.0% -17.2 54.1 100% 
3rd Best 1195.2 -151.4 0.0% -97.3 54.1 100% 
4th Best 1263.8 -82.8 0.0% -28.7 54.1 100% 
5th Best 1260.8 -85.8 0.0% -31.7 54.1 100% 
 
Table 5.17 Results of RTCA with CTS in the Post-SCED Stage with the SCED Solution Correspond-
ing to the 5th Best CTS Solution Identified in the Pre-SCED Stage on the Cascadia System 
CTS 
Flow 
(MVA) 
Flow change 
caused by 
CTS (MVA) 
Percent vio-
lation be-
yond limit 
Violation 
(MVA) 
Violation 
reduction 
(MVA) 
Violation 
reduction in 
percent 
1st Best 1274.5 -71.4 0.0% -18 53.3 100% 
2nd Best 1274.5 -71.4 0.0% -18 53.3 100% 
3rd Best 1194.4 -151.5 0.0% -98.1 53.3 100% 
4th Best 1263.1 -82.8 0.0% -29.4 53.3 100% 
5th Best 1260.2 -85.7 0.0% -32.3 53.3 100% 
 
With lower branch limits used for the network constraints in SCED, branches 
would have more security margins in the post-SCED stage. As the congestion cost re-
duction does not vary much with different CTS solutions considered in SCED, using 
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the pseudo limit associated with the 3rd best switching actions can provide both eco-
nomic benefits and significant post-contingency violation reductions. 
Market solutions of the traditional SCED and the proposed E-SCEDs are shown in 
Table 5.18. When the flexibility in transmission network is taken into account, the load 
payment drops significantly, as well as the generator revenue, generator rent, and con-
gestion revenue. It is observed that the amount of load payment reduction is much more 
than the amount of generator rent reduction. Fig. 5.10 and Fig. 5.11 show the load pay-
ment and congestion revenue respectively, for various SCED and E-SCEDs on the Cas-
cadia system. Apparently, with higher pseudo limit used in E-SCED, the system-wide 
load payment and congestion revenue substantially decreases, which implies that E-
SCED can improve the market efficiency in comparison with a traditional SCED. 
 
Table 5.18 Market Results with SCED and Various E-SCED on the Cascadia System 
 Load Pay-
ment ($/h) 
Generator 
Revenue 
($/h) 
Generator 
Cost ($/h) 
Generator 
Rent ($/h) 
Congestion 
Revenue 
($/h) 
E-SCED1 58158.48 57290.96 42839.47 14451.49 867.52 
E-SCED2 58158.48 57290.96 42839.47 14451.49 867.52 
E-SCED3 58112.06 57056.21 42845.19 14211.02 1055.85 
E-SCED4 58977.22 57363.58 42876.2 14487.38 1613.64 
E-SCED5 58977.22 57364.73 42877.34 14487.39 1612.49 
SCED 74865.79 62553.62 42943.34 19610.28 12312.17 
 
The nodal LMP including the energy component and congestion component is 
shown in Table 5.19. The energy LMP of each bus is the same across the entire system 
and is also equal to the LMP at the slack bus. The average LMPs and the average con-
gestion LMPs for various E-SCED are very close, since even the fifth best CTS solution 
can relieve the system congestion by 82%. However, in comparison with the traditional 
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SCED, the average LMP is reduce by about 5% while the average congestion LMP is 
reduced by 82% to 88%, which is consistent with the degree of congestion cost reduc-
tion as shown in Table 5.12. 
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Fig. 5.10 Load Payment for Various SCED and E-SCEDs on the Cascadia System. 
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Fig. 5.11 Congestion Revenue for Various SCED and E-SCEDs on the Cascadia System. 
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Table 5.19 Average LMP with SCED and Various E-SCEDs on the Cascadia System 
 Average LMP 
($/MWh) 
Average Congestion LMP 
($/MWh) 
Energy LMP 
($/MWh) 
E-SCED1 7.685 0.063 7.622 
E-SCED2 7.685 0.063 7.622 
E-SCED3 7.649 0.071 7.578 
E-SCED4 7.672 0.094 7.578 
E-SCED5 7.672 0.095 7.578 
SCED 8.037 0.542 7.494 
 
5.4 Conclusions 
In Chapter 4, it is demonstrated that corrective transmission switching can signifi-
cantly reduce or even fully eliminate post-contingency violations, which is believed to 
reduce the need for expensive reliability-motivated generation re-dispatch and can be 
translated into significant saving [147]. Thus, two procedures are proposed in this chap-
ter to investigate the potential cost saving with CTS: 1) the proposed Procedure-A rep-
resents existing industrial practice; 2) the proposed Procedure-B can fully utilize the 
benefits provided by CTS in the RT SCED application. Built upon existing SCED tools, 
the change required to implement the proposed Procedure-B and the proposed E-SCED 
model is only to replace the actual limits with pseudo limits for branch limit constraints 
in SCED, which requires minimal effort for the industry to adopt the proposed Proce-
dure-B. 
Numerical simulations have demonstrated that the post-contingency violation re-
duction with CTS can translate into significant congestion cost reduction for RT SCED. 
The marginal cost reduction with 1 MW increase in the limit of a bottleneck branch 
may drop as the associated branch limit increases. Even with a conservative CTS solu-
tion, for instance, using the branch pseudo limit that is associated with the 3rd best CTS 
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solution in SCED, the 29% reduction in post-contingency violation is translated into 
90% reduction in congestion cost in RT SCED. The case studies also demonstrate the 
performance of CTS-based RTCA in the post-SCED stage. It is concluded that conges-
tion cost can be significantly reduced with the consideration of CTS. 
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6. FALSE DATA INJECTION CYBER-ATTACK DETECTION 
State estimation estimates the system condition in real-time and provides a starting 
point for other EMS applications including RTCA and RT SCED. Failure of state esti-
mation may cause very severe consequences. The measurements collected by state es-
timation may involve random errors, which can be identified and removed by bad data 
detection. However, malicious cyber-attacks can inject false measurements that can by-
pass traditional bad data detection and result in an incorrectly estimated system condi-
tion [105]-[123]. This indicates that power system state estimation is subject to false 
data injection cyber-attacks. In addition, a biased system condition may mislead oper-
ators to take unnecessary or improper actions that reduce the reliability and damage the 
system. For instance, recent efforts [109]-[114] show that FDI cyber-attacks can cause 
unobservable branch overloads in real-time. Thus, developing a detection approach that 
can efficiently detect FDI attacks is vital for reliability enhancements and secure oper-
ations of electric power systems. The goal of FDID is to improve system reliability by 
detecting FDI cyber-attacks and enhancing state estimation. 
6.1 Concept 
6.1.1 State Estimation 
State estimation is run continuously to estimate the system status in real-time, in-
cluding bus voltages and line flows. The measurement model for state estimation can 
be represented by (6.1). In (6.1), ℎ(𝑥) describes the relationship between state variable 
𝑥 and measurements 𝑧, while 𝑒 denotes the measurement error vector. 
𝑧 = ℎ(𝑥) + 𝑒      (6.1) 
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For DC state estimation, the relationship between state variable 𝑥 and measure-
ments 𝑧 is linear and ℎ(𝑥) can be replaced by Hx, where H is a constant Jacobian ma-
trix; then, (6.1) can be replaced by (6.2) for DC state estimation. Variable 𝑥 in (6.2) 
denotes the bus voltage angle vector. This chapter focuses on the DC measurement 
model, which is a linearization of (6.1). 
𝑧 = 𝐻𝑥 + 𝑒      (6.2) 
6.1.2 FDI Cyber-Attack 
To launch an unobservable FDI cyber-attack, the injected false measurements 
should meet (6.3) that represents the measurement model under attack. In (6.3), ?̃? de-
notes the state variable under attack and ?̃? denotes false measurements. Equation (6.4) 
defines the relationship between the cyber state variable under attack and the actual 
state variable; variable 𝑐 in (6.4) is referred to as the attack vector. 
?̃? = 𝐻?̃? + 𝑒      (6.3) 
?̃? = 𝑥 + 𝑐      (6.4) 
If the attacker has access to only a part of the system, then the measurements out-
side the attack area will remain the same. Similarly, for the buses that are located out-
side the attack area, the associated elements in the attack vector 𝑐 are zeros. For sim-
plicity, it is assumed in this work that the attacker has access to the entire system. 
Fig. 6.1 shows the time line that is used to illustrate FDI cyber-attacks. There are 
two dispatch intervals. The assumptions made in this work are listed below: 
• the attacker injects false data or measurements at 𝑡 = 0−, right before SE 
and SCED execute at 𝑡 = 0, 
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• the generation at 𝑡 = −𝑇𝐸𝐷
−  is optimal, which implies the generation in the 
first SCED period remain the same, 
• system operators have accurate information at 𝑡 = −𝑇𝐸𝐷, 
• the load in the second SCED dispatch interval remains constant, or the fore-
casting load at the end of the second SCED interval is the same with the 
load at the beginning of the second SCED interval, 
• SE executes repeatedly with the same frequency of SCED execution, 
• Loads at the same bus are combined into a single aggregate load. 
 
t = -TED
1st SCED period 2nd SCED period
t = TEDt = 0
 
Fig. 6.1 Time Line for Illustrating FDI Cyber-Attack 
 
In [110], a bi-level optimization model is proposed to determine the attack vector 
and false load vector that can cause the most severe loading condition on a target trans-
mission and may result in physical flow violation. Heuristics for this bi-level model are 
proposed in [111]; a modified version of one of those heuristic models is presented 
below, 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒⁡⁡𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑃𝑙,0−)(𝑝𝑙 − ?̃?𝑙)    (6.5) 
subject to 
𝑝𝑘 = (𝜃𝑛(𝑘−) − 𝜃𝑛(𝑘+))/𝑋𝑘⁡, 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾    (6.6) 
?̃?𝑘 = (?̃?𝑛(𝑘−) − ?̃?𝑛(𝑘+))/𝑋𝑘⁡, 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾    (6.7) 
?̃?𝑛 = 𝜃𝑛 + 𝑐𝑛⁡, 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁      (6.8) 
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∆?̃?𝑑 = ∑ (𝑝𝑘 − ?̃?𝑘)𝑘∈𝐾(𝑛(𝑑)−) − ∑ (𝑝𝑘 − ?̃?𝑘)𝑘∈𝐾(𝑛(𝑑)+) , 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷  (6.9) 
−𝐿𝑆𝑃𝑑 ≤ ∆?̃?𝑑 ≤ 𝐿𝑆𝑃𝑑 ⁡, 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷     (6.10) 
−𝑐𝑛 ≤ 𝑠𝑛⁡, 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁      (6.11) 
𝑐𝑛 ≤ 𝑠𝑛⁡, 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁      (6.12) 
∑ 𝑠𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑁1⁡       (6.13) 
where 𝑃𝑙,0− denotes the actual flow on the target branch 𝑙 at 𝑡 = 0
−; 𝑝𝑘 and 𝑝𝑘 denote 
the expected actual flow and cyber flow on branch 𝑘 at 𝑡 = 𝑇𝐸𝐷 respectively; 𝜃𝑛 and 
?̃?𝑛 denote the expected phase angle and cyber phase angle of bus n at 𝑡 = 𝑇𝐸𝐷 respec-
tively; ∆?̃?𝑑 denotes the malicious deviation of load d; and 𝐿𝑆 denotes the load shift fac-
tor. 
The objective of this model is to maximize the difference between post-attack phys-
ical and cyber power flows on a pre-specified target branch l. Equations (6.6) and (6.7) 
calculate the post-attack physical branch flows and cyber branch flows respectively. 
Equation (6.8) shows the relationship between physical bus angles and cyber bus an-
gles. Equation (6.9) calculates the malicious load deviation vector, while (6.10) ensures 
that the load shift is within the limit. The summation of the absolute change in state 
variables is restricted by (6.11)-(6.13), which is equivalent to an 𝑙1-norm constraint; 
where 𝑁1 is the limit of that 𝑙1-norm constraint. 
The above model can be further simplified by introducing a new variable ∆𝑝𝑘 that 
denotes the difference between the post-attack physical and cyber power flows. The 
simplified FDI cyber-attack model is formulated below. 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒⁡⁡𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑃𝑙,0−)∆𝑝𝑙     (6.14) 
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subject to (6.10), (6.11), (6.12), (6.13), and     
∆𝑝𝑘 = (−𝑐𝑛(𝑘−) + 𝑐𝑛(𝑘+))/𝑋𝑘⁡, 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾    (6.15) 
∆?̃?𝑑 = ∑ (∆𝑝𝑘)𝑘∈𝐾(𝑛(𝑑)−) − ∑ (∆𝑝𝑘)𝑘∈𝐾(𝑛(𝑑)+) , 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷  (6.16) 
where, 
∆𝑝𝑙 = 𝑝𝑙 − ?̃?𝑙       (6.17) 
Note that this simplified 𝐵-∆𝜃 FDI cyber-attack model, consisting of (6.10)-(6.17), 
is mathematically equivalent to the third heuristic algorithm presented in [111]. The 
proposed 𝐵-∆𝜃 FDI cyber-attack model is implemented to provide data for the FDID 
studies in this dissertation. 
6.2 FDID Metrics 
Two categories of metrics are proposed in this dissertation to detect potential FDI 
cyber-attacks on a specific branch. They are the malicious load deviation index (MLDI) 
and the branch overload risk index (BORI). MLDI can recognize load change patterns 
and identify malicious load deviation, while BORI monitors suspicious changes in 
branch flows. MLDI and BORI are metrics for determining whether a specific branch 
is an attack target. Systematic metrics and methodology are discussed in Section 6.3. 
An FDI cyber-attack alert system is also proposed in this dissertation. This system 
has four different alert levels that are defined as Danger, Warning, Monitor, and Nor-
mal. The alert level can be determined by the proposed FDID metrics. 
6.2.1 MLDI 
As described in the previous chapter, PTDF is a matrix of sensitivity factors that 
measures the incremental change in branch flow due to a change in power transferring 
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between a slack bus and a non-slack bus. Thus, given a branch, the loads that have a 
significant impact on that branch should be monitored. It would be unusual if the 
changes in all the loads that are critical to a branch k contribute to decreasing the flow 
on branch k. Therefore, based on this observation, a malicious load deviation index is 
proposed to detect potential FDI cyber-attacks. Given a branch k, 𝑀𝐿𝐷𝐼𝑘 can be calcu-
lated by (6.18), 
𝑀𝐿𝐷𝐼𝑘 = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑃𝑘−)
∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑑,𝑘𝑑∈𝐷(𝑘)
𝑁𝐷𝑘
    (6.18) 
where  
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑑,𝑘 =
{
 
 
 
 −𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑛(𝑑),𝑘)⁡⁡,⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑖𝑓
𝑃𝑑0,𝐼𝑆𝑂−𝑃𝑑−
𝑃𝑑−
≤ −5%
0⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡,⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑖𝑓 − 5% <
𝑃𝑑0,𝐼𝑆𝑂−𝑃𝑑−
𝑃𝑑−
< 5%
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑛(𝑑),𝑘)⁡⁡,⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑖𝑓⁡
𝑃𝑑0,𝐼𝑆𝑂−𝑃𝑑−
𝑃𝑑−
≥ 5%
 (6.19) 
and, 
𝑁𝐷𝑘 = ∑ 1𝑑∈𝐷(𝑘)      (6.20) 
where D(k) denotes a set of loads that are critical to branch k. If the absolute value of 
𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑛(𝑑),𝑘 is not less than 1%, then, load d is defined to be critical to branch k. 
Though 𝑀𝐿𝐷𝐼𝑘 is in the range of [-1, 1] theoretically, 𝑀𝐿𝐷𝐼𝑘 is typically close to 
zero if the load fluctuates randomly. A positive value indicates that the load change 
might reduce the flow on branch k. A very high positive value may imply the load 
fluctuation is abnormal and the probably of branch k being targeted by an FDI attack is 
high. 
Metric 𝑀𝐿𝐷𝐼𝑘 only considers the number of load buses that are critical to a branch, 
but fails to take load magnitude and PTDF values into account. To consider those two 
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factors, an enhanced malicious load deviation index (EMLDI) is proposed in this work. 
Similar to 𝑀𝐿𝐷𝐼𝑘, 𝐸𝑀𝐿𝐷𝐼𝑘 is defined by (6.21), 
𝐸𝑀𝐿𝐷𝐼𝑘 = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑃𝑘−)∑ (𝐼𝑓𝑑,𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑑,𝑘)𝑑∈𝐷(𝑘)   (6.21) 
where, 
𝐼𝑓𝑑,𝑘 =
|(𝑃𝑑0,𝐼𝑆𝑂−𝑃𝑑−)∙𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑛(𝑑),𝑘|
∑ |(𝑃𝑑0,𝐼𝑆𝑂−𝑃𝑑−)∙𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑛(𝑑),𝑘|𝑑∈𝐷(𝑘)
   (6.22) 
𝐸𝑀𝐿𝐷𝐼𝑘 shares the same range and indication with 𝑀𝐿𝐷𝐼𝑘. The difference is that 
the effects of load magnitude and PTDF values are not considered for 𝑀𝐿𝐷𝐼𝑘 but are 
captured by 𝐸𝑀𝐿𝐷𝐼𝑘. Thus, given a potential target branch k, 𝐸𝑀𝐿𝐷𝐼𝑘 may be a better 
indicator to determine whether there is an attack targeting that branch. 
The alert level criteria for 𝑀𝐿𝐷𝐼𝑘 and 𝐸𝑀𝐿𝐷𝐼𝑘 are the same and defined in Table 
6.1. With the proposed metrics and alert system, it is not very hard to identify whether 
a specified branch is under attack. As 𝐸𝑀𝐿𝐷𝐼𝑘 considers more factors than 𝑀𝐿𝐷𝐼𝑘, the 
alert level for branch k should be determined by 𝐸𝑀𝐿𝐷𝐼𝑘. In this work, 𝐴𝐿𝑀𝑘 denotes 
the alert level associated with 𝑀𝐿𝐷𝐼𝑘  while 𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑘  denotes the alert level associated 
with 𝐸𝑀𝐿𝐷𝐼𝑘. 
 
Table 6.1 Alert Level Criteria based on 𝑀𝐿𝐷𝐼𝑘 or 𝐸𝑀𝐿𝐷𝐼𝑘 
Alert level 𝑀𝐿𝐷𝐼𝑘 or 𝐸𝑀𝐿𝐷𝐼𝑘 
Danger >50% 
Warning >35% 
Monitor >20% 
Normal <20% 
 
6.2.2 BORI 
The first category of FDID metrics monitors load change and identifies potential 
attacks while the second category of FDID metrics monitors flow changes and identifies 
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potential overloads. As introduced above, in order to execute an unobservable FDI 
cyber-attack that would overload a line, the attacker needs to change the measurements 
including load measurements that are sent to the system operators. In the cyber world, 
the attacker can deliberately reduce the flow on a congested line or a heavily loaded 
line by shifting loads. This would mislead operators to believe that there is extra avail-
able capacity on the target branch; then, operators may re-dispatch generation to take 
advantage of that extra available capacity and reduce the total cost. However, in the real 
world, there is no such extra available capacity and physical overloads may occur. Thus, 
based on this type of flow change pattern, this work proposes a branch overload risk 
index to detect FDI cyber-attacks. 
Considering the attacker may or may not take the effect of generation re-dispatch 
into account, two similar but different metrics, BORI1 and BORI2, are proposed in this 
dissertation. BORI1 only considers the flow changes during the previous interval while 
BORI2 takes the SCED results into account. BORI1 and BORI2 are defined in (6.23) 
and (6.24) respectively. 
𝐵𝑂𝑅𝐼1𝑘 = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑃𝑘−)(𝑃𝑘− − 𝑃𝑘0,𝐼𝑆𝑂 + 𝑃𝑘−)/𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝐴𝑘  (6.23) 
𝐵𝑂𝑅𝐼2𝑘 = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑃𝑘−)(𝑃𝑘− − 𝑃𝑘0,𝐼𝑆𝑂 + 𝑃𝑘+,𝑆𝐶𝐸𝐷)/𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝐴𝑘 (6.24) 
A comprehensive metric 𝐵𝑂𝑅𝐼𝑘 is proposed to combine those two metrics belong-
ing to the second category of FDID metrics. As shown in (6.25), 𝐵𝑂𝑅𝐼𝑘⁡ is defined to 
be the larger between 𝐵𝑂𝑅𝐼1𝑘 and 𝐵𝑂𝑅𝐼2𝑘. 
𝐵𝑂𝑅𝐼𝑘 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝐵𝑂𝑅𝐼1𝑘, 𝐵𝑂𝑅𝐼2𝑘)    (6.25) 
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The alert level criterion for 𝐵𝑂𝑅𝐼𝑘 is defined in Table 6.2. In this work, 𝐴𝐿𝐵𝑘 de-
notes the alert level associated with 𝐵𝑂𝑅𝐼𝑘. 𝐵𝑂𝑅𝐼𝑘 and 𝐴𝐿𝐵𝑘 enable operators to de-
termine whether a branch is under attack from the viewpoint of flow violations. 
 
Table 6.2 Alert Level Criteria based on 𝐵𝑂𝑅𝐼𝑘  
Alert level 𝐵𝑂𝑅𝐼𝑘 
Danger >115% 
Warning >110% 
Monitor >105% 
Normal <105% 
 
6.3 Two-stage FDID Approach 
Metrics MLDI and BORI presented in Section 6.2 are used to detect potential FDI 
attacks on a specific branch rather than monitor the system as a whole. Thus, a system-
atic approach is desired. In this section, a two-stage FDID approach, consisting the FDI 
attack awareness stage and the target branch identification stage, is proposed to detect 
potential FDI cyber-attacks. The first stage is to determine whether the system is under 
FDI cyber-attack and the second stage would identify the target branch. 
6.3.1 Stage 1: FDI Attack Awareness 
As introduced in Section 6.2, MLDI and BORI are proposed to detect whether an 
FDI cyber-attack is launched for a specific branch. Since system operators have limited 
information regarding which branch the attacker would target, it is necessary to calcu-
late the metrics for all branches. However, given that a practical power system typically 
has a large number of branches, even random load fluctuations may cause large 𝑀𝐿𝐷𝐼𝑘, 
𝐸𝑀𝐿𝐷𝐼𝑘, and 𝐵𝑂𝑅𝐼𝑘 values for a few branches, which may mislead system operators 
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to believe that the load fluctuation is abnormal and the system is under attack. There-
fore, a system-wide malicious load deviation index (SMLDI) is proposed to resolve this 
issue. SMLDI is defined in the equation shown below, 
𝑆𝑀𝐿𝐷𝐼 =
∑ 𝑀𝐿𝐷𝐼𝑘𝑘∈𝐾𝐴
∑ 1𝑘∈𝐾𝐴
     (6.26) 
where KA is a set of ten branches that have the top ten 𝑀𝐿𝐷𝐼𝑘 values. If the number of 
load buses that have significant effects on branch k is too small, then the associated 
𝑀𝐿𝐷𝐼𝑘 cannot be used for malicious load deviation recognition and branch k will not 
be included in the set KA. In this work, branches that have less than five critical load 
buses will not be considered as a candidate element of set KA. 
In this stage, SMLDI is used as the only metric to determine whether the system is 
under attack. Similar to the alert level designed for a target line, a system-wide FDI 
alert level is defined in Table 6.3. A system would be considered to be FDI cyber-attack 
free if the associated alert level is marked as Normal or Monitor in stage 1. Only the 
cases that have either Warning or Danger alert flags will be sent to stage 2 for FDI 
target branch identification. 
 
Table 6.3 Alert Level Criteria based on 𝑆𝑀𝐿𝐷𝐼 
Alert level 𝑆𝑀𝐿𝐷𝐼 
Danger >50% 
Warning >35% 
Monitor >20% 
Normal <20% 
 
6.3.2 Stage 2: Target Branch Identification 
It is vital to determine whether the system is under malicious FDI cyber-attack in 
stage 1. It is also very important to identify which branch is the attacker’s target so that 
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system operators can take immediate actions to handle the detected FDI attack. Thus, 
the goal of stage 2 is to identify the target branch. 
As presented above, 𝐸𝑀𝐿𝐷𝐼𝑘 detects FDI attacks targeting branch k from the view-
point of suspicious load deviation while 𝐵𝑂𝑅𝐼𝑘 detects FDI attacks targeting branch k 
from the viewpoint of potential flow violation. Both of the metrics are considered in 
this stage. The alert levels associated with 𝐸𝑀𝐿𝐷𝐼𝑘 and 𝐵𝑂𝑅𝐼𝑘 can be combined into a 
single comprehensive FDI attack alert level. The combination of the two alert levels is 
defined in Table 6.4. This comprehensive alert level, denoted by 𝐴𝐿𝐶𝑘, is used as the 
alert level for identifying the target branch. 
 
Table 6.4 Comprehensive Alert Level Combined from Two Separate Alert Levels 
Alert level 
Alert level 
Normal Monitor Warning Danger 
Normal Normal Monitor Monitor Warning 
Monitor Monitor Monitor Warning Warning 
Warning Monitor Warning Warning Danger 
Danger Warning Warning Danger Danger 
 
Though the proposed alert system can provide a qualitative analysis, it is also very 
important to analyze the FDI attack quantitatively. Thus, a comprehensive FDI attack 
index (CI) that considers both load deviation patterns and potential branch overloads is 
proposed in this work. 𝐶𝐼𝑘 is defined in (6.27). Thus, the branch that has the biggest 
𝐶𝐼𝑘 is considered to be the most suspicious target branch; moreover, the 𝐶𝐼𝑘 rank can 
serve as a metric that indicates the possibility of branch k being the target branch. 
𝐶𝐼𝑘 =⁡𝐸𝑀𝐿𝐷𝐼𝑘 ⁡𝐵𝑂𝑅𝐼𝑘    (6.27) 
Therefore, the proposed comprehensive index 𝐶𝐼𝑘 and the proposed comprehen-
sive alert level 𝐴𝐿𝐶𝑘 are used to identify the target branch in stage 2. In this work, the 
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branches that are marked as Danger or have a 𝐶𝐼𝑘 ranking in the top three are consid-
ered to be the most suspicious target branches. 
6.4 Case Studies 
The IEEE 118-bus test system is used in this work to investigate the proposed 𝐵-
∆𝜃 FDI cyber-attack model presented in Section 6.1.2. Then, this test case is further 
used to examine the proposed two-stage FDID approach, as well as the proposed FDI 
cyber-attack alert system. This case contains 118 buses, 186 branches, and 19 online 
units. The initial total load at 𝑡 = −𝑇𝐸𝐷 is 4,242 MW. Out of 118 buses, 99 buses are 
load buses or have non-zero loads. 
6.4.1 FDI Results 
In this section, to study the effectiveness of the proposed 𝐵-∆𝜃 FDI cyber-attack 
model, numerical simulations are conducted with different system scenarios including 
constant load scenarios and random load fluctuation scenarios in the first dispatch in-
terval, from 𝑡 = −𝑇𝐸𝐷 to 𝑡 = 0. The effects of different load shift factors and 𝑙1-norm 
constraint limits on the physical consequences of an FDI attack are also analyzed in this 
section. 
By assuming the load profile does not change in the first dispatch interval, the max-
imum power flows on branch 111 and branch 118 with different FDI attack settings are 
presented in Fig. 6.2 and Fig. 6.3 respectively. The blue curve with diamond markers 
in Fig. 6.2 corresponds to the FDI results with a load shift factor of 5% and it becomes 
flat quickly. The reason is that the load shift constraint is binding when 𝑁1 is 6 and 
further relaxing the 𝑙1-norm constraint will not change the FDI results. 
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Fig. 6.2 Maximum Power Flow on Line 111 with Various Load Shift Factors and 𝑙1-Norm Constraint 
Limits. 
 
 
Fig. 6.3 Maximum Power Flow on Line 118 with Various Load Shift Factors and 𝑙1-Norm Constraint 
Limits. 
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Since the 𝐵-∆𝜃 FDI model proposed in this work is a fast heuristic rather than an 
exact approach, the maximum flows shown in Fig. 6.2 and Fig. 6.3 do not strictly in-
crease as the load shift factor or 𝑙1-norm constraint limit increases. However, with a 
more flexible condition, the attacker can typically cause more severe flow violations. 
In reality, loads fluctuate all the time. Thus, it is important to analyze the effects of 
random load fluctuations on FDI cyber-attacks. It is assumed that the load fluctuation 
follows the normal distribution with a mean of 𝜇 (a percentage) and a standard devia-
tion 𝜎 (a percentage), which is denoted by N(𝜇, 𝜎). The process of generating a load 
fluctuation vector following N(𝜇, 𝜎) is presented below: 
1) generate a vector 𝑣 that follows standard normal distribution, 
2) apply a cutoff value 1.96 to this vector 𝑣, 
3) adjust 𝑣 with equation: 𝑣 = 𝑣𝜎 + 𝜇, 
4) create a load fluctuation vector: ∆𝑝𝑑 = 𝑃𝑑−𝑣. 
Note that since loads do not fluctuate significantly in the short-term, step 2) ensures 
that the random load fluctuation does not have a long tail distribution. 
For the FDI simulations conducted in this section, the random load fluctuation fol-
lows N(0, 3%). For each FDI attack simulated, the load profile is updated with a differ-
ent randomly generated load fluctuation vector. The results of FDI attacks with load 
fluctuations are presented in Fig. 6.4 and Fig. 6.5. Fig. 6.4 shows the results of an FDI 
attack targeting branch 111 while Fig. 6.5 shows the results of an FDI attack targeting 
branch 118. The curves in Fig. 6.4 and Fig. 6.5 look very similar to the corresponding 
curves in Fig. 6.2 and Fig. 6.3 respectively. Random load fluctuations may either relieve 
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the violation or contribute to the violation to a limited extent. Fig. 6.4 and Fig. 6.5 show 
that an FDI cyber-attack can still result in a flow violation on the target branch even 
with random load fluctuations. 
 
 
 
Fig. 6.4 Maximum Power Flow on Line 111 with Random Load Fluctuation. 
 
 
 
Fig. 6.5 Maximum Power Flow on Line 118 with Random Load Fluctuation. 
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6.4.2 FDID Results 
Stage 1: FDI Attack Awareness 
As introduced above, the proposed FDID strategy consists of two stages. Stage 1 
determines whether the system is under an FDI cyber-attack by analyzing the load pro-
file changes. It is important to detect FDI attacks. Furthermore, it is also vital to bypass 
random load fluctuations. The goal of stage 1 is to have a low false alarm probability 
as well as a low false dismissal probability. 
Two sets of load deviation vectors, including the FDI malicious load deviation vec-
tors and random load fluctuation vectors, are tested in this stage. The load deviation 
vector denotes the difference between the loads at the beginning of the second dispatch 
interval (𝑡 = 0) and the loads profile at the beginning of the first dispatch interval (𝑡 =
−𝑇𝐸𝐷). The first set of malicious load deviation vectors can be obtained from the 160 
different FDI attacks performed in Section 6.4.1. The second set of normal load fluctu-
ation vectors is created with four different normal distributions: N(0, 3%), N(0, 5%), 
N(-1%, 3%), and N(1%, 3%). Twenty independent vectors are generated for each nor-
mal distribution. Thus, the second set has a total of 80 normal load fluctuation vectors. 
The SMLDI values for those 240 load change vectors are calculated in stage 1. The 
results for the 160 FDI malicious load deviation vectors and 80 random load fluctuation 
vectors are presented in Table 6.5 and Table 6.6 respectively. The SMLDI values for 
the random load fluctuation vectors are very small and the averages are close to zero. 
As for the FDI malicious load deviation vectors, the associated SMLDI values are much 
bigger and the average values are around 70%. This indicates that FDI cyber-attacks 
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can be successfully detected with the proposed metric SMLDI and random load fluctu-
ations can successfully bypass this two-stage FDID approach. 
Fig. 6.6 shows a scatter plot of the SMLDI values for all the random load fluctua-
tions and FDI cyber-attacks simulated in this work. The blue squares correspond to the 
random load fluctuation vectors while the red triangles correspond to the FDI malicious 
load deviation vectors. As shown in Fig. 6.6, the SMLDI values for the random load 
fluctuation vectors are all below 35% and, thus, the associated alert levels are either 
Normal or Monitor. The alert levels for most random vectors are Normal. As for the 
FDI malicious load deviation vectors, the associated SMLDI values are all above the 
warning tolerance and the alert levels for most FDI attack load deviation vectors are 
Danger. Therefore, it is demonstrated that the proposed metric SMLDI can efficiently 
detect FDI cyber-attacks and would not mistakenly identify a random load fluctuation 
as an FDI attack. In other words, the results presented in Fig. 6.6 demonstrate the pro-
posed two-stage FDID approach has a very low false alarm rate as well as a very low 
false dismissal rate. 
The first 80 system scenarios in Fig. 6.6 correspond to random load fluctuations 
with four different normal distributions. They are listed as the order of N(0, 3%), N(0, 
5%), N(-1%, 3%), and N(1%, 3%). Each normal distribution has 20 scenarios. By com-
paring the random load fluctuations generated with different normal distribution func-
tions, it is observed that the mean of load fluctuation does not affect the metric while 
higher standard deviations may result in higher SMLDI values. This is consistent with 
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the statistics presented in Table 6.6. This implies that the false alarm rate for the pro-
posed approach may increase as the magnitude of load deviation increases. It is worth 
noting that loads typically do not deviate too much in a short time frame. 
Fig. 6.7 illustrates the SMLDI values that are associated with various FDI attacks 
targeting branch 118 with random load fluctuations that follow N(0, 3%) in the first 
dispatch interval. The red dotted line is the boundary between the alert levels Monitor 
and Warning. Those SMLDI values are well above the Warning alert tolerance of 35%, 
especially for the cases that have more flexible constraints. It is very straightforward 
and efficient to identify whether the system is under malicious FDI cyber-attack with 
the proposed metric SMLDI. 
 
Table 6.5 SMLDI Values for FDI Malicious Load Deviation Vectors 
 Attack on branch 118 Attack on branch 111 
Constant load N(0, 3%) Constant load N(0, 3%) 
max 97.8% 97.8% 97.8% 97.5% 
min 48.8% 39.9% 35.7% 38.7% 
median 62.9% 68.5% 62.9% 63.8% 
average 72.1% 74.5% 68.6% 70.7% 
std 16.8% 19.0% 19.4% 20.3% 
 
Table 6.6 SMLDI Values for Random Load Fluctuation Vector 
 Normal load fluctuation only 
N(0, 3%) N(0, 5%) N(-1%, 3%) N(1%, 3%) 
max 23.1% 28.0% 23.5% 20.9% 
min 3.2% 13.8% 5.5% 7.5% 
median 11.8% 22.8% 12.0% 12.5% 
average 12.2% 21.7% 12.4% 13.2% 
std 4.4% 3.7% 4.7% 3.7% 
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Fig. 6.6 SMLDI Values for Random Load Fluctuations and FDI Cyber-Attacks. 
 
 
Fig. 6.7 SMLDI of FDI Attacks for Target Branch 118 with N(0, 3%) Random Load Fluctuation. 
 
Stage 2: Target Branch Identification 
In this stage, only the cases that are identified to be under FDI cyber-attack will be 
examined. Thus, only those 160 FDI attack scenarios are sent to the target branch iden-
tification routine. 
Table 6.7 shows the results of target line identification for FDI attacks on branch 
111 with a load shift factor of 10% and no random load fluctuations in the first dispatch 
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interval. Out of the ten system scenarios, the metric 𝐶𝐼𝑘 of branch 111 ranks first for 
the nine scenarios and ranks second for the remaining one scenario. There are eight 
scenarios for which branches marked as Danger exist; branch 111 is the only one that 
is marked as Danger for those eight scenarios. Therefore, both the proposed compre-
hensive FDID index and the proposed comprehensive alert level indicate that branch 
111 is the most suspicious target branch. Table 6.8 shows the results of target line iden-
tification for FDI attacks on branch 111 with a load shift factor of 10% and a random 
load fluctuation that follows N(0, 3%). The difference between the two sets of simula-
tions associated with Table 6.7 and Table 6.8 respectively is that the simulations corre-
sponding to Table 6.7 do not involve random load fluctuations. Therefore, the results 
shown in Table 6.8 are more realistic. However, the conclusions drawn from Table 6.8 
are similar to Table 6.7. This indicates that the proposed method is effective even when 
the normal load fluctuation is modeled. 
 
Table 6.7 Target Line Identification Results for FDI Attacks on Line 111 with a Load Shift Factor of 
10% and No Random Load Fluctuation in the First Dispatch Interval 
 𝐶𝐼111 
Rank of 
𝐶𝐼111 
𝐴𝐿𝐶111 𝐴𝐿𝐸111 𝐴𝐿𝐵111 
Number of lines 
marked Danger 
List of suspi-
cious target lines 
N1 = 1 0.46 2 Monitor Warning Normal 0 145, 111, 150 
N1 = 2 0.66 1 Warning Danger Monitor 0 111, 129, 145 
N1 = 3 0.90 1 Danger Danger Warning 1 111, 129, 181 
N1 = 4 1.13 1 Danger Danger Danger 1 111, 119, 141 
N1 = 5 1.26 1 Danger Danger Danger 1 111, 97, 141 
N1 = 6 1.30 1 Danger Danger Danger 1 111, 97, 186 
N1 = 7 1.27 1 Danger Danger Danger 1 111, 97, 186 
N1 = 8 1.27 1 Danger Danger Danger 1 111, 97, 186 
N1 = 9 1.26 1 Danger Danger Danger 1 111, 97, 186 
N1 = 10 1.26 1 Danger Danger Danger 1 111, 97, 186 
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Table 6.9 presents the FDID results on various FDI attacks. As shown in Table 6.9, 
the target branches are correctly identified for 96.9% or 155 scenarios out of the 160 
FDI cyber-attacks. The target branch is marked as Danger for over 90% of the FDI 
attacks on branch 118. The percentage of the cases that the target line for the FDI attacks 
on line 111 is marked as Danger is relatively low. The reason is that the overloads on 
line 111 for some attacks, including most FDI attacks with a load shift factor of 5%, are 
not very significant and do not reach the Warning alert threshold. However, the associ-
ated comprehensive FDI attack index 𝐶𝐼 of line 111 ranks first for most cases. For all 
FDID tests on the 160 FDI attacks, the FDID comprehensive index 𝐶𝐼 of the target line 
ranks very high and almost all of the FDID comprehensive indices rank either first or 
second. 
 
 
Table 6.8 Target Line Identification Results for FDI Attacks on Line 111 with a Load Shift Factor of 
10% and N(0, 3%) Load Random Fluctuation in the First Dispatch Interval 
 𝐶𝐼111 
Rank of 
𝐶𝐼111 
𝐴𝐿𝐶111 𝐴𝐿𝐸111 𝐴𝐿𝐵111 
Number of lines 
marked Danger 
List of suspi-
cious target lines 
N1 = 1 0.45 2 Monitor Warning Normal 0 145, 111, 150 
N1 = 2 0.68 1 Warning Danger Monitor 0 111, 129, 145 
N1 = 3 0.91 1 Danger Danger Danger 1 111, 129, 181 
N1 = 4 1.07 1 Danger Danger Danger 1 111, 119, 141 
N1 = 5 1.21 1 Danger Danger Danger 1 111, 97, 141 
N1 = 6 1.37 1 Danger Danger Danger 2 111, 97, 186 
N1 = 7 1.19 1 Danger Danger Danger 1 111, 97, 186 
N1 = 8 1.29 1 Danger Danger Danger 2 111, 97, 186 
N1 = 9 1.23 1 Danger Danger Danger 1 111, 97, 186 
N1 = 10 1.20 1 Danger Danger Danger 1 111, 97, 141 
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Table 6.9 Results of FDID on Various FDI Attacks 
 Attack on line 118 Attack on line 111 
Total Constant 
load 
N(0, 3%) 
Constant 
load 
N(0, 3%) 
Average 𝐶𝐼𝑘 rank of the target line 1.58 1.55 1.13 1.33 1.39 
Percent of scenarios for which the 
target line is identified 
92.5% 100% 100% 95.0% 96.9% 
Percent of scenarios for which the 
target line is marked as Danger 
92.5% 92.5% 65% 77.5% 81.9% 
Number of scenarios simulated 40 40 40 40 160 
 
6.5 Conclusions 
Recent work in the literature has demonstrated that power systems are subject to 
unobservable FDI cyber-attacks in real-time. Attackers can cause flow violations that 
are neither observed nor detected by conventional state estimation. Therefore, it is very 
important to develop a strategy that can quickly detect such malicious FDI cyber-at-
tacks in real-time. 
An FDI model is first proposed in this dissertation in order to examine the effects 
of FDI attacks on system reliability. Then, a two-stage strategy is proposed to detect 
FDI attacks. Two categories of metrics, MLDI and BORI, are proposed and used in this 
two-stage approach to determine whether the change in system condition is abnormal. 
MLDI recognizes malicious load changes while BORI identifies suspicious flow 
changes. In stage 1, the proposed system-wide MLDI is used to determine whether the 
system is under attack. If the system is deemed to be under attack, stage 2 will launch 
and the proposed alert system and comprehensive FDID index will be used to identify 
the attack target branch. 
Simulation results show that FDI cyber-attacks can cause physical flow violations 
and, then, demonstrates the effectiveness of the proposed FDID metrics, FDI cyber-
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attack alert system, and two-stage FDID approach. The proposed two-stage FDID ap-
proach successfully detects all 160 FDI attacks that are simulated in this work and cor-
rectly identifies the target branch for about 97% of the cases. In addition, random load 
fluctuations will not activate the FDID alert system. Numerical simulations conducted 
on 80 different random load fluctuation vectors show that none of the random load 
fluctuation scenarios are mistakenly identified as malicious load deviations. To con-
clude, normal load fluctuations will not activate the proposed FDI alert system, while 
the proposed two-stage FDID approach can efficiently detect FDI attacks and the target 
branch. In other words, the false alarm rate and false dismissal rate for the proposed 
two-stage FDID approach are very low. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
Transmission components are traditionally modeled as static assets in power sys-
tem real-time operations. Although previous studies have demonstrated transmission 
switching can provide a variety of benefits, they are based on a DC framework and are 
verified with small test systems. Directly modeling transmission switching in RTCA 
and RT SCED will cause a serious computational burden and substantially increase the 
solution time, which is impractical for real-time applications. Therefore, this disserta-
tion proposes CTS to utilize the flexibility in transmission networks in a practical way. 
The reliability benefits and economic benefits provided by CTS are investigated on 
large-scale power systems on an AC framework. The proposed CTS can reduce post-
contingency violations as an inexpensive corrective strategy and reduce congestion cost 
by relieving critical network constraints. 
If an unexpected critical contingency is not handled properly, it may result in a 
serious emergency and cause blackouts. RTCA identifies critical contingencies and the 
associated violations. With RTCA, pre-planned strategies can be made in advance to 
deal with potential critical contingencies. One widely used strategy is to re-dispatch 
generation to eliminate potential post-contingency violations. However, reliability-mo-
tivated generation re-dispatch is typically very expensive. 
In this dissertation, CTS is proposed as another technique to handle potential post-
contingency violations. Over 1.5 million contingencies are simulated on three large-
scale practical power systems (TVA, ERCOT, and PJM) to evaluate the effectiveness 
of CTS with respect to post-contingency violation reduction. Numerical simulations 
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using the full AC power flow model show that each system is subject to critical contin-
gencies and the proposed CTS algorithms can effectively reduce potential post-contin-
gency violations. For instance, the average flow violation reduction achieved with CTS 
is around 60% for the PJM system. The percent of contingencies for which the associ-
ated violations can be fully eliminated by CTS is greater than 25% while the percent of 
contingencies where there is no beneficial CTS solution is less than 10%. 
It is verified that CTS can provide operators with an alternative corrective strategy 
to relieve both flow violations and voltage violations caused by critical contingencies. 
Multiple beneficial switching actions are available, which provide operators with 
choices. Substantial post-contingency violation reduction can be achieved with the pro-
posed heuristic algorithms that can achieve very similar results with complete enumer-
ation but are much faster. Parallel computing can further reduce the solution time. Pa-
reto improvement is proposed to investigate the impact of CTS on individual element. 
The benefits achieved with and without enforcing Pareto improvement are very similar; 
in other words, most identified CTS solutions can reduce post-contingency violations 
at an aggregate level while creating no additional violations on any individual element. 
Incorporating CTS in RTCA can substantially improve system reliability. In exist-
ing EMS, RTCA provides RT SCED with a list of network constraints. As CTS can 
efficiently reduce or even eliminate post-contingency violations, the network con-
straints sent to RT SCED can be relaxed, which reduce the need for reliability-moti-
vated generation re-dispatch. Simulation results on the Cascadia system illustrate sig-
nificant (about 90%) cost reduction can be achieved when modeling CTS in RT SCED. 
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Two procedures are proposed in this dissertation to connect RTCA and RT SCED. 
Procedure-A represents the traditional procedure used in industry. In Procedure-A, the 
potential post-contingency violations are sent to RT SCED, as well as the actual base-
case violations. RT SCED determines the optimal dispatch solution that has the least 
cost while all violations are eliminated and reliability requirements are met. Although 
the solution provided by RT SCED is on a DC model basis, it is fully evaluated on an 
AC framework and the effectiveness of Procedure-A is demonstrated. Multiple SCED 
models with different forms of network constraints are investigated and the hot-start 
PTDF model based SCED is shown to have the best performance. 
Procedure-B, an enhanced version of Procedure-A, is proposed to integrate CTS 
into existing real-time operational modules in EMS. Procedure-B can capture the reli-
ability benefits of CTS in RT SCED. With the proposed concept of pseudo limit, the 
transition from Procedure-A to more advanced Procedure-B requires minimal change, 
which is the replacement of actual limits with pseudo limits for the contingency-case 
network constraints in RT SCED. Numerical simulations show that substantial conges-
tion cost reduction can be achieved by considering CTS in RT SCED; The beneficial 
CTS actions identified in the pre-SCED stage can also reduce the violations caused by 
the same contingency in the post-SCED stage even if the system condition may have 
changed significantly. 
Full utilization of the network flexibility could benefit power systems significantly. 
Transmission switching has gained ISOs’ considerable attention in various areas in 
power systems since CTS can add flexibility in power system real-time operations. The 
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cost to implement CTS is low since the required hardware is already available in the 
field of existing power systems. In this dissertation, it is demonstrated that CTS is able 
to provide reliability benefits in regard to post-contingency violation reduction as well 
as economic benefits with respect to congestion cost reduction. Moreover, the proposed 
mechanism of integrating CTS into EMS including RTCA and RT SCED will require 
minimal change; in other words, CTS can be considered as an add-on module for exist-
ing EMS. Thus, with the proposed mechanism, it is not very difficult for the industry 
to adopt CTS for real-time operations. 
The traditional bad data detection function of state estimation can effectively iden-
tify large measurement errors and outliers that would dramatically drift the estimated 
system status away from the actual system status. It ensures the impact of random meas-
urement noises on state estimation is minimal. However, malicious FDI cyber-attacks 
can inject false measurements that are designed to meet the physical laws and bypass 
bad data detection. Thus, state estimation under FDI attack would provide an inaccurate 
base case for other EMS applications. This would mislead system operators to adjust 
the generation improperly, which may cause unobservable flow violations. Numerical 
simulations show that FDI cyber-attacks can cause severe flow violations in real-time. 
Therefore, it is very important to identify FDI cyber-attack effectively. 
Several metrics are proposed to monitor abnormal load deviations and flow 
changes. An FDI cyber-attack alert system is proposed to identify FDI attacks. It is very 
unlikely that a system is under FDI attack if the corresponding alert level is marked as 
Normal or Monitor. However, the system can be considered to be under FDI attack 
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when the alert flag is marked as Warning or Danger. Based on the proposed metrics 
and alert system, a systematic two-stage FDID approach is proposed to detect malicious 
FDI cyber-attacks. The first stage determines whether a system is under attack. For the 
cases that are deemed to be under attack, they will be sent to the target branch identifi-
cation routine in the second stage. Case studies demonstrate the effectiveness of the 
proposed two-stage FDID approach. The proposed approach successfully detects all 
160 FDI attacks and identifies the target correctly for about 97% of the cases. The false 
alarm rate is zero as none of the normal load fluctuations activate the proposed alert 
system. 
In conclusion, this dissertation proposes a two-stage FDID approach that can ef-
fectively detect FDI cyber-attacks and secure state estimation. After state estimation 
determines the system status in real-time, RTCA would execute and identify the poten-
tial network violations that would be converted into network constraints for RT SCED. 
Traditional RTCA and RT SCED treat the transmission network as a static network and 
are not able to capture the flexibility in the transmission network. In this dissertation, 
corrective transmission switching is proposed to enable operators to utilize the flexibil-
ity in the transmission network. Incorporating CTS into RTCA and RT SCED can en-
hance system reliability and reduce the total cost. The proposed approaches are demon-
strated with the cases that are tested in this dissertation, while it is worth noting that 
they can be applied to other systems as well. 
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8. FUTURE WORK 
The effects of CTS on RTCA and RT SCED are examined in this dissertation. 
Heuristics are proposed to create the ranked switching list and identify the beneficial 
switching solutions in real-time. Case studies show that CTS can efficiently reduce 
post-contingency violations. With the reliability benefits provided by CTS, higher lim-
its are available for contingency-case network constraints in RT SCED, which substan-
tially reduce congestion cost. 
The reliability benefits of employing CTS in RTCA are tested on the TVA, ER-
COT, and PJM systems. Numerical simulations verify the effectiveness of CTS. The 
results are promising and convincing as the test cases are large-scale practical power 
systems with real EMS data. The proposed heuristics that can quickly identify benefi-
cial switching solutions include two vicinity-based local search algorithms (CBCE and 
CBVE) and two different data mining methods (RDM and EDM). In addition, sensitiv-
ity factors, mainly LODF, may be a good indicator to identify the beneficial CTS solu-
tions for flow violation reduction. Thus, potential future work is to investigate LODF 
based heuristic algorithm for identifying the candidate CTS list. Since NERC requires 
power systems to be N-1 reliable, another potential future work is to ensure the system 
is N-1 reliable in the post-switching situation. 
With the availability of CTS as a corrective control scheme, higher short-term 
branch limits can be used in RT SCED, which reduces congestion cost significantly. 
Numerical simulations on the Cascadia system demonstrate the effectiveness of CTS in 
terms of congestion cost reduction. Though RT SCED is based on DC power flow 
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model, AC feasibility of the RT SCED solutions is verified by performing AC power 
flow, AC contingency analysis, and AC transmission switching simulations in the post-
SCED stage. This work is tested on the Cascadia system, which is an artificial 179-bus 
system. Therefore, in order to demonstrate the robustness and effectiveness of the pro-
posed strategy for integrating CTS into RT SCED, potential future work is to investi-
gate this strategy on large-scale realistic power systems. 
False data injection cyber-attacks can compromise measurements that are sent to 
the control center and result in biased state estimation solutions. This could further mis-
lead operators to take improper adjustments and cause physical flow violations, which 
would jeopardize system security. Thus, it is key to detecting FDI cyber-attacks effi-
ciently. This dissertation implements an FDI heuristic method to show the physical 
consequences of an FDI attack and proposes a two-stage FDID approach to identify 
potential FDI attacks. Case studies demonstrate that FDI attack can overload the target 
branch and that the proposed FDID approach can efficiently detect FDI attacks. It is 
worth noting that: 1) the simplified DC model is used rather than the full AC model; 2) 
it is assumed that attackers have access to the entire system; and 3) the test case is the 
IEEE 118-bus system that is small-scale and artificial. Therefore, future work may ex-
tend this work to AC framework with a more realistic assumption that attackers have 
limited access to only a single area rather than access to the entire system; numerical 
simulations on large-scale practical power systems are also desired. 
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